The Philosophical Work of Rudolf Allers: A Selection

EDITED BY JESSE A. MANN
WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY
JAMES COLLINS
AND A FOREWORD BY
REV. BRIAN A. MCGRATH, S.J.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editor of this volume wishes to express his gratitude to Professor James Collins for writing his essay on Rudolf Allers with the needs of this volume in mind, and for suggesting the inclusion of major portions of the long article by Allers entitled "Microcosmus." As a result the reader will be able to integrate Professor Collins' insights on the method of Allers with a superb example of that method.

Dr. Ulrich S. Allers, son of Rudolf Allers and Associate Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University offered valued counsel as a result of his own intimate knowledge of his father's immensely productive scholarship. Dr. Wilfrid Desan, Thomas P. McTighe and Louis Dupre likewise offered suggestions during the course of the editing. Gratitude is hereby expressed to them all. Responsibility, of course, for the limitations of the volume, is due not to them but to the editor alone. An attempt was made to select a few typical articles from Allers' publications. These publications are about six hundred in total number. The difficulty of giving a representative selection of such an enormous output in so modest a volume is obvious.

Much of the proof reading was done by Mrs. Helen K. Owens, a former student of Rudolf Allers and by Mr. Raymond Herbenick, a graduate fellow in philosophy at Georgetown. The Secretary of the Philosophy Department, Mrs. Alneator Gilliam assisted in the typing of the manuscript and in many other ways.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the editors and the publishers of *Franciscan Studies, The New Scholasticism, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, The Review of Metaphysics* and *Traditio* for their kind permission to reproduce the articles of this collection in memory of Professor Rudolf Allers. Specific and detailed references are to be found in the Bibliography.

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FOREWORD

A University is honored by the dedication and creativity of its faculty. The career of Professor Rudolf A. Allers, as Professor of Medicine and Professor of Philosophy, exemplifies the resourcefulness and commitment that has enhanced university education here and abroad, and reflects the great contributions that have been made by European scholars who, in the pursuit of truth and freedom, have sacrificed a career in one nation and shared it with another.

To his students Professor Allers was the scholar and gentleman. Quick, erudite, open, he valued the questioning mind, the new insights while he cherished the best of the ancient and medieval traditions; he was also patient but demanding, stirring and encouraging, attentive to both the novice and the candidate. With his colleagues he was generous and cooperative without cant or pretense. He could not be categorized because he was never bound in a narrow system. Plato and Aristotle, Thomas and Kant, Marx, Russell and Whitehead were respected for their contributions. He felt free to agree or disagree with their solutions as he explored reality in his search for truth.

It has been customary to mark the completion of such a career by a Festschrift. The present volume is an exception. Over the years as he served three universities on two continents, Dr. Rudolf Allers has published a number of articles that reveal the range and distinction of his career. To make these more readily available to his friends and students and to pay homage to a revered scholar this volume presents a selection from his many articles.

Dr. Jesse Mann of the Philosophy Department has been responsible for the editorial work of this volume. Dr. Thomas McTighe, Dr. Louis Dupre, Dr. Wilfrid Desan and Dr. Ulrich Allers have assisted him in the selection.

The death of Professor Allers in his eightieth year has delayed the publication but has allowed us to reprint the tribute paid by Dr. Collins, a distinguished scholar and former student of Professor Allers.

Brian A. McGrath, S.J.,
Academic Vice President
Georgetown University
October, 1965

THE WORK OF RUDOLF ALLERS

By James Collins

When Rudolf Allers was once asked to contribute to a collection of autobiographical essays, he agreed to do so only with a certain reluctance and with the understanding that he would concentrate mainly upon his work and not upon his life's happenings. "The message that one has to convey, the view to suggest, the position to defend, they are all in the work. The work alone counts. It is the fruit by which we shall be known." [1] This response was dictated by his firm conviction that we cannot profit very much from the sheer recital of a man's course of life but must always view it in relation to the goals of his striving, the standards of rigor which he accepts, and the actual content and quality of his achievements for the human community. For these goals, standards, and attained results constitute not only the measure of a man's life but also the basis for communicating the significance of his development to other men. We cannot strictly imitate the inalienably personal aspects of someone else's life, and yet we can draw some guidance and encouragement from the methods which he follows and the ideals he acknowledges. Hence it was characteristic of Allers to direct us toward his work rather than his person. This was no mere conventional gesture of modesty, since it arose from his deeply ingrained spirit of objectivity. His was not a mindless and depersonalizing objectivity: it was an attitude of intense personal dedication, year in and year out, to that sector of the common tasks of men in this world for which he acknowledged a responsibility.

1. The Academic Man

Born in Vienna in 1883, Allers had the good fortune of sharing in a home life which combined scientific and humanistic interests in an unusually broad range. His father being a physician, it was almost inevitable that he himself should study medicine at the University of Vienna. He was a member of the last class taught in the Medical School there by Sigmund Freud, toward whose method and theories he eventually took an independent critical stand. After receiving his M.D. degree in 1906, he made the extra effort to combine his hospital internship with practical work in a chemical laboratory. Allers credited his training in biochemistry with giving him some control over the techniques required for his later experimental work in neurophysiology and perception. It also made him familiar at first hand with several modes of the

[1] *The Book of Catholic Authors,* ed. W. Romig, 4th series (Grosse Pointe, Michigan, 1948) p. 18. This is an autobiographical statement by Allers.

scientific method, thus furnishing a basis for estimating its power and its limits in application to man.

This combination of laboratory and clinical components colored his interest in the relatively new field of psychiatry and his estimation of the work of Freud, who was striving to combine the positivistic and the distinctively psychological interpretations of man. From 1908 onwards, Allers specialized in psychiatry, working as an assistant in the clinics for mental diseases at the German University in Prague and then at Munich. In 1913, he became an instructor in psychiatry in the Medical School of the University of Munich, but his teaching activity was interrupted by World War I. His service in the surgeons' corps of the Austrian Army enabled him to perfect several surgical procedures and brought him some decorations. This wartime experience also broadened his horizons on the various types of men, the importance of linguistic and cultural differences, and the revelatory effect of situations of stress.

During the difficult two decades from 1918 to 1938, Allers served in the Medical School of the University of Vienna, working first in the department of sense physiology and medical psychology and then (from 1927) in that of psychiatry. He was able to blend teaching with laboratory research and a private practice. It was always against this complex background of teaching-research-therapy that he viewed the several schools of psychiatry which acknowledged Vienna as their radiating center. He became increasingly aware that the psychiatric interpretations and methods were raising very general questions about man, and that the positions to which they led were laden with philosophical and religious implications. His clinical work, his private practice, and his personal reflections worked convergently to convince him of the need to examine the philosophical issues formally and at length.

At this crucial point in his development, Allers received encouragement and practical advice from a friend and kindred mind, Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M., himself a psychologist and rector of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan. He agreed that it would be fruitful for Allers to broaden his inquiries to include a philosophical analysis of man in the spirit of the Christian philosophical traditions. After pursuing his philosophical studies at Milan, Allers received the doctoral degree in philosophy there in 1934. His "return to school" enabled him not only to deepen his acquaintance with the Greek and modern philosophical treatments of man but also to increase his intense interest in what the medievals had to say about man and his functions in the universe. He felt that the developing European groundswell of studies in medieval philosophy would be seriously imbalanced, were it to overlook the rich materials provided by every medieval century on man's cosmic, ethical, and religious aspects.

Similarly, it seemed to him that Max Scheler's ideal of a philosophical anthropology could be realized within a contemporary context, without becoming sidetracked in Scheler's special brand of evolutionary pantheism.

Allers looked to the philosophy of man as the decisive context within which to integrate his psychiatric work, his historical investigations, and his growing concern with the development of moral character. This program, already outlined in his 1929 book on the growth of the ethical person (*Das Werden der sittlichen Person*), was to occupy him fully during the next three decades of strenuous study, teaching, and writing.

In 1908, Allers had married Carola Meitner whose sister, Dr. Lise Meitner, did basic research with Otto Hahn on atomic fission. Many visitors were received in the Allers home in Vienna during the nineteen-thirties, due to the growing reputation won by his publications and the many lectures he delivered at various European universities. One such visitor was Edith Stein, the phenomenologist who later went on to become a Discalced Carmelite and a victim at Auschwitz. She shared with Mrs. Allers a special interest in women's education, and with Dr. Allers a desire to combine the best in medieval philosophy with the best in contemporary thought. They also shared the common problem of how to translate St. Thomas Aquinas into flowing yet accurate German. During her first visit to Vienna, Edith Stein remained immured in the Allers home for the sake of scholarly labor and conversation, except for a lecture and a last-minute tour around the city with Mrs. Allers.[2]

Another caller was Francis Braceland, M.D., who went abroad in 1934-35 as a Rockefeller Fellow in psychiatry and who subsequently became the psychiatrist-in-chief of the Institute of Living (Hartford, Connecticut). He was impressed not only by Allers' current work in psychology but also by his broad humanistic grasp of history and languages, mathematics and music. That Allers could match the seriousness of his dedication to projects at hand with a healthy sense of everyday reality and a playful humor, comes out in one of Braceland's reminiscences of a visit made at this time. "I remember that he explained to me that Mrs. Allers would be late coming downstairs to tea and he pointed to a series of books which he said he wrote while he was waiting for Mrs. Allers, that he had learned early in his married life that his wife would always be twenty minutes late. This is a little aside which, I suppose, is just human."[3] In fact, a saving lightness of touch characterized Allers' attituude toward his own condition at all times, enabling him to survive with fortitude and grace the severe changes which were coming into his life.

The Hitler policies gradually made his situation in Austria unbearable. Fortunately, Braceland took the initiative in interesting the procurator and rector of The Catholic University of America in the possibility of obtaining Allers for that institution. Fr. Ignatius Smith, O.P., dean of the School of Philosophy there, entered into negotiations with Allers in the summer of 1937, bringing him and his family to America in 1938 in time to teach the spring

[2] H. Graef, *The Scholar and the Cross* (Westminster, 1955) p. 66, quoting a letter from Allers to Graef.

[3] Letter of F. Braceland to James Collins, March 30, 1964.

semester. As professor of psychology in the School of Philosophy, Allers entered upon a new scene of academic life with great vigor. Although he had left behind in Austria all his worldly possessions and library, he aimed at contributing as much as possible to American intellectual life. He had already written in English a short survey of *The New Psychologies* (1932), and after his arrival here he worked constantly at improving his spoken English. He good-humoredly charged a few of his students with the responsibility of helping him correct at least one point in pronunciation per day, on the basis of his lectures.

The change to America was made while Allers was at the height of his powers, and it only seemed to give them a new spur. Almost without pause, he began attending the meetings of the associations in psychology and philosophy, contributing to the professional journals, and making himself available for consultation on moral and educational problems from the psychiatric viewpoint. The center of his activities, however, was his university lecture hall and seminar room. He quietly developed a remarkable cycle of year-long graduate courses dealing with the cognitive functions, the emotions, character, and philosophical anthropology. The doctoral dissertations done under his direction reflected various facets of the problems which were brought up in these courses. Allers' scholarship and bold mastery of his field made a deep impact upon his students, whether or not they eventually did their major work in the field of psychology and the philosophy of man.

After teaching for a decade at Catholic University, Allers had to take into account the likelihood of his having several more years of academic activity ahead, which would bring him beyond the age of mandatory retirement. In 1948, therefore, he transferred to Georgetown University as professor of philosophy. There, he continued to unfold his philosophical interests to the benefit of his students. He used some courses in the history of philosophy to develop his theory that there is much more continuity between the medieval and the modern worlds than is suspected. He sought to show this continuity of themes in his own field of the theory of man rather than in the usual areas in metaphysics. A flexible teaching program also enabled him to explore such problems as the internal consistency of the schizophrenic's universe, the bases of political assent, and the psychology of communication. It was during the Georgetown years, also, that Allers was able to bring to focus his lifelong concern with phenomenology and existentialism, especially as related to psychiatry. He continued to receive students in private quarters at his son's home in Falls Church, Va., even after he became professor emeritus in 1957.

During his final decade, Allers' achievements received wide recognition. In the spring of 1955, he served as a Fulbright lecturer at the Universities in Paris and Toulouse, Geneva and Vienna. And with the aid of a Guggenheim grant he was able to spend the fall term of 1958-59 in Paris, where he engaged in an extensive comparative study of the political attitudes prevailing in

Europe and America. The years 1959-60 were particularly fruitful for him, despite the heart trouble which was slowing him down. At the Brooklyn College meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1959, he gave the presidential address on the problem of the subjective and the objective. During the same year, he served as distinguished visiting professor at the Institute of Living, where he delivered a series of lectures on the relations between existentialism and psychiatry. Then, at the 1960 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in St. Louis, the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal was given to Allers as an appreciation of his scholarly work. In his presentation address upon that occasion, Bishop Joseph Marling of Jefferson City referred to his former teaching colleague as "one who is by nature a determined pursuer of the truth and an ardent lover of wisdom." [4] These same qualities of mind and spirit were acknowledged in the honorary LL.D. degree conferred upon him by Georgetown University in the same year. Allers continued to keep abreast of scholarly work being done in psychiatry and philosophy and to write pointed book reviews almost until the end, which came on December 18, 1963.

2. The Teacher

The most elusive part of any scholar's activity is that upon which he spends so much time and concern: his teaching. His students are unable to grasp its full significance while they are in course, and then in later life the memory of it grows hazy and difficult to communicate to others. Nevertheless, I would like to attempt here a halting description of the manner and quality of Allers' teaching, because it constitutes a large part of his work and influence. I had the good fortune of attending his three year-long courses at Catholic University during the years 1941-44, and thus I incurred a large debt to him as a teacher. These imperfect impressions are intended to discharge this debt in part and, in doing so, perhaps to make us more mindful of the traits which go toward making an eminent teacher of philosophy.

Due to a highly developed memory and a delicate sense of proportion, Allers was able to present his materials in a steady thematic development without relying upon written notes, even when he made verbatim quotations from the sources. He gave one the impression of being totally and passionately involved in the topic under discussion, which he examined in an orderly fashion and yet with a sustained intellectual enthusiasm that was highly infectious among his students. They felt a special demanding quality about his lectures, which asked more rather than less of them if they were to appreciate what was going on. Allers did not have to preach about the integration of disciplines in the liberative mind, since his own example was

[4] J. Marling, "Rudolf Allers: A Citation," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XXXIV (1960) 11.

there to observe and profit by. The act of teaching was for him a way of achieving, and encouraging others to achieve, a pertinent unification of the scientific and humanistic, historical and reflective, modes of human experience. The practical-exemplar character of this way of teaching was all the more effective for the fact that it never became divorced from the actual treatment of the problems at hand.

The basic orientation in each problem was usually made in a polar form, through a careful presentation of some classical philosophical position and then a report on the relevant experimental findings made in psychology, with emphasis upon the German laboratory background and psychiatric schools. Once the outlines of the issue were sketched, Allers would then begin the deliberate process of showing how much more complicated the matter really was than one might suspect from the preliminary scouting expedition. On the philosophical side, he would move on from the classical ground in Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, into a broad range of medieval and modern sources which suggest other difficulties and other insights. He delighted in quoting a passage from St. Anselm or Hugh of St. Victor in order to bring out another view on the nature of mind and sensation, and thus also to convey the lively diversity among the medieval minds. Then, he would ponder in visible difficulty over a countersuggestion from Leibniz, or cut off all routes whereby his students might try to evade Kant's arguments on the paralogisms in rational psychology, or else ask himself aloud what Bergson could possibly mean by a nobly evocative phrase on spirit and freedom.

A subsequent lecture or two would be devoted to describing how far psychology had come from its beginnings in Wundt and what the present state of the particular question was among American psychologists, with appropriate references to recent meetings and published papers. Whenever the opportunity arose of showing the philosophical implications of experimental work, such as in the case of Kurt Goldstein's William James Lectures on the organism, Allers was quick to take advantage of it for the sake of interlacing the scientific and the philosophical approaches to man. Knowing the value of testimony based upon one's own work, he would also cite his clinical and laboratory studies which inclined him to accept a particular explanation. And as he went along, he would point out instances where he was in the process of revising some position which he previously held on the relation between instinct and reflex, or between dread and motor activity. It did not take his students too long to realize that there was a recurrent pattern in Allers' treatment of topics, and that its purpose was not only to enable him to treat the questions with some adequacy but also to show his class in a concrete manner what methods are advisable for the inquiring philosopher to employ.

Toward the end of the lectures allotted to a given topic, a subtle transformation would occur in his approach. He would begin quoting passages from his

favorite poet Goethe on the meaning of ripeness, or would suggest that anyone interested in alienation should spend a season in Arthur Rimbaud's hell of the soul. The Greek myths would be brought to life again as projections of human mediations on the intermingling of happiness and insecurity in our life, and further confirmation would be sought in a Cezanne painting or a short story by Hugo von Hofmannsthal. The wisdom of the Allers cat might be balanced against the involuted structure of Bach's last fugue, and Toynbee's generalizations might be made to pass the scrutiny of von Ranke's observation of men. Nor was the religious witness to the spirit of man left in silence, especially when it could be taken from the penetrating and humane reflections of Teresa of Avila and Francis de Sales.

As Allers went along in this vein, it began to dawn upon his students that they also must become critical of the narrow technological image of man, that they must become actively discontented with the purely professional treatment of man in psychology and philosophy, and that they were being invited to make good and pertinent use of their humanistic studies and religious convictions. Allers was showing them a way of broadening the context of the philosophy of man by consulting the artists and historians and saints for their distinctive understanding of man. The concretizing of the philosophy of man thus passed from being a matter for abstract harangue to a process which was going on within the actual teaching and learning situation, transpiring within this particular course of study.

A similar policy of making his point by carrying out the process, rather than by discoursing about how fine it would be to do such a thing, was followed by Allers on the relationship between teaching and research. He did not spend valuable time in advocating their mutual compatibility and enrichment, but he did enrich his teaching through his research—and made it clear to his students that their responsibility was not to argue a case for it but to achieve their own analogous form of enrichment through their personal research and teaching efforts. What made the course in philosophical anthropology so memorable, for instance, was the sense of sharing very closely in Allers' research on the theme of man the microcosm, of following along the trail as he suddenly found more meaning than was anticipated in a text, or as he reluctantly admitted that a promising lead had petered out in his hands.

When this particular research was published subsequently as an article in *Traditio,* there was a fascinating opportunity for his students to compare the finished piece of scholarship with their remembrance of the work in the making.[5] With such an example before them, they could only agree that the real problem in the research-and-teaching discussion was not to torture themselves in an exquisitely quietistic way about the abstract realtionship but to get on with a little solid research activity of their own. In the concrete order,

[5] R. Allers, "Microcosmos," *Traditio,* II (1944) 319-407.

it hardly seemed worth worrying about whether research, carried on in a philosophical spirit, would ever constitute a genuine obstacle to teaching.

Another one of Allers' teaching aims was to make his students aware of relatively new problems and of why they have arisen in the philosophy of man. It may be useful to describe his classroom procedure in the specific instance of the problem of intersubjective knowledge. (I draw this illustration from my class notes for his Fall 1943 course, although I realize how dubious a source the student notebook may be.) He introduced the theme by drawing quite a stark contrast between the almost total silence on it among pre-modern philosophers and its over-bearing prominence in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations,* the French version of which was then being passed around among the students. It seemed unlikely, however, that the earlier philosophers were completely untroubled by the problem of intersubjectivity. Allers observed that an oblique approach was taken to it by the Stoics, not at the level of the individual ego but at that of the world community of men. They were uneasy about how to account for a growing sense of unity among men, but they sought a solution in metaphysical and cosmological terms by appealing to a common link of spirit, which unites men with each other and with the rest of the cosmos. This theory of spirit cannot be dismissed hastily with the remark that it is only a subtle material force, since its significance for us lies not so much in the content as in the functional reason for propounding the theory. Allers' point was that the Stoics used the concept of spirit as a metaphysical basis for their affirmation of a connective sympathy among men. Thereby, he sought to show that the question of intersubjectivity has some analogical levels and is rooted in some permanent human concerns. It underlies both our ordinary and our philosophical talk about human nature, and is even one way of accounting for the recurrent interest which philosophers take in the universals.

Allers' next step was to achieve proper focus for his approach by distinguishing between the epistemological and the psychological ways of treating the knowledge of other selves. This knowledge was rendered problematic in the epistemological theories of Descartes and Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley, who then called for such solutions as were derivable from their respective conceptions of human knowledge. Allers made a special effort to show why intersubjectivity became so acute an issue in Husserl, who wanted to retain both the individual egological principles and the transcendental reduction, both the reality of co-constituted history and the primacy of the transcendental source of meaning. After making his students feel quite perceptibly the Husserlian predicament, Allers then achieved a detente by observing that nevertheless people do continue to fall in love, to agree and disagree heartily with each other, and to feel the surge of communal purposes and cross-purposes within themselves. This actual presence of intersubjective reality does not render the epistemological and reductional inquiries superfluous, but it does suggest that

they are incomplete and that the philosopher of man must reflect upon the other human resources involved in establishing and maintaining community relationships. In this inductive way, it was made clear that there is room for a distinctive psychological treatment of the whole matter. Allers was tireless in stressing the need for a distinctive psychological method of treating the problems of man: *Psychologica psychologice traduntur.*

In discussing selected psychological theories, Allers was careful to avoid any semblance of making an exhaustive canvass or of setting up a comprehensive basis for all theories. By treating his sources as variant developments of the inquiry rather than as rigid alternatives, he fostered this attitude in his students: "Let us see what intelligent men have actually said about the issue, and let us avoid any artificial schematizing and closure." From the eighteenth century, he chose to deal with Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiment as a ground for intersubjective knowledge. Smith made the classical suggestion that one comes to know a mode of another man's being through the process of imitation of motor phenomena, recognition of the feeling aroused in oneself by the imitative behavior, and then inference to the presence of a similar state in the other person. Allers livened the case for this view by reminding his class of how spectators lean with the tightrope walker and help the golfer's putt along with a little body English of their own.

Then he began the patient work of criticizing this imitative-inferential theory. He called attention to its limited scope, since it presupposes the known existence of other persons and confines itself to accounting for the feeling exhibitable through motor phenomena. More generally, he raised the question of whether we men really do use such complicated reasoning to attain the knowledge in the first instance, or whether it is only appealed to in a retrospective attempt at explanation. Our ordinary talk about seeing the man's anger or the surprise in his eyes suggests a more direct act of recognition, correlated with the incarnate quality of the emotion itself. On this score, Allers felt it appropriate to cite the humanistic testimony of Vergil's fourth *Eclogue,* where the child is asked to learn to know its mother in her smile. There is some discernment of another person's reality and attitude quite apart from the machinery of imitation and inference, and perhaps as a condition even for coming to know oneself as a self.

Aided by this carefully developed transition, Allers then made his way into Theodor Lipps's theory of empathy and Max Scheler's work on sympathy. He brought out the significant fact that Lipps originally proposed his notion of empathy in connection with esthetic appreciation. Our attitudes differ when we are in a Byzantine structure combining sublimity with containment, and when we are in a Gothic cathedral. In the Byzantine church the predominant feeling is one of awed serenity in the presence of majesty and power. In the cathedral of Wurtemberg, however, the structural form aims at a convergence

in invisible heights, arousing a feeling of movement from below upwards in a vertical infinity, a striving toward the mystery of God.

After letting these modes of esthetic and religious communication sink home, Allers then asked how we make the transfer from a relationship to works of art to direct human interrelationships. The problem is complicated by the need to recognize a distinctively human configuration, by the judgment differentiating between an appreciation of an artifact and an interpersonal experience which involves more than my own esthetic state, and by the factor of reciprocal acknowledgment between persons. Scheler's account of sympathy was intended precisely to take account of these differences and thus to restore the primacy to interhuman relations. Allers probe into Scheler's remarks on the perspicacity of lovers, their recognition of active potentialities in the beloved, and the real anteriority of one's ordination toward other men to any introspective attitude and any egocentric isolation.

The entire topic was rounded off with a lecture on some further avenues for investigation. Allers recalled clinical cases of melancholia where a startling depersonalization occurred, not only with respect to the individual's own being but also with respect to the other people with whom he stood related. Due to a failure of love, there is often a rapid deterioriation of the awareness of difference between humans and other beings within the field of the melancholic subject's activity. Although Allers agreed with Gabriel Marcel that the disposition toward depersonalization is induced by living within a technological civilization, he also indicated that the individual falls in with an *exclusively* reifying and technological appraisal of himself and other men in consequence of a failure to maintain the human minimum of love. Sartre simply spells out the consequence of trying to work out a societal relationship on a purely functional and aggressive footing.

Allers then threw out the suggestion that perhaps the latent medieval contribution to the question of intersubjectivity lies in the volitional and emotive order rather than in the cognitive. Philosophers of man may have to look for the pertinent materials in a source which they usually dismiss as being too vague and effusive: the religious conception of love as an ecstatic movement, a free going out from oneself to the other as other, and a realizing of one's selfhood in the life of interchange between persons. As a sort of footnote, he added that neither he nor Edith Stein could fully accept Scheler's view of sympathy, despite its strong features, because it regarded the shared life among selves as a sort of impersonal element rather than as a reality constituted by, and consisting in, the personal acts themselves.

In developing the several main topics of a course in accord with this pattern, Allers was at the same time defining the areas of responsibility for his students and suggesting lines of research for them to follow. He had a tacit understanding with them that they could either submit a paper upon which he would make only a few written comments or else join with him in the weekly

evening seminars. Those who were adventuresome enough to make the latter choice found the going very rough, very stimulating, and (at least as seen in retrospect) supremely rewarding for their own development.

The members of the seminar were graduate students in psychology and philosophy, joined at various times by visitors to Washington. Each student had to prepare a paper dealing with some aspect of a topic under consideration in that year's course, although considerable leeway was allowed. But his main education came not so much from the research which went into his paper as from his actual participation in the seminar meetings. As the proceedings unfolded, he might find that his own general subject was being treated by another participant from quite a different standpoint, and that he was going to be required to understand the differences and make some sensible comments on the other presentation. The opportunities for discussion were many, in view of the fact that some people were working out of the current periodical literature and experiments in psychology, some were delving into this or that theory in the history of philosophy, and still others were struggling with contemporary philosophical theories.

The latter path was particularly difficult and yet exciting to follow, at least as far as the wartime conditions permitted. It was in this seminar that the members were first introduced to the 1936 version of Husserl's *Krisis* article and required to ponder over his removal of the sediment from the modern scientific view of nature. One memorable evening, Edith Stein's concept of the community was discussed against the background awareness of her impending personal fate. On this occasion, Mrs. Allers was in attendance and added a few words of clarification and elaboration to the paper. It was here, also, that the students learned to foreswear the easy global assertion about the existentialists and get down to a textual study of such particular works as were then already published. They also made their first acquaintance with Nicolai Hartmann and the French spiritual philosophers, Blondel and Lavelle and Le Senne, through research submitted on their views of knowledge and value. The opposite end of the philosophical compass was also represented in strenuous discussion of Ayer's as yet unrevised version of the verification principle, as well as in a precise analysis of Bridgman's theory of operational meaning. And sometimes an evening was devoted unexpectedly to a postmortem discussion of some notable local event, such as the meeting of the Congress on Esthetics at which both Jacques and Raissa Maritain had delivered papers on esthetic intuition in its theory and practice. It was not difficult to recover the threads of the seminar thereafter, when Allers made his own observations on esthetic meaning and called attention to Ernst Cassirer's key notion of symbolic forms.

Allers had several functions at the seminar. Lest the particular topic for the evening be introduced too abruptly, he usually provided some background ideas, relating it both to the work going on in the lecture room and to philo-

sophical theories with which the students were already familiar. As the paper of the evening was presented, Allers took the attitude of the laboratory man examining an assistant's experiment. Some passages had to be reformulated for greater clarity and precision; others seemed to be unredeemable and called forth a word of dry, incisive criticism; and still others aroused some creative remarks and words of encouragement from the professor which made all the effort worthwhile.

Then the paper had to undergo scrutiny from one's fellow students, at which point Allers would work as an orchestra leader. He would become engrossed in the task of trying to bring out the right observation at the right time, and thus of eliciting from a student some valuable comment which should be forthcoming for the common good of the whole seminar group. This was an unforgettable lesson in the difference between annihilative and creative criticism, as well as a way of seeing that the quality of a group effort depends on the intelligence and humaneness of the participants. At the session's end, there would be a brief word of evaluation by Allers, all of whose teaching activities were stamped with that mingling of objective severity and human graciousness which called forth the best work from the students. As they went out into the night, they realized that they were indeed sharing in the life of inquiry for which every university comes into being, and in the absence of which it would be a deceiving hulk and drag on the wider community.

Allers was accustomed to bring each course to an end with a closing lecture which seldom varied from year to year. He did not believe in making any grandiose summary of the year's work, since one of his main points was that every inquiry in the philosophy of man prospers only when it stays open-ended and calls for consideration anew at a future time. Instead, he would devote his final talk to the responsibilities of Catholic philosophers in America. The least sectarian of men, he was nevertheless deeply concerned about the state of philosophy among American Catholics and his own responsibility for helping to improve the condition. He aimed his criticism squarely at the mutually reinforcing attitudes of separatism and complacency, which he felt to be the typical failings of the Catholic intelligence in America. His purpose was not to enjoy the luxury of deploring these failings, however, but to do his physician's duty of diagnosing the disease and suggesting a remedy.

He traced the situation to a failure to understand and take seriously the philosophical method and its conditions of inquiry, which remain distinct from the possession of revealed truth and its theological elaboration. In relief of the disease, he proposed that some simple steps be first taken to overcome the separatism in the individual philosopher's own life. One can begin by making a close first-hand study of the major modern sources and contemporary philosophies, by developing one's personal interest in a philosophical problem to the point of attaining competence, and by contributing actively

to the general philosophical associations. Along with one's teaching responsibilities, one can also try to embody research in good written form, both in order to profit by the discipline of scholarly criticism and to contribute something worthwhile to the human community.

Allers preferred to make these specific suggestions to his students rather than dwell in a general and self-defeating way on the situation. He felt that an old complacency is only replaced by a new one, if one does not learn the meaning of philosophizing through personal participation in the philosophical life in America. The problem is not to eliminate the philosophical traditions of mankind but to invigorate them in the only center where this can be done: in the individual philosopher's wrestling with his own experience and the state of the great human questions in his own age and country.

This question of reorienting Catholic philosophical minds in America was a major topic in the correspondence which passed between Allers and myself during the next two decades. In one letter, he expressed himself rather strongly on the need to become strongly prepared not only in the medievals and in some contemporary schools but also in the whole development of modern philosophy, which alone permits any intelligible links to be established between medieval theories and those of our own contemporaries.

It is high time that Catholic thinkers become aware of the fact that, after all, the world in which they live, for which they have to educate the younger generations, and on which they are supposed to exercize some influence, has been fashioned by the ideas which, however disagreeing with their own, deserve consideration, must be taken seriously, and cannot simply be brushed aside. One may be as much of a Thomist or Scotist or what else and still admit that there have come to the fore, since the 13th century, problems which simply could not occur to the men of the Middle Ages.[6]

This is the spirit in which Allers carried on his own investigations in modern philosophy and contemporary problems, and the spirit which he sought to enkindle in the minds of his students and younger colleagues.

3. The Author

A steady stream of articles and books came from Allers' pen, right from the time of his first appointment down to his last few months. In all these publications, his style is straightforward and directed toward personal communication with the reader. He states his positions clearly, marshals the evidence for them in an orderly way, and keeps his critical observations well under control. His thought steers away from vague systematic constructions, but is at home with the definite issues raised by his clinical work, his historical readings, and his own observations. Philosophical generality is achieved in his writings by virtue of the convergence of all his reflections upon the

[6] Letter of Rudolf Allers to James Collins, April 4, 1954.

nature of man. One point which he never tires of restating is that no one can deal with man in any sustained theoretical way without developing at least an implicit philosophical framework of interpretation. The path followed by his scholarly writings is that of rendering his own interpretation of human nature ever more explicit, and uncovering the philosophical suppositions in the other views of man which are so influential in the twentieth century.

Allers' publications before 1922 are all of an apprentice nature. They are reports on his findings in the physiology laboratory, the psychiatric clinic, and the operating room. His ability to analyze a new situation rapidly and reach some general conclusions which can be communicated to others is perhaps best illustrated by his wartime book, *Über Schädelschüsse* (1916). This is an account of the surgical techniques devised by himself and his senior surgeon in dealing with gunshot wounds in the head, among the soldiers brought to the Lemberg Hospital. His remarks on the psychic disorders which these victims often suffered bring out his conviction in the unity of human nature. When he speaks rather impatiently in later years about Freud's fantastic physiological notions, it is not a side issue but a fundamental demand, born out of his wartime experiences, that every psychiatric theory should respect the chemical and physiological influences and therapeutic roles.

After settling down in Vienna, Allers was able to make a more comprehensive study of man in terms of his development as a moral personality. His major treatise in this field is *The Psychology of Character,* to use the English title of the 1930 translation of *Das Werden der sittlichen Person.* In the Preface to that book, Allers states the threefold context within which he carries on his investigation of character and the moral formation of man:

> the Catholic conception of the universe, the philosophical system of the *philosophia perennis,* and the empiricism of modern psychological investigation, especially as represented in the individual-psychology teaching of Alfred Adler, the Viennese physician.[7]

The first and the last chapters of this book are important for understanding Allers' view of man, since they deal respectively with the problem of values and that of self-development within the community of selves. He stresses the value-affirming nature of man as a way of counterbalancing a purely genetic and elementaristic approach to the human person. Furthermore, he seeks to temper the application of such physical metaphors as "force" and "drive," by centering human development in the distinctively interpersonal relations constituting the community. The morally mature person is the one who reflectively takes account of the conditions required so that a human community of values can be fostered.

Several of Allers' other books work out the details of his dynamic personalism in more particular areas. *Self Improvement* (1939) concentrates upon

[7] R. Allers, *The Psychology of Character* (London, 1930) p. xi.

the problem of permanence and change in its peculiarly human form. This involves an interplay between the three factors of person, personality, and character. Throughout the life of a man, it can be said that he is this permanent living whole of spirit-in-matter which constitutes him a person. But this personal existent is essentially related to the world and to other persons through lines of mutual action and determination, the sum total of which actual traits within the individual constitute his personality. Allers does not locate character somewhere apart, but regards it as the principle of action whereby the personal agent acts to achieve his complete personality. Moreover, character is that sort of principle of personal action which depends upon recognition of some order of values.

Perhaps the most crucial and delicate task of human culture is to aid the young person in freely discerning and accepting a sufficiently complex and humane order of values. Allers devotes *Character Education in Adolescence* (1940) to this question. His practical psychiatric wisdom comes to ripest expression in this volume, which studies the ways in which the growing man seeks to attain a determinate selfhood. Without using the technical vocabulary of psychiatry or existentialism, Allers nevertheless draws upon both of these approaches to man for guidance in understanding the basic adolescent problem of thorough uncertainty, as well as in coping with the danger of hostile estrangement on the part of adults who lack such understanding.

Concerning adolescent reticence and embarrassment, for instance, he remarks:

With the slowly growing consciousness of being a self—absolutely distinct from every other self, having to live its own life and to bear the whole responsibility for its being and doing—the adolescent mind develops a natural reluctance to disclose itself. What makes the parents who were accustomed to the openmindedness of the child (though children have their secrets too, more of them often than the parents suspect) call the adolescent reticent, secretive, and impenetrable, is in truth the first manifestation of a normal and even necessary quality of the adult mind. One may even give to this quality the name of discretion, if this word is understood in its original sense (such as it possesses, for instance, in the Rule of St. Benedict), implying the right discernment of things to be told and things to be withheld.[8]

On the important matter of helping the maturing mind to appreciate the significance of sexuality, Allers guides himself by three practical principles. An understanding of sexuality must be gained within the context of an education in the general meaning of human nature; it must be kept in open relation with the whole order of values which engage our human freedom; and it must be seen in close connection with whatever moral and religious conviction the

[8] R. Allers, *Character Education in Adolescence* (New York, 1940) p. 33. On Allers' psychological work, cf. R. Titone, *Rudolf Allers, psicologo del carattere* (Brescia, 1957).

adolescent person acknowledges and is in the process of reconsidering at an intellectual level. This contextual and maturational approach to sexuality provides the orientation in *Sex Psychology in Education* (1937), where Allers distinguishes pointedly between an isolated sex education and a central inclusion of the human meaning of sexuality within the general educational development of the human person.

Allers' main treatments of Freud are found in *The New Psychologies* and in *The Successful Error* (1940). In the former book, he gives his judgment that Freud's own outlook is materialistic and hedonistic in its explicit conception of man, even though there are elements in his anthropology which point toward something nonreductive in human life. He contrasts the Freudian psychology-from-below unfavorably with Adler's individual psychology-from-above, in which the genetic analysis of motivations is always referred eventually to the purposive order of action and valuation. Nevertheless, Allers finds it necessary to criticize Adler for oversimplifying the problem of conflict in terms of the will to power and the will to community. The two main deficiencies in Adlerian psychology are its over-intellectualized view of individual volition and its narrow restriction of values to the measure set by social utility. Allers himself sees the need for revising the theory of will to include all the impulses which actively affect our determination of character, as well as the need for revising the affirmation of the reality of values to include the moral and religious values and the correlative act of human valuing.

In the Preface to *The Successful Error,* Allers observes that his appraisal of Freud has grown increasingly more critical over the years and that it runs counter to the current trend among psychoanalysts. Three factors account for the mainly critical tenor of his approach. First, he concentrates upon Freud himself rather than upon the thematic developments made by later psychoanalysts and other psychiatrists on Freudian materials. Second, he takes seriously the close union in Freud's writings and practice between method and content, leaving it to others to develop the possibilities when the method is loosened from the particular Freudian restriction on content and is adapted to other conceptions of man. And finally, he regards Freud's own conception of man as entailing a valuational closure to the *truth*-status of the moral and religious values needed for the full growth and ordering of personality. This consideration is especially crucial in the educational process, since the adolescent seeks to cope with his uncertainty not only through reading and experience but also in terms of the truth of the moral and religious view of man.

When the other question is raised of finding aspects in Freud which can be liberated and incorporated within another conext, however, Allers sees the need for such an investigation. He himself contributes some leads on the direction which such a mature reinterpretation can take.

One may call it a merit of psychoanalysis that, in an age of unduly exaggerated intellectualism, it has made visible the influence of non-intellectual factors

within human personality. Though the relation of these factors to personality and to the faculties of the mind was misinterpreted by Freud, he nevertheless restored in a way the old and nearly forgotten knowledge that man is not pure reason or pure spirit, but a being composed of matter and soul. Behind this, however, is hidden what is Freud's greatest and most unexpected achievement. He restored the knowledge of the leading role of the mind, the knowledge of the dominating place held by the soul in human nature. To do this was not his intention. He did not know that he was serving the rebirth of a truer conception of man's nature than he himself was ever capable of imagining. We do not here allude to his discoveries regarding the influence mental factors have on bodily phenomena, nor to his unveiling of the mental origin of so many troubles, nor to his having demonstrated the curvative influence of mental attitudes. All this is but the peripheral manifestation of things much deeper and much more important. Freud's real achievement is: This discovery that mental treatment is capable of healing certain bodily troubles, that it may result in a total change of attitudes, has delivered mankind from the bondage of biologism. Not everything is due to heredity, to bodily constitution, to an immutable set-up of personality, decreed by blind fate. The dominion of the mind is reestablished.[9]

If we are in possession of an adequate theory of method, knowledge, and metaphysics, we can liberate Freud's two great findings concerning the intimate composite unity of human nature and the distinctive reality of mind and its meanings.

That such a process of reinterpretation can benefit considerably from the phenomenological and existential conceptions of man is the burden of Allers' lectures given in the Institute of Living: *Existentialism and Psychiatry* (1961). One feature of these remarkable lectures is that Allers shows us what it is like for a psychiatrist to read the existentialist accounts of man. Anyone approaching existentialism from a psychiatric background is predisposed to accept the stress on the historicity of human existence and the freedom in human interpretation of meanings. And from such a background, some of the particular existentialist descriptions are seen to be similar to a psychiatric analysis of certain states of mind. Allers points out the similarity between the anankastic syndrome, neurotic egocentrism, and Sartre's theory of social relations. He also shows how natural it is for the so-called third school of Vienna—the existential psychiatry of Binswanger and Frankl—to employ some of Heidegger's concepts. There is agreement here between the philosopher and the psychiatrists on the broad truths that man and his world are strictly co-constitutive, that the human self develops essentially within the relationship of being-with or existing in the interpersonal community, and that personal development involves some decision concerning the order of values and hence the authenticity of one's way of existing.

[9] R. Allers, *The Successful Error* (New York, 1940) pp. 259-60. A study of Allers' view on Freud is made by L. Jugnet, *Un psychiatre philosophe, Rudolf Allers ou l'Anti-Freud* (Paris, 1950).

But perhaps the most original portion of this book is the third lecture, wherein Allers makes his own contribution to the existential approach in psychiatry.[10] He furnishes a logico-psychological description of three main types of abnormal world, which he designates as the defective, the transformed, and the perverted worlds. One interesting subtype of the abnormally defective world is the perforated world of people suffering from agnosia. Here, the symbolic function disappears, generalizations are difficult to make, and things lose their function of pointing beyond themselves in a meaningful pattern. Allers compares this situation with the existentialist encounter with the nought and the attitude of dread. In setting forth the structure of the transformed worlds, he notes that the outlook of the schizophrenic (upon which most of the existential psychiatrists have concentrated for their case studies) is only one subtype. He identifies the other modalities in terms of disruption, instability, and especially estrangement. In the estranged type of transformed world, there is depersonalization without deindividualization, that is, the subject remains intensely aware of himself and others as individuals, but they are all kept at a dead level of units lacking the accentuation of human persons and values. Marcel's theme of the reduction of men to functions is relevant here, as is the broader problem of intersubjectivity mentioned above in the account of Allers as a teacher.

Allers locates the various psychiatric analyses of neurosis within the logical frame of a study of the perverted world of the self-centered and the loveless. What constitutes the great interest of Sartre's repeated efforts to develop a social morality is that, from Allers' viewpoint, he is trying to do so within a psychological and logical context which does not permit interpersonal community. The social morality which he may evolve within this framework will remain essentially abstract and one-sided in its interpretative power.

Allers' chief criticism of existentialism and existential psychiatry is that they construe too narrowly the meaning of "object" and "the objective." In their anxiety to avoid the Cartesian solipsism pointed out by Husserl and the social attitude of atomistic individualism, they have permitted the Hegelian dialectic to dictate the terms of a solution. As a consequence, they are always uneasy until the contrast between subject and object is dialectically overcome at the origin and the goal of experience. Allers suggests, however, that the philosophy of man has to sink its roots in the broad median plain between origins and goals, and that it cannot allow itself to be stampeded by charges of psychologism and naiveté into treating that plain of human existence as a dialectical phase. From the standpoint of the existing and related person, everything to which I am related is an object. This holds for other persons as well as things, without entailing any reduction of the reality of the former to the latter. The person develops along with the whole world of objects and

[10] R. Allers, *Existentialism and Psychiatry* (Springfield, Ill., 1961) pp. 50-79.

enters into just as many different kinds of objective relationships as there are kinds of beings within his range.

Among the numerous articles published in English by Allers, attention may be directed at least to his closely related presidential address to the Metaphysical Society and his Medalist's address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association. In these papers, he gives a sustained analysis of the problem of the subjective and the objective, the mutually specified reality of which is the lesson drawn from his long years of psychiatric work and philosophical reflection.

Allers underlines this finding in a striking way through his proposal concerning ergology or the theory of human work. He widens the meaning of work, so that it is not confined to the economic, technological, and artistic categories but becomes recognized as a quite comprehensive route toward understanding the reality of man. Hegel's insight into subjective and objective spirit can be given a free human development here, without being forced to minister to his doctrine on the absolute. Our transformation of the world through work not only affects our milieu but also enables the human spirit to achieve transcendence, develop its freedom, and reveal its own nature. There is a mutual relationship of insistent being which work brings forth between spirit and the world, between the intrasubjective and the transsubjective. The latter shows itself to be more than the scientific sort of objectivity. It has an insistent actuality and richness of its own, which becomes available to the laboring human spirit but which never becomes exhausted by man or simply reduced to his instrument of satisfaction.

Just as this present study opened with Allers' invitation to focus upon his work rather than his person, so it may be fittingly concluded with a recommendation that we pay special attention to those considerations in his writings which lead him to regard the theory of work and insistent being as a central concern in the philosophy of man.

Man has been endowed by his Creator with the power of creativity, not indeed, to bring forth existence but to transform that which merely exists into a meaningful world. It is man's prerogative that he may, by inserting messages into the world that is merely there, by incorporating what insists but lacks existence into the material world, bring forth what without him would not be at all: the whole world of artifacts, of products, institutions, interpretations, in one word the world of culture which is that in which man truly lives and moves and has his being.[11]

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[11] R. Allers, "Reflections on Co-operation and Communication," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XXXIV (1960) 26. Perhaps the key sentence in his address to the Metaphysical Society is this: "The insistence of the spirit in the work and the insistence of the transsubjective in the mind are correlatives." R. Allers, "The Subjective and the Objective," *The Review of Metaphysics,* XII (1958-59) 512.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE ON ILLUMINATION

By Rudolf Allers

Few points in Augustinian doctrine have been discussed as much and interpreted as differently as that on "illumination." It may appear presumptious if one tries to resume this discussion. It seems, however, that there is one approach which has not found the attention it deserves. I shall not review the various opinions on the nature of illumination; this is the more superfluous since it has been done in an exhaustive manner by F. Cayre.[1] From his survey one gathers that there is as yet no agreement on what illumination means.

This lack of agreement is largely the result of the scant explanation St. Augustine himself gives of his idea. Nowhere in his work is the doctrine of illumination treated systematically or comprehensively. He assumed, probably, that his meaning would be intelligible to his readers. This may have been the case because light appears as an explanatory principle also in Platonic and Neo-Platonic theories of cognition, quite apart from the fact that certain Scriptural texts, of which St. Augustine avails himself frequently, refer to light in more than one sense.

According to St. Augustine, light is the principle of all cognition. The performance of sight appears to him as the prototype of all, not only sensible, knowledge. "Since light is the most subtle thing in the body and, therefore, closer to the soul than any other thing, it is first diffused alone by the eyes and radiates forth in the rays of the eyes towards the sensible things at which we look." In the other senses, the light is mixed up with other matters; first with pure air, then with dark and nebulous air, thirdly with the still darker humidity—or liquid, *humor*—finally with the toughness of earth. Correspondingly, the knowledge mediated by the other four senses becomes less and less clear.[2]

Light is the principle of sensory cognition. In this case it is "corporeal" light. Intellectual cognition requires an "intelligible" or "incorporeal" light, on which more will be said below.

Since all cognition requires light, "vision" becomes the prototype of all cognitive performances. Thus, St. Augustine remarks that in reading a letter one makes use of "three kinds of vision." There is, first, that of the eyes by which the letter and its words are seen, then another vision of the spirit by which one thinks or has the image of the absent writer, and a third vision of the mind which looks at love (*contuitus*) and therein envisages love understood

[1] F. Cayré, *Initiation à la philosophie de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1947), p. 209ff.
[2] *De gen. ad lit.*, XII., c. 16., n. 32.

by the mind (*dilectio intellecta conspicitur*).[3] The representation by means of a memory image, thus, is called a vision, and so also the intellectual understanding. The basic likeness of these cognitive performances appears to St. Augustine as so evident that he refers to it as a proof for the eminence of sight above other senses: the vision of the eye is able as is that of the spirit to envisage simultaneously many things.[4]

It should be noted that the term "vision" signifies sometimes the performance of sight or of another cognitive power, frequently however, also the product of such performances. The image which comes to be in the sense or in imagination is called vision. "The form which is impressed (on the mind) by the sense is called vision." [5]

Neither the idea of light as the principle of cognition nor that of vision as the prototype of all cognitive performances is original with St. Augustine. These conceptions rest, as do several others, on certain presuppositions which St. Augustine shared with many of his contemporaries and with which he had become acquainted through his studies.

One of these presuppositions is common to almost all thinkers of Antiquity and also shared by many of the Middle Ages. Since Empedocles it had been the common conviction that there has to be a "connaturality" between agent and acted upon, therefore, also between knower and known. This conception is, for instance, implied in the well-known argument for the immateriality of the intellect: the intellect knows the immaterial, because not individualized, universals and, hence, has to be immaterial itself.

The eye sees things in the light and sees the light too. Consequently, the eye must be of the nature of light. Plato calls the eye "the most sunlike of all organs concerned with sensing." [6] Its "power is dispensed by the sun, like a stream flooding the eye." [7] The participants of the discussion take it obviously for granted that the eye is "sunlike." Elsewhere Plato speaks of the eye as "light bearing," *φωσφόρα*; the gods "caused the pure fire within to flow out through the eyes in a continuous and dense stream." "Whenever the stream of vision is surrounded by mid-day light, it flows out (of the eyes) like unto like, *ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον*, and merging therewith forms a kindred substance." [8]

According to Plato, there is light or "fire" in the eyes which emanates from them to meet the light coming from the luminous bodies, a name which

[3] *Ibid.* XII., c. 6, n. 15.
[4] *De Trin.*, XI., c. 1.
[5] *Ibid.* XI., c. 2, n. 2.
[6] *Rep.* VI., 508, a.b. *ἡλιοδέστατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων.*
[7] F. M. Cornford, *The Republic of Plato* (New York, 1945), p. 219: *Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμιευμένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; . . .*
[8] *Tim.*, 45 c; cf. 67, c.

applies to all colored things. "Light is thus a kind of extended touch or contact at a distance." [9]

Light is fire, not only its effect. Fire is one of the "elements" and therefore corporeal; fire and, therefore, light consist of particles, as one gathers from the account on color-vision in *Timaeus.*

Since Plato does not explain any further his ideas, one may presume that they were not new to his readers. They may have reached St. Augustine through many channels. His main source is, as in most instances, Plotinus. "The eye would never see the sun were it not sunlike itself nor would the soul see the beautiful were it not beautiful itself." [10] Plotinus, says St. Augustine, taught that the Good is the sun which illuminates the intelligible world in a manner comparable to that by which the sun illuminates the sensible world. The soul is, in some way, like the moon which receives its light from the sun.[11] This doctrine appears to St. Augustine as "consonant" with the Gospel, namely *John,* 1, 6-9. He also adopts the Plotinian expression "father of light" which refers with Plotinus to the One and is applied by St. Augustine to God, obviously in remembrance of *James* 1, 7.[12]

There are many passages in St. Augustine in which he returns to this idea. He addresses God as "the intelligible light and our illumination"; [13] or calls Him "that superior light by which the human mind is illuminated." [14] The quotations can be easily multiplied; but these two may suffice.

There is a number of texts in Plotinus which refer to the "light-like" nature of the eye and to "illumination" as the essence of cognition.[15] Of these texts, one deserves mention because it states an empirical reason for the notion of the eye possessing a light of its own. "We also see in animals whose eyes shine naturally that a light proceeds from their eyes, and that in animals which possess in their interior condensed fire, light shines out into darkness when they open the eyes." [16]

Apart from the fact referred to by Plotinus, there are other phenomena which might have suggested the notion of light being contained, as it were, in the eye. Many people observe particularly shining colors when they close their eyes in darkness; also, pressure causes such "photismata" to appear.

[9] A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), p. 278.

[10] *Enn,* I., 6, 9: *οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη.*

[11] *De civ. Dei,* X. c. 2; referring to Enn. V, 1, 10; 9, 1.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Solil.* I, c. 1, n. 2.

[14] *In Joan.* tr. XV., n. 5.

[15] See, e.g., *Enn.* IV; 5, 6, 5, 7; V., 1, 10; 9, 1.

[16] *Enn.,* VI., 7., 41.: *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἰδεῖν ζώων λαμπόντων τῶν ὀμμάτων, γιγνομένου αὐτοῖς φωτὸς καὶ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ζώων, ἃ ἔνδον συνεστραμμένον πῦρ ἔχοντα ταῖς ἀνοιδάνσεσιν ἐν σκοτῷ ἐκλάμπει εις τὸ ἔξω . . .*
I have rendered *συνεστραμμένον* by "condensed;" literally it means "twisted into one" from *συνστρέφω.*

These facts have led H. V. Helmholtz to speak of a "proper light of the retina." [17] He supposes that we never see perfect darkness or perfect black but always a dark grey because the "proper light" is mixed up with the black. I shall adopt the term "proper light" for both the "corporeal light" which supposedly emanates from the eyes and that "incorporeal light" which emanates from reason.

The theory of vision, conceived of by Plato or Plotinus, and others, too, demands that light be seen by light and that, therefore, the organ of sight be itself of a light-like nature. Vision rests on the "growing together" *sumpagis* of the light emanating from the eye and the light coming from the visible body. Both these lights have to be present for vision to become possible.

Since the idea of light emanating from the eye was not new and apparently widely accepted, St. Augustine was not under any obligation to explain this point. It is important that this conception of the nature of vision underlies all views of St. Augustine on cognition in general. No cognition, be it of the senses or of other powers, can be achieved if there is not some sort of light in the known and in the knower. "Light is that by which anything whatsoever—*unaquaeque res*—becomes manifest." [18] As the proper light of the sense is not sufficient for vision to arise, but has to be joined to the light outside, so also is the inner vision possible only if its objects be illuminated and become, as it were, luminous themselves, sending out light which then is joined to the "proper light" of the cognitive power. By itself, says St. Augustine, the eye suffices only for not seeing the darkness; to see and to know it must receive assistance from a light not its own.

The things apprehended by inner vision are not such as to be illuminated by the same light which renders visible corporeal things. The light which makes them visible must be of another kind. It is an "incorporeal light," a notion St. Augustine may have found in Plotinus.[19] The principle of "connaturality" makes it necessary that the "proper light" of the operating powers be likewise incorporeal. This incorporeal light or, at least one such light is created. St. Augustine considers the possibility that the light created at the beginning, prior to the celestial bodies, might have been a "non-corporeal spiritual light." [20]

Since he saw in sight the prototype of all cognition and interpreted the performance of the eyes in the manner outlined above, St. Augustine could not arrive at any other conception of knowledge but one resting on the notion of illumination. His admiration for Plotinus—an attitude which persisted in spite of becoming more critical in later times—contributed to his forming the doctrine under consideration.

[17] H. V. Helmholtz, *Physiologische Optik* (2d. ed.; Leipzig, 1896).
[18] *De gen. ad lit. imperf.*, c. 5, n. 24.
[19] *Enn.* IV, 5, 7.: ἀσώματον δὲ πάντως δεῖ τιέναι . . .
[20] *De gen. ad lit.*, IV, c. 23, n. 39.

If one tries to arrive at a clear and consistent interpretation of St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination, one must guard against taking all passages as referring to this particular point which mention light or similar notions. In some passages the term "light" is almost nothing but a metaphor, as when it is said that the mind calls "light" the truth it discovers within and above itself.[21]

Whenever light is seen, there must be, of course, illumination. But what is seen is not the light but that which is illuminated, that is, some luminous thing, whether it shine by itself or by light received from some source.

The kind of vision depends on the kind of objects made visible. The visual power is another when the object is another. Correspondingly, there must exist different kinds of light.

The objects of vision belong to four classes or levels. First, there are the sensible things, of which the mind attains knowledge by means of the senses of the body, hence, by the corporeal light which proceeds from the eyes on the one hand and from the visible objects on the other. This light is part of the human body, one of its constituent "elements"; it is the same in the seen things and the two lights are joined, and unite, so to speak, the organ and its object. The second kind of vision is called by St. Augustine sometimes "spiritual"—his use of the term varies—and renders the mind cognizant of things not actually present but retained in memory and "seen" as images. In the terminology of Thomism, one may speak of vision of the internal senses. But St. Augustine's conception is another, since he does not consider the "spiritual" vision as corporeal. The third level is that of rational truths. Of these there are two types.

The sensible truths are, indeed, less certain but they, too, are expressed in judgments formed by reason. The intellectual truths, commonly referred to as "eternal verities," are absolutely certain and they deal with objects other than either things or images.[23] The fourth class comprises all those truths which the mind cannot attain by means of its natural power and of which it becomes cognizant only in faith and through revelation.

One may debate whether the difference of the truths of the senses and those of reason is great enough to make necessary two different cognitive powers, hence two different operations, and two different kinds of "intelligible" light. This is, however, a minor point which need not be elaborated.

There is, however, another problem which presents serious difficulties. St. Augustine calls the objects of the intellectual vision "ideas," but also

[21] *Conf.* VII, c. 10, n. 16.

[22] The reference footnote 22 was left out of the original manuscript.

[23] Although this matter is not within the scope of the present essay it should be noted that there are definite relations of this Augustinian distinction and that of Leibniz of *verités de fait* and *verités de raison*, and also Kant's synthetic judgments *a posteriori* and a *priori*.

formae, species, rationes, regulae.[24] Form or species, he says, renders the Greek idea; these two terms are, therefore, strictly synonymous. *Ratio* corresponds to *logos,* but it is not incorrect to use it also for idea. Whether the correspondence is as close as St. Augustine assumes may be doubtful. There is, on the other hand, a notable difference between idea and *regula.* In the parlance of Plato as well as of later writers, idea refers to "concept" or "universal." But *regula* is necessarily of the nature of a proposition or, at least, such as to be expressible in a proposition; it is a judgment and not a concept.

Several authors have remarked that the "ideas" of St. Augustine are not concepts but "verities" and, therefore, judgments. This is evidenced also by the comparison of "sensible" and "intelligible" truths; the former are indubitably judgments on sensible things or "states of affairs." [25]

Furthermore, St. Augustine refers often to the "eternal verities" under the name of "laws": law of numbers, law of morals, law of beauty. He also exemplifies them by pointing out, not concepts, but propositions.[26] He speaks of a "natural power of judgment" by which the mind discerns truth from falsity.[27] The eternal verities are also called "rules of virtue" [28] and are, therefore, of the nature of judgments.[29]

St. Augustine knows that reason and reasoning are two different things; the former "serves vision," the latter search.[30] Reasoning, *ratiocinatio,* is the name given to what is usually called discursive reasoning, the progress from premises to conclusion. Reason, *ratio,* designates, as it seems, some intuitive power. Here precisely lies the difficulty.

Perhaps, the problem would vanish if one were to think consistently in the terms peculiar to St. Augustine and free oneself of all connotations the names have acquired in later times. As long as one conceives of *ratio* as performing chiefly the operations of abstracting, judging, and discursive reasoning, it is difficult to understand how a judgment, or that denoted by it, can be the object of intuition or vision. We are accustomed to envisage a judgment as resulting from combination or division, as the technical terms read, hence, as an elaboration of data the intellect has at its disposal. But it may be that the idea of St. Augustine was different.

[24] *De div. quaest.* 83, q. 46, c. 1-2.

[25] *De ord.,* II, c. 11, n. 32; *De quant. an.,* c. 23, n. 71; *De mus.,* V, c. 10.

[26] E.G., *Contra Acad.,* III, c. 25: "If there are six worlds and one more, there are seven . . ."

[27] *De civ. Dei.,* XI, c. 27, n. 2.

[28] *De lib. arb.,* II, c. 10, n. 29; *De Trin.,* XV, c. 15; n. 1, cf. J. Rohmer, *La finalité morale chez les théologians de saint Augustin à Duns Scotus!* (Paris, 1939). *Et. de Phil. Médiév.,* XXVII, p. 15.

[29] On the judgment character of these truths, see E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2d ed.; Paris, 1943), p. 120; M. C. d'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), p. 182.

[30] *De quant. anim.* c. 15, n. 53.

In this regard, too, it may be helpful to recall the primary position given to vision in St. Augustine's theory of cognition. The numerous references to light, illumination, and the many comparisons between intellectual and sensory vision, suggest that St. Augustine based his whole conception on an analysis of sight. Reference has been made above to his remark that the eminence of sight is shown in that the eye may grasp simultaneously many objects, just as the spirit may. Unprejudiced observation teaches, in fact, that the eye does not only see many things, but sees them as related to each other. It is an error to suppose that all knowledge of relations is an achievement of the intellect. Relations in space and time are immediately apprehended by the senses, even though to express them in judgments the co-operation of reason is needed. The eye apprehends also relations obtaining among colors; their difference and similitude are seen, not concluded. This is evidenced, apart from self-observation, by the fact that animals recognize colors as similar or dissimilar. Hence, it is conceivable that St. Augustine attributed to the intellectual vision a like capacity, namely one by which the mind would immediately apprehend relations, hence that state of affairs to which a judgment refers, immediately, without any further operation. It may well be that for him a relation, or a "state of affairs," was simply a *res,* something to be apprehended intuitively, be it by the sense or by the intellect.

If this interpretation of St. Augustine's thought is correct, one understands that the eternal verities, for instance, the "law of numbers," are said to be objects of vision.

Many times St. Augustine dwells on the properties of numbers which never cease to fascinate him. One recalls his speculation on the number six, one of the "perfect numbers." But it is, in truth, not the number itself with which he is concerned but the totality of relation for which the number stands. The number represents or symbolizes the "immutable law of numbers." [31] In a thoroughly Platonic spirit he believes that to know about this law is an indispensable prerequisite for philosophical inquiry.

It was pointed out above that St. Augustine speaks of two kinds of incorporeal light, one created and one uncreated. The created incorporeal light must possess some function; it must illuminate and render visible some incorporeal things. These incorporeal things are the memory images on the one hand, the eternal verities on the other. It is submitted that this uncorporeal light is the "proper light" of reason and also that which emanates from—or is "reflected" by—the intelligible objects reason apprehends.

One of the most obscure points in St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination is undoubtedly that of the nature of the light in which the intelligible things are envisaged. It has to be admitted that there are many passages which

[31] *De lib. arb.* c. 11, n. 30; c. 16, n. 24; many references to number may be found in *De mus.,* e.g., VI, c. 4, n. 5; c. 7, n. 18, 19; c. 9, n. 23. On the rôle of numbers in the thought of St. Augustine, *see Nourisson. La Philosophie de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1865), I, 118.

suggest that St. Augustine did not, or not always, sharply distinguish between the created and the uncreated intelligible light. It seems that he never arrived at a final formulation of his idea on the nature and mode of illumination. But one may say that he gradually abandoned his original view which seems to have been that illumination is something directly worked by divine influence. This is, at least, the idea stated in the *Soliloquies* where he speaks of a divine light emanating from God and making intelligible the spiritual things.[32]

The main reason for his modifying his original conception seems to be that he came to realize more fully the significance of *John* 1, 14 where it is said that the light lighteth every man coming into this world. There are many truths every rational soul may discover within itself, and some of these truths are "eternal" verities, like the law of number.

In his earlier writings, this point does not appear to have played a greater role. But even in *De magistro,* when he speaks of "consulting God" he affirms that this may be done by every rational soul.[33] This consulting, therefore, is independent of the state of the soul. Of course, "the pious, chaste and diligent quest" [34] will arrive at a better comprehension of certain truths, especially in regard to morals, and there are some truths the "impious" cannot recognize, whereas these truths are visible to men striving strenuously and piously because they receive divine help.[35] The "impious" are not however unable to attain truth,[36] and pious striving is not a privilege of the Christian faithful.

All people, whoever and whatever they be, hitherto unacquainted with the eternal truths or the disciplines dealing with them, may give the right answers if the questions are formulated in the right manner. "There is present in them the light of eternal reason, in which light the immutable truths are envisaged." [37] One must beware of taking all texts speaking of the "eternal" as referring to things of a strictly divine nature. This is the more necessary in regard to the term *ratio* which has so many meanings with St. Augustine.

The light which renders visible these eternal verities is said to be *sui generis*.[38] This passage has been interpreted by some thus that the *sui* is taken as referring back to *anima;* the meaning would then be that the light is of the same nature as the soul. Others, however, take these words to indicate a peculiar nature of this light.[39] This interpretation is supported by

[32] *Soliloquy* I, c. 6-7 n. 13-14.
[33] *De mag.,* c. 11, n. 36.
[34] *De quant. anim.,* c. 14, n. 24.
[35] *De vera relig.,* c. 10, n. 20.
[36] *De Trin.,* IV, c. 18, n. 24.
[37] *Retract.,* I, c. 4, n. 4. One senses an echo of Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, although St. Augustine had abandoned this idea when he wrote this passage—if he ever seriously held it.
[38] *De Trin.,* IX, c. 15, n. 24.
[39] E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2d ed.; Paris, 1943), p. 107.

reasons both of context and of grammar. In regard to the latter, it seems almost certain that St. Augustine would have written *illius* or *ipsius generis* had he intended to say what the first interpretation assumes.[40] One may, of course, say that this light is of the same nature as the soul in so far as the latter, too, is "incorporeal." [41] One may furthermore consider that the light has to be in some manner "part" of the soul, as the corporeal light, which emanates from the eyes, is supposed to be one of the elements constituting the body. But the light emanates not only from the cognitive power which envisages the intelligible objects but also from these objects. It is difficult to understand how the light emitted by the eternal verities could be of the "same nature" as the soul.

It is particularly important that one bear in mind the distinction between the created and the uncreated intelligible light. The latter is strictly supernatural. It is identified with divine wisdom and that immutable truth which "shines like the sun into man's soul" [42] and which, therefore, is not of the same nature as the soul. But this is not the created incorporeal light in which "all intelligible things are relucent." [43]

This appears to be the basic conviction of St. Augustine, although he is not always consistent in his expressions. In fact, he says, in the same work, that God makes all intelligible things visible as light makes visible corporeal things.[44] These and similar inconsistencies are troubling. They are also largely responsible for the disagreement on St. Augustine's true meaning.

One wonders at the contradictions, or at least, the inconsistencies in the Augustinian texts. They may, to some measure, be caused by the pressure of work and the many disturbances to which the writer was exposed. But there may be also another reason. Most of the inconsistencies occur, apparently, on points which are more or less closely related to the philosophical ideas of Plotinus. St. Augustine came gradually to see that Plotinus' philosophy was not as close to Christian doctrine as he had believed at first. St. Augustine, however, was an eminently grateful personality. He may speak rather harshly of Cicero in one place; on the whole he never forgets that he is indebted to *Hortensius* for awakening his interest in philosophy. He may have become critical of Neo-Platonism, but he remembered forever how

See also, of the older interpreters, Mathaeus ab Aquasparta, *Quaest. disput.* (Quaracchi, 1903), I, 243, 264.

[40] E. Hendrikx, *Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystik* (Würzburg, 1936), p. 42.

[41] This seems to be the opinion of St. Bonaventura, II Sent., d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3m.: et vocat (Augustinus) illam lucem increatam quam dicit esse 'sui generis' propter hoc quod spiritualis est sicut anima. However, it is not quite sure that St. Augustine speaks in this passage of the uncreated intelligible light.

[42] *De gen. contra Man.*, VII, c. 25, n. 43, Cf. *De doctr. christ.*, I, c. 32, n. 35; *De vera relig.*, c. 1, n. 2; *Confess.* VII, c. 12, n. 18.

[43] *Ennar. in Psalm.*, VII, n. 8.

[44] *Ibid.*, n. 10.

much he owed to the study of the *Enneades*. His old admiration for the Greek thinker, his everlasting gratefulness for the furthering he received from him—it was Plotinus who convinced him of the existence of spiritual substances—, and also his habit of thinking in Plotinian terms interferes somehow with St. Augustine's own ideas. It is almost as if he regretted that Plotinus could not be interpreted in a more Christian spirit.

There is, however, another reason for the apparent contradictions in the statements of St. Augustine; and this reason may explain also some of the obscurities in his doctrine of illumination. Before this point can be further elucidated, several other matters must be mentioned.

If the parallel between sensory and intellectual vision is carried through one comes to the conclusion that there must exist a "proper light" of the intellect as there is one of or in the eye. The latter, corporeal, light is said by Plato to form part of the body; light and fire are the same thing, and the latter is one of the four elements. Can one assume that the incorporeal light be a "part" of the soul?

If the idea of the soul as a simple substance is taken in its most precise significance, the existence of any parts in it is excluded. One may, however, recall that in some sense even St. Thomas uses the term *partes animae*. Surely not in the sense as if the soul were composed of these parts as the body is supposed to consist of the four elements. But it would be possible to conceive of the soul as possessing light as a "part," if the soul were somehow itself luminous.

It should be remembered also that the doctrine of the simplicity of the soul was not always held and not by all. Avicebron did not doubt that the soul is immortal, nor that it is immaterial; nonetheless, he assumed that the soul is a composite of form and "spiritual matter." His views depend, indeed, on Aristotelian hylemorphism. St. Augustine did not think in the terms of the Peripatos. His thought was formed by Platonism, particularly by the philosophy of Plotinus. In the latter's system, perfect simplicity is proper to the One only. Even the *nous* is somehow composed, since it is at once pure thought and the object of this thought, the intelligible world. Hence, the notion of a spiritual being possessing parts might not have been alien to the mind of St. Augustine.

The "ideas" which the mind envisions in the intelligible light are not "parts" of the soul. They are strictly set over against the cognitive power, as its proper objects. They become objects of the intellectual vision because they are relucent in the intelligible light as the visible things are relucent in the corporeal light. The objects of the intellectual vision are not substances, and the incorporeal light cannot be a "part" of them. On the other hand, it must be the same light as the "proper light" of reason, as has been explained above. Hence, the incorporeal or intelligible light, even if it becomes a "part" of the soul in a way comparable to one of the "elements" in the

material world, cannot well be conceived of as being of the substance of the soul. In fact, it is this that St. Augustine seems to have in mind when he refers to this incorporeal and created light as "irradiating" into the soul.[45]

In view of the preceding observations, the following questions may be asked: (1) From where stem the "ideas" the mind discovers within itself? (2) What is the origin and the mode of operation of the created incorporeal light in which and by which these ideas come to be known to reason? (3) What is the relation of the created intelligible light and its function to the uncreated intelligible light and the knowledge it allows the mind to obtain?

(1) St. Augustine insists that the ideas are not derived from experience. They are neither "parts" of the mind. Since there is "nothing between the mind and God" [46] the only source of the ideas seems to be God Himself. The ideas are said to be "the eternal and immutable forms contained in divine reason." [47] However, this does not necessarily mean that the ideas are in the human mind according to the same mode as they are in God.

St. Augustine does not think that these ideas are directly "given" to consciousness. He speaks repeatedly of the ideas as being latent in the mind and discovered there only by diligent search.[48] But once discovered they are immediately evident. Although hidden in the mind, the ideas are not innate.

It is not quite clear why the ideas cannot be innate. One should think that it does not make any difference whether the ideas, whatever their origin, be donated to the mind prior to birth or at a later time. The reason for denying the innateness of the ideas is, probably, that St. Augustine wanted to emphasize that the ideas do not pertain to human nature. They are something added to nature. However, this addition could take place any time.[49]

Another reason for the rejection of the notion of innateness may have been that this notion was closely related, in the mind of St. Augustine and

[45] *De civ. Dei,* XI, c. 27, n. 2. M. Grabmann, *Der göttliche Grund der der menschlichen Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustin und Thomas* (Münster, 1924), p. 2. uses this term in reference to the origin of ideas in the human mind. This terminology will be adopted here and the term "illumination" reserved for the cognitive performance.

[46] *De div. quest.* 83, q. 51, n. 2.

[47] *Ibid.,* q. 46, n. 2; *In Joann.* tr. IV, c. 29, n. 62.

[48] *Contra. Acad.,* III, c. 13; *de lib. arb.,* II, c. 12, n. 34; *Confess.* X, c. 10; *De Trin.,* IV, c. 3, n. 4.

[49] E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2d. ed.; Paris, 1943), p. 122, writes "Man possesses a long series of ideas which are utterly independent of all sensible origin . . . Since St. Augustine denies absolutely all empirical origin, and, on the other hand, rejects the doctrine of innate ideas . . . what other origin could one imagine of the content of our concept besides divine illumination?" The argument of the eminent scholar is not quite convincing. First, it seems that one has to distinguish between the mode by which the ideas come to be in the mind, which shall be called here "irradiation," on one hand, and the cognitive process, on the other hand, which shall be termed strictly "illumination." Secondly, ideas need not be innate and still originate in the mind itself when reason reflects on its own mode of operation. But the main point is that "irradiation" must be viewed as something other than "illumination."

with many of his contemporaries, with the Platonic doctrine of "reminiscence." This doctrine implies the idea of pre-existence which has no place within a Christian philosophy. Quite apart from the thesis that every soul owes its existence to a particular creative act of God, pre-existence entails the view that the soul existed in a perfect state before it came to be united with the body. Hence, the Platonic doctrine is incompatible with that of original sin.

The ideas, then, are "irradiated" into the mind from above, by virtue of a special divine decree. Not, however, as a supernatural gift since these ideas are granted to every rational soul.

This point seems one of minor importance within the doctrine of illumination. One can conceive of these ideas as discoverable within the mind without the intervention of a "peculiar light." [50]

(2) It has been pointed out that St. Augustine makes a distinction between the "eternal verities" knowable to every rational soul, and the truths of faith or any such truth pertaining strictly to the realm of the supernatural. One can hardly attribute to St. Augustine the notion that insight into the "law of numbers" as such is conducive to a good life and salvation. Meditation on this law may, indeed, prove a step towards the recognition of supernatural truth, when and in so far as man is granted divine help. But in itself, the law of numbers is not part of a knowledge one might call supernatural.

One has to take account of this distinction in reading passages like this one: "The rational soul is above all things God created and is nearest to God. To the measure in which the soul is 'coherent' with God it envisions truth, because perfected and illuminated by Him, in some way by the intelligible light. It sees . . . by means of its own highest power (*principale*) by which it excells, that is, by means of its reason . . . these ideas (*rationes*) by virtue of which it attains beatitude." [51] St. Augustine refers, in this passage, obviously, not to those "eternal verities" which every rational soul discovers. Neither the profoundest understanding of mathematics, nor the possession of "natural virtues"—those virtues of the pagans which are but "splendid vices"—nor the most refined understanding of art and poetry ensure the attainment of beatitude.

As the truths every rational soul may know are not those which man is allowed to know by faith, the light which "illuminates" the former can neither be the light rendering visible the latter. Only to the supernatural truths, to those "by virtue of which the soul attains beatitude," refer all the statements on an intelligible light which is God's wisdom. These truths are beyond any natural capacity of the soul, however widely this term may be

[50] This is evidenced, e.g., by the views Descartes held on our knowledge of first truths. True, he assumed that ideas were innate. But the origin of ideas, once more, has no bearing on the theory of intellectual cognition. It suffices that ideas be in the mind to make them discoverable.

[51] *De div. quaest.* 83, q. 46, n. 2.

interpreted. The "proper light" operative in this sort of cognition must be connatural to the truths which are known.[52]

The same applies to the truths known by every rational soul. They, too, require a light corresponding to their nature.

The ideas are not concepts but "states of affairs," or relational contexts. They are intuited, but can be expressed only in judgments. At first sight, it appears questionable whether such an object of reason can be said to be made "relucent" by the intelligible light. The notion of an illumination, comparable to that of bodies by the corporeal light, seems understandable if the illuminated objects may be compared to things; one might argue that this may be affirmed of concepts but not of relational contexts.

It is possible, however, that St. Augustine had of these matters a more correct conception than modern psychology—or also epistemology. But some psychologists, at least, have come to realize that the old notion of sensory awareness needs rather far-reaching corrections. We do not apprehend elementary sensations to combine them afterwards into things; we see things, that is contexts of data which coexist in the thing. As soon as sensory awareness goes beyond mere consciousness of "something present" it becomes the knowledge of a complex or context of data none of which possesses independent existence. Furthermore, anything appears not only as this one thing but as related in a manifold manner to other things; it is a part of a "situation." It is also one of its kind, it resembles others, and this is known also without the intervention of reason, since resemblance is, obviously, noted by animals.

If one abandons the old notion, one strongly influenced by sensationistic theories and Kant's idea of a primary "chaos" or "rhapsody" of sensations, and replaces it by a view more in accord with the facts, the parallel of sensory and intellectual vision loses much of its strangeness.

The intelligible light may well render "visible" contexts as it is the case with the corporeal light.

A more serious difficulty arises, as has been pointed out above, when one considers the relation of the intelligible light to the knowing power. The corporeal light is present in the eye, because the light is an "element" of the organism. Is any analogy to this doctrine conceivable on the level of intellectual cognition?

One looks in vain for any definite answer in the writings of St. Augustine.

[52] V. J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* (Milwaukee, 1944), p. 217, underrates, perhaps, the significance of certain statements in St. Augustine when he writes: "Whether the spiritual light is natural as well as supernatural, whether it falls within the framework of the general *concursus* with which God the Creator supports creation, or whether this light is a special help given to the individual mind by God—these are questions for which there appears to be no satisfactory answer in the works of St. Augustine." At least, the first question seems to allow for a definite answer, and the other two may be answered satisfactorily, even though the answers may still be somewhat hypothetical.

However, a hypothesis seems possible. The soul—or its highest power—might be conceived of as being "truth-like" in the sense in which the eye is called "sun-like." The eye possesses this property independently of its seeing or not seeing; the proper light of the eye is insufficient by itself to engender vision, but it pre-exists prior to all actual seeing. The eye sees when a visible object is present and the corporeal light without joins with the proper light of the eye. Likewise, reason might be endowed with a proper light and nonetheless be able to operate only if there is an intelligible object present—or presented—and an intelligible light at hand rendering visible the objects. The "proper light" of reason would, then, pertain to the natural endowment of man.

This hypothesis is in agreement with St. Augustine's statement that the idea does not form part of man's natural equipment. It does so as little as the objects of sight are part of man's nature. They must be presented to the sense of sight, and so must be presented, too, the intelligible objects.

Such a doctrine may appear to the modern mind as utterly fantastic. But it is consistent with St. Augustine's fundamental conceptions of the nature of knowledge, and with his theory of vision, or sensory awareness in general.

Consequently, the main problem is that of the ontological status of the ideas. To be "irradiated" into the mind and to be illuminated there by the intelligible light, they must have some sort of being in themselves. In some manner they have to be "things." [53] In this regard, it is not enough if one refers to the influence of Platonism. The position of St. Augustine in what concerns the ontological status of the ideas is not, and cannot be, that of either Plato or Plotinus. Nor did St. Augustine consider a world of created ideas as one finds it in the system of Philo Judaeus.[54] The ideas, according to St. Augustine, are either in the divine or in the human mind. They have no existence outside of a mind. He is able to reconcile somehow this view with that of Plotinus in so far as the *nous is* equated to God's Wisdom or the Word. But therewith falls the notion of an intelligible cosmos above and outside of the universe.

Nonetheless, the ideas are not formed out of the human mind, even though they reside there. They truly come "from without"; they enter the human mind by virtue of divine power. But St. Augustine "is too sure of the infirmity of human nature and the human mind to give the latter a vision of the ideas as they are in God's mind." [55] Why, indeed, should the

[53] "Things" more or less in the same sense as that which E. Husserl had in mind when he admonished the philosophical world to "go back to things." Cf. *Confess.* X, c.q.; in science and art memory contains the "things" themselves.

[54] H. A. Wolfson, *Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), I, 200ff., *et pass.*

[55] M. C. d'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), p. 181.

ideas as man conceives of them be such as they are in God when the things God created according to His ideas are so unlike the divine ideas, being material, contingent, and what not?

St. Augustine was not much concerned with questions of ontology. It would be difficult to find any definite statement on such things in his works. One may, however, safely presume that his views were what may be called a mitigated Platonism. That is, he did not doubt that the ideas have some sort of being independently of their being known. But he had to place them in the divine mind, since there is nothing in between the rational soul and God. It is not improbable that this remark which occurs more than once, is meant to reject the doctrine of a "realm of ideas," be it in the sense of Plato, of Philo, or of Plotinus.[56]

Although ideas exist, within the range of human experience, only in the human mind, they exist nonetheless objectively. They are "objects" in the true sense of the term. The mind encounters them when it sets out to search itself.

This encounter is rendered possible by the intelligible light, the created intelligible light. It seems that one has to think of this light as surrounding the intelligible things in a manner analogical[57] to that in which the corporeal light pervades the world of sensibles. But there is no darkness in the intelligible world. The created incorporeal light has been granted to every rational soul and the soul has been endowed with the "eternal verities." Every man "coming into the world" receives the light by which he is enabled to discover the eternal verities.

In this created light man envisages the truths and cannot but conceive of the notion that these truths must come from some source. They are not of his making; they are not derived from experience. He cannot but wonder at the mysteries of number; he cannot but recognize a moral order or an order of goodness which, so St. Augustine believes, is as evident as is that of numbers. The order of goodness possesses moreover the character of imposing an obligation and thus becomes an evident principle regulating action.[58]

But if this interpretation of Augustinian thought is correct, why is it that the question arose at all whether or not the principle of illumination is

[56] It is not without interest to note that recently a philosopher, without referring to and probably without being influenced by St. Augustine, proposed an ontology of "spiritual beings," or ideas, which could be related to the notions of St. Augustine—see Nic. Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins* (2d. ed.; Berlin, 1949).

[57] If the term "analogical" is used here, it does not imply the particular significance it has within the system of St. Thomas. Although St. Augustine recognizes the hierarchical order of being, he does not see it as dominated by the principle of the *analogia entis.* Many of his statements on similarities can well be expressed also within the framework of the *analogia entis;* but St. Augustine's conception is, nevertheless, different.

[58] See, e.g., B. Roland-Gosselin, "St. Augustine's System of Morals," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), p. 236.

God Himself and whether or not the human mind in itself envisages in itself the divine ideas?

(3) It has been claimed that one must acknowledge two illuminations; one by the created intelligible light which renders visible the eternal, but not supernatural, truths, and another by the uncreated intelligible light in which man may, so far as his abilities go, attain a vision—in a "dark mirror"—of the supernatural truths. This distinction follows from St. Augustine's own statements on the two lights.

But, there are many passages which seem to affirm that even the knowledge of those truths which every rational soul may attain is achieved under the influence of a light which not only comes from God—as a gift, indeed, above nature, but nevertheless not a supernatural gift—but in some way is God. It is unnecessary to mention such passages; they are numerous and well known.

When St. Augustine speaks of illumination in reference to the uncreated light he attributes to the light an effect "not only epistemological but also ontological." [59] By divine illumination, in the strict sense, man is not only enabled to know truth, and to know some truths more perfectly; he is himself perfected. One surely will not credit St. Augustine with the notion that a thorough understanding of mathematics makes a man better.

There is one rather remarkable statement: "The light which illuminates a mind according to rules of truth is lightened by the First Truth and tends to return there." [60] What St. Augustine means to say is, probably, more or less this: Whenever the mind becomes cognizant of some evident, absolute truth the very fact of evidence as well as the fact of "objectivity"—that is, of being independent of man's activity—point beyond the truth at a source. It is for that reason, that the fullness of truth becomes known to the "saintly and pious soul"; not as if these qualities were prerequisites for the understanding of the law of numbers, for instance, but they are for the understanding of what is "behind" and above this law.

Reason, however, cannot proceed much beyond the mere discovery of the source or the existence of a first truth. But reason, or the mind, once enlightened by the uncreated light, will never forget that the verities it knows by means of the created light are but parts of The Truth or "perfect similitudes of the principle," [61] perfect but still only similitudes.

Knowledge granted to man by God through the uncreated light makes the rational verities not only "relucent" but, as it were, "transparent." These verities then lose their independence; they are no longer true by and in themselves but owe their being true to the First Truth which they somehow mirror.

[59] V. J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* (Milwaukee, 1944), p. 226.
[60] *De vera relig.*, c. 39, n. 72.
[61] *Ibid.*, c. 36, n. 66.

Things transparent are apt to be overlooked. When we look at things through a perfectly transparent glass, we see only the things but not the glass, even though it may be glass which enables us to see things, as it is with our eyeglasses or even more so with optical instruments. The astronomer at his telescope or the anatomist at his microscope sees the objects of his study only by means of the lenses; but they do not see the lenses.

Thus, the mind accustomed, by God's grace, to see things in the uncreated light may arrive at a point where the knoweldge of the rational verities and that of things divine are fused or merged into one another. And the splendor of the uncreated light is so strong that the illuminating power of the created intelligible light passes unnoticed.

This seems to have been the case with St. Augustine. It would be easy to bring together instances of his intellectual and religious development and to show that his progress in philosophical thought is so much intertwined with his penetrating ever more deeply into the truths of faith as to render him incapable of clearly keeping separate the two kinds of knowledge. More and more it becomes a habit of his mind to envisage the eternal verities, accessible to every rational soul, but as the preambles of supernatural truths. He is the more inclined to disregard the knowledge on the created intelligible light and to attribute all knowledge to divine illumination since to him all knowledge has become thoroughly "transparent." He almost is compelled, by the habits of his mind, to conceive of every triade he discovers as a "vestige" of the Trinity, of every beauty he admires as a reflexion of Beauty Itself, of every good, however, humble as an out pouring of Goodness Itself.

Only if one takes account of those passages in which he distinguishes between the created and the uncreated intelligible light, or remembers that knowledge, even of the eternal and immutable verities, is attained also by the "impious," does one arrive, it seems, at an understanding of his doctrine of illumination. These passages are not inconsistencies, least of all concessions made to divergent views; they are rather the expression of his true systematic conception.

There remain several problems which cannot be discussed within the scope of this article. One of these problems is that of the relation of the uncreated intelligible light to grace. Another, that of the relation of "illumination" to the *concursus*. In this regard one might venture to say that the illumination through the created intelligible light is the manifestation of the *concursus* on the level of rationality. The divine *concursus* takes on, if one may say so, different forms according to the ontological status of the created thing to which the *concursus* is granted. God provides for the things He created not only that they persist in being but also that they operate according to the nature He has given to everything. A third problem is that of the mode in which the created intelligible light becomes the "proper light" of reason. Whether this question can be answered at all is debatable.

It is not the intention of the foregoing considerations to furnish a "proof" for the theory of illumination. It is not claimed that this doctrine can be maintained or defended without modifications. Whether or not this be the case is a question not to be discussed here.

This article pursued no other aim than to submit a contribution to the understanding of the Augustinian theory of cognition and to show that the ideas of the *doctor gratiae* are consistent with themselves and sufficiently clear. They do not require any particularly ingenious hypotheses to become intelligible. Least of all, do these ideas entail any danger of "ontologism." This apparent danger vanishes at once if one realizes that there are, according to St. Augustine, two intellectual illuminations, as this study tried to demonstrate.

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THE NOTIONS OF TRIAD AND OF MEDIATION IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. AUGUSTINE

By Rudolf Allers

In his great treatise *De Trinitate,* St. Augustine endeavors to show that one may discover, throughout reality, the *vestigia trinitatis*; although it is primarily man who has been created *in imaginem et similitudinem* of the Creator, and although the term "image" applies only to man inasmuch as his highest powers are considered, the whole creation nevertheless bespeaks the greatness and, in an increasingly imperfect manner, the nature to which it owes its origin.

St. Augustine does not dwell much on things subhuman. He is concerned, according to his often quoted statement, only with "God and the soul." What has not a direct bearing on either of these questions appears to him as of a minor interest. He does not, however, fail to point out that the triadic structure, in which he discovers the, be it very faint, resemblance between creature and Creator, is found also in the material world. Some of the triads he mentions are, it seems, merely metaphors, used to illustrate his idea; thus when he refers to the triad of source, river, and potable water. Others, however, indicate essential traits of reality. This is quite clear, for instance, when he speaks of all reality being determined by *mensura, pondus et numerus.*[1]

It is evident that the mainspring of St. Augustine's meditations on this subject is, on the one hand, the doctrine of the Trinity and, on the other, the passage in *Genesis,* 1, 26, where the words quoted above occur.

But it is probable that he was influenced in this respect, as in many others, by the philosophy of Plotinus. It is not the intention of this essay to reopen the discussion on the extent to which St. Augustine has remained true to the principles of Neo-Platonism. Whatever the answer be, it is indubitable that he had made his own the fundamentals of this philosophy, even though he came to recognize that he had at first overrated its closeness to the tenets of the Faith. He never ceased to acknowledge his indebtedness to the great pagan thinker and indications of the latter's influence can be found throughout the words of the Bishop of Hippo.

To make clear the significance of Plotinian metaphysics in relation to the ontological speculations of St. Augustine some comments on the former are required. It is claimed that the triadic principle is an essential feature in Neo-Platonic metaphysics.

Before attempting to show that and where this principle may be found in the *Enneades,* it may be pointed out that the idea of triads comes to the fore, in a very marked degree, indeed, in the writings of the later Neo-Platonists. Some of these philosophers did not conceive of their work as a continuation

[1] This point will be taken up briefly below. The formula is that of *Sap.,* XI, 21.

of that begun by Plotinus, but rather as an elaboration of Plato's own ideas. Plotinus was seen by these men not so much as the initiator of a new philosophy but as an outstanding interpreter of Platonic doctrines.[2] They could, in fact, find much of what Plotinus had taught implied, or even stated explicitly, in the works of Plato. We are concerned here only with the idea of the triad and may, accordingly, disregard all other sides of Platonism or Neo-Platonism.

One will find easily a great number of references to triads in the works of Plato. Two of the dialogues, however, seem to deserve particular attention. One is the *Phaedrus* with its "myth" of the charioteer and the two horses, as an image of the human soul. One may follow the effectiveness of this notion through all the centuries, down to modern times. It is certainly back of St. Augustine's description of the three powers or "parts" of the mind, to which he gives not always the same names, but the number of which is always three.

The other dialogue is, of course, the *Timeaeus*. The "cosmogonic myth" told there speaks of three factors required for a world to come to be. Since the Demiurge does not create *ex nihilo,* he needs a material, which is the primeval chaos; he fashions the world in accord with the vision he has of the eternal ideas, so that there are three origins of reality. Even more important is that the Demiurge "fashioned reason within soul and soul within body, to the end that the work he accomplished might be by nature as excellent and perfect as possible." [3] This is a special instance of the general idea of a tripartite reality which recurs again and again in the thought of Plato. Later on Timaeus tells of how the Demiurge constructed the world out of fire and earth, and he proceeds: "But two things alone cannot be satisfactorily united without a third; for there must be a bond between them drawing them together." The most perfect unity is achieved by a bond "of the nature of a continued geometrical proportion." [4] Such a proportion implies three terms and is of the general form, a:b=b:c.[5]

What is said in the *Timaeus*—and it does not matter here, whether these are Plato's own views or some others on which he reports—is that the establishment of a new unity with two extreme terms requires the presence of a third element. In shaping the world, the Demiurge brings together, as it were,

[2] This is, e. g., quite evident in the case of Proclus; cf. L. J. Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (New York, 1949). Proclus headed the Academy of Athens and was thus actually the "successor" of Plato (διάδοχος). On the Platonism of Plotinus and the "pre-Neo-Platonism" of Aristotle and the Academy, cf. P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (The Hague, 1953).

[3] *Tim.,* 31B; F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (New York, 1952), p. 44. Cf. also *Tim.,* 35A; three forms of existence, an intermediary one between the divisible and the indivisible. Ibid., 48A: the soul composed of existence, being and becoming; and 52D, where the "receptacle" is mentioned as intermediary of and joining being and becoming.

[4] *Tim.,* 31C.

[5] Cornford, *op. cit.,* p. 45 ff. This proportion is called, in Greek mathematics ἀναλογία Its significance in regard to ontological conceptions will be briefly referred to below.

the idea and the material wherein the idea will be present, so that the existent will "participate" in the idea. The bond of participation replaces, once the world-shaping work is done, the active influence of the Demiurge. Once the world has come to exist, there is this "static" relationship of participation instead of the "dynamic" one apparent in the world-fashioning process.

The notion of a "bond" between two heterogeneous terms, or—as we prefer to say—of a "mediation," a term which leaves undecided whether one has to do with an intermediary ontic stratum or with a dynamic relationship, this notion, then, holds also a prominent place in the metaphysics of Plotinus. This becomes evident not only by a study of the *Enneades,* but also, and with particular clarity, by the fact that the followers of Plotinus show a marked tendency to multiply the triads found in the work of Plotinus. None of the latter's followers went as far in this respect as Jamblichus of whom "it is known that he attempted a more systematic analysis of emanation by resolving them [the several hypostases] into subordinate triads." [6]

That the idea of the triad is prominent also in the thought of Proclus can be seen in many passages, especially in those in which he treats of the forthcoming and return, as for example in the *Institutio theologica,* XXIX-XXXI.[7]

If the successors of Plotinus discovered the triad in the master's works, and in those of Plato himself—they thought of themselves as followers of Plato rather than of Plotinus who was viewed mainly as a continuator and interpreter of the true Platonic tradition—it is improbable that the presence and the importance of the triad should have escaped the perspicacity of St. Augustine; this is the more probable, since he was prepared to accept this idea because of his notion of the *vestigia trinitatis.*

The philosophy which Plotinus and his successors professed appeared to them not as a "Neo-Platonism" but as the authentic interpretation of Platonism, so much so that the scholars at Athens did not want to be considered as continuators of the Academy but as "Platonists" because they felt that the Academy had not been true to the authentic tradition. This, however, did not prevent their being influenced, even to a marked degree, by the conceptions of some of the representatives of the Academy, by Speusippus, Xenocrates, and also others.

Plotinus himself was, perhaps, not quite aware of the modifications to which he subjected the ideas of Plato; he may have felt that he did no more than develop in greater detail what Plato had but adumbrated or left incomplete. Thus, when he constructed his hierarchical cosmos, he may have conceived of his ontology as an elaboration on the Platonic idea of the tripartition of being.

[6] T. Whittacker, *The Neo-Platonists,* 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1928) p. 123.

[7] *Procli successoris Platonici Institutio theologica,* ed. Fr. Dübner, in: *Plotini Enneades* ed. Fr. Creuzer and H. Moser (Paris, 1896) p. LXIII. For a complete list of triads in Proclus, cf. Rosán, *op. cit.,* p. 97 ff.; who justly calls the "triadic arrangement" the *"leitmotif"* of Proclus' philosophy.

This may have been the case the more since Plotinus was concerned with the problem of being rather than with that of knowledge. Plato had related the three divisions of being to three kinds of knowledge and it had been the latter question which had preoccupied, not exclusively indeed, but to a large extent, the philosophers of the Hellenistic age.[8] Plotinus returned to a strictly ontological problematics.

In this ontology, the triadic principle is very evident. If one mentions the idea of the triad in regard to Plotinian metaphysics, one thinks, probably, in first place of the three supreme hypostases, the doctrine of which was also what appeared to St. Augustine as close to the trinitarian dogma of the Church. It may be that later interpreters of Neo-Platonism were influenced also, in their emphasis on the three first hypostases, consciously or unconsciously, by this apparent resemblance to Christian doctrine. The triadic structure, however, is, in truth, not limited to the One, the Nous, and the World-Soul, but pervades the whole of Plotinian metaphysics.

The Plotinian universe is a stratified whole. The world picture which results from the story of creation in *Genesis* is likewise that of a stratified whole. In this regard, too, St. Augustine could find an impressive resemblance between pagan philosophy and Christian doctrine. There is, however, a profound difference. The relationship, namely, of the several strata is another here and there. According to Christian—and, for that matter, Hebrew—doctrine, the "succession" of the strata depends on the creative will of God whose *fiat* gives existence to the lowest stratum first—at least, as far as this tangible, "sub-lunar" world is concerned—so that the higher stratum is founded on the lower one. Once created, each stratum has an existence of its own, even though the higher requires the lower in order to be. But the lower does not require the higher. The unity of the cosmos is, at the same time, that of the divine plan and that of finality, since the lower strata exist, in a certain sense, "for the sake of" the higher ones. In Neo-Platonism not only is there no idea of creation by an act of divine will, but also the relationship of the strata is reversed; it is the higher hypostasis which "gives birth" to the one beneath it. While in Christian doctrine it is God *qui disposuit omnia suaviter,*[9] in Neo-Platonism the sequence of hypostases results by virtue of an intrinsic necessity; for it is of the nature of the good that it "flow over." [10]

[8] Cf. e. g., Merlan, *op. cit.*, p. 33, 56 *et pass.* It is, for that matter, perhaps always a sign of a decline of speculative power if philosophy concentrates more on method and the modes of knowledge than on being itself.

[9] *Sap.*, 8, 1.

[10] One must beware, or so it seems to us, of attributing too much of a "dynamic" sense to certain expressions which Plotinus has to employ, there being none to replace them. It is, perhaps, going too far when E. Bréhier, *Plotin: Ennéades* (Paris, 1938) VI, 2, p. 154, renders the terms ἐνέργεια and ἐνέργημα by "act" and "product." One would, it seems, be closer to the meaning of Plotinus if one were to speak of "reality" and "derived reality." There are many passages in which all kinds of activity or doing is expressly denied not only of the one but also of the lower hypostases. See next note.

One has to keep in mind that this "overflow" is not an activity of the hypostasis which through it engenders the next one. The impassivity, immovability of the One repeats itself, *secundum quid,* in every one of the lower hypostases. It is very difficult to condense the complex and subtle conceptions of Plotinus in a short and simple formula. Nevertheless, some things have to be said to elucidate the peculiar significance which the notion of the triad assumes in the hands of St. Augustine.

For the universe to be a structured whole, a cosmos in the true sense of the name, there must be an all-pervading principle which holds together the several strata and confers unity on the universe. The creating and maintaining will of God, the *concursus* which keeps things in existence, is absent in the system of Plotinus. The unifying principle cannot come from a transcendent source because the One is totally indifferent to the sequence of hypostases which "emanate" from the One. Hence, the unifying principle must be sought in the nature of the hypostases themselves. This applies, indeed, only to the hypostases which form the existing cosmos, those which are, if one may say so, contained between the One and mere matter; for the absolute transcendent One does not allow any predication by means of the categories of the "intermediary" hypostases, nor does matter which is void of all characteristics and which does not engender a hypostasis lower than itself.

The unifying principle is found in that a hypostasis does not become completely separated from the one it engenders nor from that by which it is engendered. Many passages from the *Enneades* could be quoted in support of this principle. One of the most characteristic statements is one which introduces Nature as answering the questioning mind: "I [Nature] preserve the disposition of my mother and of the principles which produced me. These two were born of contemplation; and I was born the same way. They produced me without acting. . . ." [11]

The last two words of this quotation should be noted. For they show that in spite of such terms as "overflow," "emanation," "producing," and so on, it is hardly correct to speak of a dynamism in Plotinian metaphysics. In engendering the next lower hypostasis the higher one "does not do anything." Neither the One nor any of the following hypostases can be said to be active in the strict sense of the word.

What Nature says of herself applies also to the hypostases. In all of them persists the "pathos" of the engendering one, which, in turn, retains somehow

[11] *Enn.,* III. 8. 4. Καὶ μοί τὸ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῶν γειναμένων ὑπάρχει πάθος. καὶ γαρ ἐκεῖνοι εἰσὶν ἐκ θεωρίας καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ ἐμὴ κείνωννύδὲν πραξάντων. The translation is that of R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus,* 3rd ed. (London, 1948) I, 159. E. Bréhier, *Plotin, Ennéades,* III, 157, also renders πάθος by "disposition." The term must be understood as meaning not only a certain readiness for operation or a passive potency, but an inner structure or constitution; the formal nature remains the same throughout the sequence of hypostases, though with diminishing power. Elsewhere Bréhier renders πάθος by *manière d'être* (e. g. *Enn.* I, i, 2.) which may be preferable.

the "traces" of their ultimate origin. Just as the free creative will of God is replaced, in the system of Plotinus, by the overflow which results necessarily from the very essence of goodness, so the "poietic" *concursus* is replaced by the "pathic" persistence in every hypostasis of something which exists in a purer manner in the engendering higher levels of being.

Thus, even the lowest hypostasis retains, at least, the "shadow" of the One but not more than that. The context of the totality of being is guaranteed not by an immediate but by a mediated relationship to the One. This principle of mediation [12] pervades the whole of the Plotinian cosmos. If we contemplate three successive hypostases, a, b, and c, we have to realize that a and c are linked the one to the other, and thus incorporated, as it were, in the whole of the universe, by the intermediary hypostasis b. Thus, whenever the relationship between three successive hypostases is envisaged, one has to do with "one and another and a third which joins the two together"; this, however, is precisely the formula which St. Augustine repeats every time that he refers to one of the triads of being, as well as of operation.

It is obvious that the foregoing, rapid examination of some points in the metaphysics of Plotinus in no way pretends to be an analysis of this system. Its aim was only to elucidate, somehow, one particular, if basic, aspect of Neo-Platonism. A few words may be added concerning the two ultimate hypostases, that is the One and Matter.

The conception of the One as absolutely transcending all being and of matter as almost non-being renders it difficult, even impossible, that the triadic principle appear as one of truly all-pervading universality. Even though the first three hypostases, the One, the Nous and the World-Soul, are referred to as three deities, this triad does not stand on the same level as those which may be found beneath that of the One. It cannot be said that there exists a relation of participation between the second and the first hypostasis, because this would involve the latter in a manner incompatible with its absolute transcendence. Consequently, neither is there possibility of speaking of *vestigia trinitatis* within the framework of Neo-Platonism.

St. Augustine stresses again and again God's transcendence, *qui melius scitur nesciendo* and who is known to us only in a *docta ignorantia.* But this non-knowing is nevertheless a knowing *in aenigmate,* and the visible things of this world lead us, indeed, to the invisible things of God. In spite of this inadequacy of the human mind to grasp divine nature even approximatively and in spite of the fact that nothing can be predicated of this nature, because the fundamental relation of substance and attribute does not apply—*Deus est quod habet*—, it is an idea of the supreme being profoundly different from that of Plotinus which dominates Augustinian thinking.

[12] It need not be emphasized that this term "mediation" is to be understood here in its literal sense and must not be confused with that "mediation" which plays so great a role in the philosophy of Hegel.

"I read there [in the *Enneades*], not in proper terms, but in a very similar sense . . . that at the beginning there was the Word, and the Word was in God, and God was the Word." [13] There is no doubt, remarks Gilson, that St. Augustine read these things in Plotinus, but it is much less certain that they are there.[14] But this interpretation may well have been suggested to St. Augustine by the fact that Plotinus designates the One as the "father of the causing agent" (this is perhaps, the best rendering of αἴτιον).[15]

It has been pointed out above that the absolute transcendence, the complete passivity and inactivity of the One preclude the recognition of anything like the idea of divine grace in the philosophy of Plotinus. Accordingly the return of the soul, in a gradual ascent, to the One is conceived of as a strictly human achievement. Neither is there, in this system, any place for prayer nor for Revelation and none either for Salvation or a Mediator.[16]

All these profound differences between the doctrines of Christianity and Neo-Platonism obtruded themselves, apparently, only gradually on the consciousness of St. Augustine. The conceptions which had suggested to him the presence of, at least, an adumbration of a trinitarian doctrine in Plotinus revealed themselves as being rather far from it. There remained, nonetheless, the triadic aspect which acquired, in the mind of St. Augustine, a new and deeper significance by being related to the mystery of the Trinity and to the idea of the *vestigia trinitatis.*

From the preceding presentation of some points of Plotinian metaphysics it should have become clear that, as we understand this philosophy, the qualification of "dynamic" applies to it in a rather inappropriate sense. Not only must the πρόοδος, the "forthcoming," of the successive hypostases be understood as non-temporal, a character which precludes all dynamism in the full sense of the term, but there are many passages in the *Enneades* which suggest that this "forthcoming" is not so much a separation, giving birth to independent forms of existence, as something like an immanent differentiation. Although there are some remarks which read as if they dealt with a "process," [17] the Plotinian triads can be described as, generally, of a "static" nature. If the passage just quoted speaks of "cooperation" of things by "being ordained towards two sides according to their nature," this co-operation has no other effect than to "produce a connection of all things," that is, the all-pervading hierarchical order of the universe. It is consistent with this more static conception that action plays a minor role in the thought of Plotinus; it is viewed as definitely inferior to contemplation of which it is but the

[13] *Confess,* VII, 9, 13.

[14] E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin,* 3d ed. (Paris, 1948) p. 261.

[15] This expression recurs several times in the *Enneades;* e.g., V, 1, 8; V, 8, 13; II, 9, 2.

[16] Cf. E. Bréhier, *La Philosophie de Plotin* (Paris, 1928) p. 114.

[17] See, e.g.; *Enn.,* III, 3, 2: Συμπλέκτει δὲ πάντα τὸ ἡγούμενον, συμφερομένων τῶν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα.

"shadow." [18] One may recall in this context the repeated emphasis, on the part of Plotinus, on "contemplation," θεωρία; it is this inner vision which engenders the next lower hypostasis. Herein lies, it would seem, a clear indication of the essentially non-dynamic nature of the Plotinian metaphysics.

To qualify Neo-Platonic metaphysics as static or a-dynamic is, of course, not tantamount to denying that Plotinus did consider activity. Plotinus was, quite to the contrary, a moralist as well as a speculative metaphysician and, consequently, had to allow to action a place in his world. But a philosophy which does not know of eternal reward or punishment, and which, moreover, lacks the idea of personal immortality, because the final goal is a sort of re-absorption into the One, needs must envisage action in a manner rather different from that which prevails in Christian doctrine.

The fundamental conception that all that is remains somehow in the One or that it is the One whose being and power founds the existence and all manifestations of the lower hypostases, relegates individual operation to a secondary place. Neo-Platonic metaphysics, therefore, to become applicable within the frame of reference of Christian doctrine, had to undergo some notable modification and complementation.

Several reasons rendered this transformation of the original Plotinian doctrine inevitable. First, there was the idea of the *vestigia trinitatis.* One may discover some similarity to this conception also in Plotinus; but it is a very faint similarity. For the "trinity" of Plotinus is one of three successive hypostases which belong, consequently, to three different existential levels. It is always a triad of entities ordered according to degrees of dignity. If, however, the created world was to be some sort of similitude to the Creator, this difference of levels would impair, almost make impossible, any such similitude.

Secondly, if time was envisaged as "the moving image of eternity," and eternity is that of the living triune Deity, the timeless *nunc stans,* and also what theology was to call the *processio Dei ad intra,* then not only time itself had to "mirror" somehow, be it most darkly, the inner trinitarian life, but all temporal events had to be construed as possessing a triadic structure which would correspond to the unfathomable mystery of divine nature. That is to say, every event would present itself as dependent on the flux of time, under the threefold aspect of past, present and future, and also reveal itself as of a triadic structure in every cross section, so to speak, so that every phase of an event would imply three constituent factors or elements.

It is not improbable that it was considerations of this kind which led St. Augustine to extend the notion of a triadic structure from the hierarchy of being to operations. He may have arrived in this way at his formula of "the third joining together the two," wherein the "third" is conceived of as belonging to the same ontic level as the two terms which are thus united.

[18] *Enn.,* III., 8, 3: σκιὰ θεωρίας καὶ λόγου.

The assumption is, perhaps, not too daring that the fact of the Incarnation and of the Redemption of man by the Word having become flesh may have exercised a definite influence on this aspect of Augustinian metaphysics. For, is it not the Mediator κατ' ἐξοχήν who unites in one Person both the divine and the human nature?

Whatever the reasons may have been, it is certain that St. Augustine went beyond Neo-Platonism inasmuch as he extended the triadic conception to operations.

This extension of the idea of the triad from inert being to active being may have appeared to St. Augustine not as a very far-reaching modification of the Plotinian conception. It is, in fact, easy to interpret as "dynamic" the "coming forth" of the hypostases from each other, although this is, as we believe, reading Plotinus in the light of some of his later successors rather than in his original meaning.[19] What suggests such a dynamic interpretation is the identification of the relationship obtaining between the lower and the higher hypostasis not only as a "contemplation"—a term, used, as we saw, also in regard to Nature which, indeed, is conceived of as possessing a "soul"—but also as a "longing." For the tendency towards a "return," towards the ἐπιστροφή, is proper not only to the soul but virtually also to all the other hypostases.

By extending the notions of the triad and the mediation to operations, St. Augustine, of course, did not eliminate the static aspect. Quite to the contrary, this aspect retains its full significance as a principle of being. And this not only because the triadic principle is valid, *modo eminentissimo,* also for the Trinity and, hence, appears in the similitude, but also because becoming and operation cannot be thought without a substratum. If, however, operation, is to be of a triadic structure, that which makes operation possible must, one has to assume, possess the same kind of structure. In fact, all philosophies which place becoming above being presuppose, tacitly or explicitly, a substratum which, then, has to contain the principles of becoming. When Heraclitus says that it is impossible to "step twice into the same river," it is nevertheless "a" river into which we step.

The absence of a strict dynamism in Plotinian metaphysics has also the consequence that there can be no real influence of one hypostasis on the other. Mediation, in Neo-Platonism, too, is essentially static; it consists in the fact that the engendered hypostasis retains something—ὑπάρχει τὸ πάθος—of

[19] One thinks, in first place, of Syrianus-Proclus; in their conception it is the triad of "remaining within the cause," μονή the "coming forth" πρόοδος, and the "return," ἐπιστροφή; what comes forth is, at once, identical with and different from its origin, "remaining" there by virtue of identity, "proceeding" and separated by virtue of difference. Because every being seeks the good and can aim at it only by turning towards its proximate origin, there is "return." But this "process" is timeless and, in truth, not a real process since the ontic levels do not become merged the one with the other but retain their separatedness and peculiarity. Cf. L. J. Rosán, *op. cit.,* p. 68 ff.

the engendering one, but it is not in any sense an "imparting" so that the higher hypostasis could be viewed as being active. So far as there is activity it is rather, to express it thus, an activity "within," proper to and flowing from, the nature of the hypostasis. If the soul, for instance, by its being immersed in matter may be said to encounter obstacles, these are not to be considered as "effects" of matter. What there is of activity is exclusively on the part of the soul which may free herself from the limitations imposed—this term too must not be taken as denoting activity—by matter, and live her true life which culminates in reunion with the Nous and through it with the One. This view is closely related to that of the superiority of contemplation above action on the one hand, and with that of the impassivity of the One on the other.[20]

It is, in fact, difficult to find a place for will in the philosophy of Plotinus. "What is free in us is that spontaneous movement of the Spirit which has no external cause; [21] it is the will of the higher Soul to return to its own Principle." [22] But this "will" is nothing other than the inborn "longing" which, in turn is expressive of the universal law of the ἐπιστροφή. It would seem that it deserves to be called "will" only in a rather unauthentic sense.

The psychology or anthropology of St. Augustine, however, has been characterized as "voluntarism," as a doctrine which credits will with the primary role in human existence. This view is, even though it has been maintained by eminent scholars, perhaps, too much of a simplification. For St. Augustine the truly central concept is not so much "will" as "love." It is love which joins together will and its goal, or willing and knowing. If one may quote numerous passages which lend support to a onesided voluntaristic interpretation, there are others in which the three fundamental powers of the soul, memory, reason and will, appear as co-ordinated and man's conduct as dependent not less on insight than on will.[23]

Few conceptions lend themselves as little to schematization as that of St. Augustine. One finds in his writings, on the one hand, a distinction of triads which then seem to form a certain hierarchy, but on the other hand also the idea of a mutual interpenetration of these triads. To mention one

[20] It is probable that Plotinus has been influenced by the ideas of Philo; but certainly not in this regard. ". . . in Philo the generation of the Logos by God was an act of will and design, in Plotinus it is without will and design." H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers,* (Cambridge, 1956) I, 202.

[21] *Enn.,* VI, 8, 1-6; note particular 3: "will resides in reason."

[22] R. Inge, *op. cit.,* II, p. 183 ff.

[23] Gilson, *op. cit.,* p. 175, emphasizes the primacy of will as an outstanding determinant even of intellectual cognition. "Avant d'engendrer ainsi en nous la connaissance, il faut que nous la désirions." Certainly; but desire, in turn, demands an antecedent acquaintance, be it however vague, of the possible object of desire. It is not proof of an exaggerated "intellectualism" if one maintains that *nihil volitum quin praecognitum*; it is simply stating a necessary truth. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that Gilson does not stress the voluntaristic aspect of the thought of St. Augustine in his new work, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955) pp. 70 ff.

example: will is joined to its end, which is recognized by reason, through love; but for something to appear as loveable, it is necessary that will join together reason and its object. The same involved relationship obtains in regard to sensory cognition.[24]

It is not for this essay to unravel the intricacies of Augustinian psychology. It is, however, relevant to note that there is an unquestionable equality of nature of the three constituents of every one of the Augustinian triads. The "third which joins together the other two" is of the same nature, or belongs to the same ontic level, as the two it unites; at the same time, the conjoining third is different from each of the two conjoined.

We believe that the triadic structure and the related notion of mediation are basic characteristics, in St. Augustine's thought, of both being and process. It is not an exaggeration to speak of an ubiquity of these principles in all parts of Augustinian speculation.

Reference has been made above to the triad of *mensura, pondus et numerus* as constitutive of the tangible world. It might be objected that in this case there is not the "ontological equality" which has been pointed out as an essential feature of the Augustinian triads, because number is an "abstract notion." This is, however, not the manner in which antiquity conceived of number; if it could be abstracted from the data of experience, it was because number was actually there, a property of these data.[25]

No more need be said on this point, although it entails many interesting questions. But for the present it suffices that the triadic structure is formally the same in all instances in which St. Augustine believes he discovers it. From this, some light also falls on the Augustinian theory of "illumination" as the essence of all cognitive achievements.[26] The same triadic structure is found

[24] The ubiquity of the triadic structure renders it questionable whether St. Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity can be qualified simply as "psychological" as in M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus* (Münster, 1927).

[25] Much has been written on the history of Greek mathematics and on the general attitude in regard to magnitude and number of the various schools. If there exists a special study of St. Augustine's knowledge of mathematics and his sources, it has escaped our attention. It ought to be superfluous to point out the necessity of viewing the utterances on mathematical questions in the light of the general mentality of an age. For even the speculations of the Neo-Pythagorans appear then not so completely "fantastic" as modern writers would have them to be.

[26] An interpretation of "illumination" on the basis of the triadic conception, particularly of vision, has been attempted previously: R. Allers, "Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Illumination," *Franciscan Studies,* XII (1952) 27, and "Illumination et vérités éternelles; une étude sur l'a-priori augustinian," *Augustinus Magister, Etudes Augustiniennes* (1955) 477. This interpretation has been challenged by Fr. Boyer, S. J., "S. Agostino e il Neo-Tomismo," *S. Agostino e le grandi correnti della filosofia contemporanea.* (Proc. Ital. Cong. of Augustinian Philos. [1956] 119 ff.; cf. esp. p. 125. The author finds fault with our interpretation because the designation of all cognition as "vision" is but an analogy and, therefore, entails difference as much as similarity. There is no doubt that one has to do with an analogy. The question is, however, what are the differences and what the similarities. For an analogy to be possible there must exist certain formal like-

again in action, so that both the receptive and the effective relationship of man to his world are based on such triads.

The emphasis on the triadic structure in no way precludes the recognition of dyadic relationships; the latter are, indeed, comprised by the former. Within the framework of such a conception, the dual relationship may be considered as a limit-case of the triad. The limit is reached either when there is an identity of the two terms or when the nature of one of the terms precludes the interposition of a third. The first is the case, for instance, of the mind searching itself, according to St. Augustine's admonition: *in te ipsum redi,* since there can be no mediation between mind questioning and mind questioned. The other instance is represented, for example, by the Plotinian One which is outside, so to speak, of all being so that any mediation between the One and the second hypostasis becomes inconceivable.

But also the relationship of the mediating third to each of the two conjoined terms is an unmediated one by virtue of the partial identity which the joining third has to each of the two terms.[27]

But fundamentally, the "unity in diversity" which constitutes the totality of being, is based on the ubiquitous triadic relationship which thus appears as the essential feature in the structure of being.

If this interpretation is correct—and we hope to have made it at least plausible—then a question arises of far greater generality, namely, that of the significance of dyadic and triadic conceptions in the several systems of metaphysics history has known. This is, of course, a problem much too vast to be discussed adequately here; it is, however, the logical outcome of the considerations submitted and cannot be disregarded altogether, even though not more than a bare outline can be traced.

St. Augustine has been called often a "precursor" of Descartes, so often, indeed, that this statement has become something of a commonplace. St. Augustine is said to have "anticipated" the Cartesian *cogito* by the argument he used to refute the scepticism of the Academy. He finds, as one knows, an incontrovertible certitude in the fact of the *sciome scire;* all mental operations, of whatever kind, are mine, with absolute certitude: when I doubt, I know for certain that it is I who doubt, therefore think, live, exist.

The similarity of the Augustinian and the Cartesian position is evident. Two questions arise. One, whether there is an ascertainable influence of

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nesses, even identities. The formal and identical principle on which St. Augustine bases his analogical discussion of knowledge is, however, precisely the thoroughgoing triadic structure. This makes it impossible that, as Fr. Boyer claims, it be the intellect itself which would be also the "intellectual light," for then there would be no longer any triad but a strictly dyadic relationship. And between a pair and a triad there is as little analogy as between a triangle and a line.

[27] An analysis of this notion of partial identity would carry us too far afield. There are, however, several problems hidden in this apparently simple term which require a special inquiry.

St. Augustine on Descartes. The other, whether the similarity or even, if one so wills, the identity, of the propositions denotes a kinship of their underlying philosophical convictions.

In regard to the first questions it may be pointed out that similarity of formulations, however far it may go, does not furnish a cogent proof of influence; nor does the absence of quotations or verbal repetitions disprove such an influence. It is conceivable that similar intellectual situations bring forth similar responses. In fact, it has happened repeatedly that the certitude of knowledge has been challenged by scepticism. Each time the desire to safeguard the reliability of knowledge has led thinkers to seek a firm starting point in the mind itself. This was the case, to some extent, with Socrates-Plato in the face of the relativistic and sceptical attitude of the sophist. It was definitely the situation of St. Augustine who had to meet the sceptic arguments of the Academy. It was again the situation in which Descartes found himself when confronted by the scepticism of Montaigne and Charron, against which he thought to render unassailable the certitude of knowledge. Kant, likewise, had to ensure the reliability of knowledge against the destructive criticism of Hume. And a similar situation recurred recently when Husserl asserted the incontrovertible certitude of logical and phenomenological insight against the psychologistic and relativistic philosophy of his days.[28] Thus it would seem that the attack by scepticism releases regularly, with a certain kind of philosopher, a response consisting in a withdrawal into the self-certitude of the knowing mind or of consciousness. Descartes, therefore, might quite well have been moved to adopt this standpoint independently of all influence by Augustinian ideas.

Concerning the second question, that of the degree of similarity between Augustinian and Cartesian thinking, there is a profound difference. For St. Augustine places himself in the position of his opponents only for the sake of argument, to refute them on their own terrain. He does not, we believe, assume for one moment that the universal doubt of scepticism is in any way justified. Descartes, however, accepts this doubt as a legitimate position, even though it becomes, in his hands, only a "methodological doubt." Or, to put it differently, Descartes is seriously worried by the reasonings of Montaigne—as was also, it seems, Pascal—whereas St. Augustine is not worried because from the very first he considers the sceptic position untenable.

The often held opinion that Descartes stands in the line of an Augustinian tradition is, in fact, of questionable value. The similarity, namely, of the two philosophies appears as limited to the choice of the argument by which

[28] Relativism, pragmatism, historicism, psychologism are, indeed, forms of scepticism, even though this may not always appear at first sight. It is a scepticism more reminiscent of that of Carneades than of that of Pyrrho. The main point is that all these schools deny the possibility of the human mind ever arriving at a time-independent certitude. Some further remarks on this question may be found in the article on the "Augustinian a-priori," referred to above, note 26.

to refute scepticism; it does not go further.[29] One could maintain rather that the Cartesian way of reasoning is very far from being like that of St. Augustine. The great difference between the two modes of philosophizing becomes particularly apparent when one considers the role the idea of the triad plays in the thought of St. Augustine.

It seems, indeed, possible for one to oppose the "formal type" of triadic thinking to another such formal type whose thought operates by means of dyadic divisions.[30]

Groups of three terms figure, of course, also in dyadic philosophies, for every relation is to be described as that of two terms and the relation itself, or what is called the *fundamentum relationis*. What characterizes the triadic way of thinking is that it conceives, in certain instances, of this *fundamentum* as of the form of a real third which, as has been remarked, belongs to the same ontological level as the two extremes it relates. The mediator stands in a dyadic relationship to each of the two extremes, but the three together constitute an indissoluble whole.

We submit that the triadic type represents a well characterized formal type of philosophical systematic thinking or a peculiar form of looking-at-the-world.[31] By virtue of the conception of a whole, formed by the three elements of a triad, this type shows a definite kinship to all forms of "organic" interpretation of reality and, generally speaking, to all such systems which stress the whole more than the constituent parts. Its very opposite is therefore "elementarism," which attempts to reduce the complexity of the phenomena to a minimum of identical elements, be these atoms or sensations.

But it is not only elementarism in its manifold developments which is opposed to a triadic conception.[32] It seems, in fact, permissible to say that

[29] One hears it said today that St. Augustine is the ancestor of contemporary "existentialism." This, too, is a rather questionable statement, which may well stem from the generally unhistoric way of thinking in which our existentialists indulge; they either disregard history altogether, being so very much convinced of representing a totally new approach, or they envisage history in a rather peculiar perspective, as is the case with Heidegger.

[30] Dyadic and not dualistic. Dualism is a name which refers to the material content of a philosophy; the other name denotes a most general formal characteristic. Both a dualistic and a monistic metaphysics may proceed by means of triadic or dyadic conceptions.

[31] There exist but few attempts aiming at the establishment of a typology of philosophical systems. W. Dilthey, who was, probably, the first to conceive of this idea, distinguished types based on the content of the systems; "Typen der Weltanschauung," in *Gesammelte Werke,* VIII (1903). K. Jaspers approaches the question from a psychological angle; *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen,* 4th ed. (Berlin-Göttingen, 1954). The only author to consider the strictly formal aspect seems to have been H. Leisegang, *Denkformen,* 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1951); he does not, however, mention the problem of triads.

[32] It is possible that the idea of the triad is finding an entry into modern physics. The notion of "complementarity," as proposed by N. Bohr, may point in this direction. If

there are, on the one hand, philosophies which recognize only pairs of related entities, and these pairs, or what is formed by them, are, in turn, related in a one-to-one relation to other pairs, and that there are, on the other hand, philosophies which conceive of the fundamental structure of being essentially as one arranged in triads.

The triad includes the dyad, but is not reducible to it. For the triad is not composed by two dyadic relations; these exist only by virtue of being contained in but not separable from the triad. The triad cannot be envisaged as the sum of the two dyads but forms a unity of its own. Thus, a philosophy based on the triadic mode of conceiving the ontological structure may well take account of all that another system based on dyads has to say, whereas the opposite is not possible.

There have been other philosophies, mainly in antiquity, but here and there also in later ages, which have assumed another "basic number." It is, however, easy to show that in these systems the triad retains its dominant significance. This is particularly evident in the systems which accord a particular importance to the number four, five, or seven. The famous τετρακτύς of the Pythagoreans is represented by a triangular figure which may be interpreted as a small triangle formed by three dots, and a larger one formed by seven dots, so that total number is ten.[33] The pentad can be represented as a pentagon in which the diagonals form three triangles. The heptad consists of two triads which are taken as units and are united by a seventh element.[34]

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the phenomena observed in one and the same experimental set-up force the physicist to interpret some sides in terms of waves, others in terms of the emission of particles, a *tertiam reuniens* is certainly required. It, does not seem, however, that physics has arrived at a satisfactory solution. That a triadic relationship may have to be considered is suggested also by the facts underlying Heisenberg's indeterminancy principle. Until recently, physics was convinced of the "objectivity" of its observations, that is, of the independence of the results from the presence of an observer. Now it is recognized that observation and measurement interfere with the phenomena and that the classic formula: "if A then B," has to be replaced by another: "if A and O, then B or C or D . . ."

[33] It must be remembered that for the Greeks numbers were "figures" in the literal sense of the word. We still speak of square and cube to denote the second and third power. For the graphical representation of the τετρακτύς, see J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy,* 4th ed. (London, 1948) p. 102.

[34] Proclus distinguishes seven powers of the mind which he groups in the manner indicated above. Such "numerological fantasies" have been severely criticized and viewed as quite meaningless. Once, however, one places oneself in the position of Greek mathematics and Greek world views in general, these ideas become almost rationalistic. The prevalence of the geometric approach, for instance, renders it quite intelligible that the δεκάς was identified with the universe. For to the point corresponds the one (which generates numbers as the point generates lines), to the two the line, to the three the solid body which is determined by at least three points, in the tetrahedron. The sum is ten. There is nothing other in the world but points, lines, surfaces and bodies. Recent developments in mathematics suggest a more lenient judgment of these "fantastic" speculations. Cf. H. Weyl, *Symmetry* (Princeton, 1952).

Thus, it would seem that these "numerological" speculations start from—or return to—the triad. Only a strictly dyadic conception is unamenable to such a reduction.

Perhaps, it would not be going too far to claim that therein lies one of the most pronounced differences in the mode of thinking of Plato and Aristotle, and that one has to do here, in fact, with two fundamental *Denkformen* which could well be followed through the ages from the time of Plato up to our own. Even to outline, in the broadest manner, the persistence of these two conceptions is, of course, far beyond the scope of this essay. Only a few remarks may be briefly submitted.

One would be disappointed were one to look for "pure" types of either the triadic or dyadic systems. As has been said above, the dyadic relationship has always to find its place; a thinker may be rather reluctant to admit such dichotomies, as may have been the case with Jamblichus and his many intermediary triads; he cannot avoid the recognition of dyadic relations. On the other hand, it is possible that triads (and more complex groupings) be ignored; this leads to a simplified view of reality which may be welcome to certain minds but amounts to a falsification: reality is not simple. It is a preconceived and unjustified idea that *simplex sigillum veri*.[35] The postulate of simplicity belongs to what E. Mach called the "economy of thinking," that is, it is expressive of a propensity of the mind but not necessarily of the nature of the object. Where this principle of simplicity is made into one of metaphysics, instead of being recognized as one of methodology, all interrelatedness will be interpreted in a dyadic form; but this procedure is legitimate only within a relatively narrow field of reality.

When elementarism is not viewed as the only permissible ideal of "scientific" thought and due consideration is accorded to totalities, for instance, to the organism as irreducible to a complex of elements standing to each other in dyadic relations, the triad reappears with an intrinsic necessity. The notion of *Gestalt,* too, implies a triadic conception. Thus it becomes easy to understand encountering again and again a co-existence of the ideas of the triad, of the whole, or of the organism.

The recognition of the triadic structure of, at least, certain aspects of reality or the given, must be distinguished from the several attempts at establishing a trichotomy of relatively independent principles. This distinction is not always easy to make, the more so, since many writers fail to emphasize the difference. Thus certain statements of medieval authors have been misinterpreted as implying a trichotomy whereas, in truth, they point at a triadic structure of an essentially indivisible whole. The terms of *corpus, ratio,* and *mens,* for instance, do not denote a trichotomic conception of human nature as it has been erroneously alleged. On the other hand it is possible that back

[35] J. Cohn put on the title page of his book, as a motto, the words: *Simplex sigillum nec veri falsi. Theorie der Dialektik. Formenlehre der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1924).

of the Averroistic idea of a separate intellect there is a fundamentally trichotomic conception.

Whether or not Aristotle himself assumed such a trichotomy, is beside the point. On the whole, it seems safe to say that the conceptions of the Philosopher are predominately patterned on the idea of a dyadic relationship. This becomes visible, for instance, in his criticism of the Platonic theory of ideas. In Plato the relationship between the idea and the particular existent is designated by the term of "participation." Ideas are real existents, and so are, in a minor degree, the particulars. Consequently, there must be an equally real bond between the two terms. For idea and particular are not only distinct but separable; the idea is, so to speak, indifferent to its concretization in a particular, since the idea possesses reality in itself. Hence, a mediating third is required. Not so in Aristotle; there is no need for a mediation between prime matter and form.

The philosophy of St. Thomas is often presented as a "Christianized Aristotelianism." Hence, one expects this system to be based essentially and, perhaps, exclusively, on the dyadic conception. It seems to us, however, that this is too narrow a view. Certainly, insofar as the hylomorphic principle is concerned, there is no place for a triad. But there are other sides to the philosophy of the *doctor communis*. It would require a lengthy examination of his works to prove that the triadic principle plays a definite role in this system. We shall have to be satisfied with pointing to two instances, one taken from psychology, the other from ontology.

The function allotted by St. Thomas to the *ratio particularis* or *vis cogitativa* in the formation of judgments concerning particulars is comparable to the idea expressed by the Augustinian formula of the "third joining together the other two." [36]

Speaking of the relationship of the several strata of being, St. Thomas states that the *suprema inferioris* coincide with the *infima superioris*. Now, this is precisely the triadic relationship to which Greek mathematicians and the philosophers of the Platonic tradition referred as "analogy." (See above p. 502) If the degrees of being or of perfection within one stratum or genus of being are symbolized by a series from a to b, then those of the higher layer may be symbolized by the series from b to c. For the formal principle of gradation has to be the same here and there. One also comes across, occasionally, certain formulae which are definitely reminiscent of Neo-Platonism, as it had been transmitted through St. Augustine, the Pseudo-Areopagites, the *Liber de causis* and other sources. Thus one reads: *semper inferior participat aliquid de perfectione superioris*.[37]

[36] It would be tempting to examine the psychological doctrines of St. Thomas further. One might then discover that his theory of cognition entails a definitely triadic element. The *intellectus agens,* in fact, "mediates" between the phantasm and the *intellectus possibilis*.

[37] *In IV. Sent.,* d. 1, 1, 2 ad 2.

St. Thomas was critical of Augustinian ideas in several respects. But it is not only the esteem for the *magister occidentis* which prevents him from rejecting all the latter's conceptions; St. Thomas was too much of a realistic thinker to overlook the significance of the triadic structures.

A re-examination and a re-appraisal of the idea of the triad would be, we believe, an enterprise of more than a merely historical interest. For we witness today not only a revival of Augustinianism but also one of Neo-Platonism. Neither has ever ceased to exercise influence on philosophical speculation, even though this influence may have been obscured by the preponderance of other conceptions. There is a marked Neo-Platonic strain in German idealism, and the renewed interest in Hegel, lately also in Schelling, brings with it also something like a "Plotinian renaissance." [38]

In view of these developments it will be an important task that one distinguish between ideas which will withstand criticism and may be incorporated into a Christian philosophy and others which will dissolve and appear as untenable when subjected to searching—and unprejudiced—critique. In this process of re-evaluation the study of the notions of the triad and of mediation may prove to be a promising approach.

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[38] The two Congresses held at Paris and at Rome on Augustinian philosophy and theology give evidence of the persistent vitality of St. Augustine's conceptions. One may mention also the works of M. F. Sciacca who is one of the outstanding representatives of this movement. In regard to a revival of Neo-Platonic influences one may remember that Bergson lectured on Plotinus and that there are unmistakable traces of Neo-Platonism in this philosopher's work. Quite recently a book appeared by V. J. Jankélévitch, *Philosophie première; Introduction à la philosophie du "presque"* (Paris, 1954), in which the author constantly makes use of Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists. There is also the work by E. Souriau, *L'Ombre de Dieu* (Paris, 1955) which relies largely on Neo-Platonic (and, to some extent Gnostic) ideas.

ON INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS

By Rudolf Allers

A philosophy may be said to be alive when it proves capable of discovering new problems and of dealing with them by means of its fundamental principles and categories. No human mind, not even the greatest, can know beforehand what questions may arise at a later time by virtue of the advance of empirical knowledge or of speculative elaboration. The test of a philosopher's greatness is precisely that his system be able to cope with problems he himself did not and could not consider.

Many of the new problems facing the philosopher today arise from the widening of scientific inquiry. Thus, cosmology and the theory of knowledge have to render account, in their own terms, of the facts and ideas brought forth by the recent developments in physics. Scientific research and its practical applications stand so much in the foreground of contemporary thought that philosophy has been preoccupied mainly with questions pertaining to this field. What has been called "human studies" has attracted comparatively less attention. We still lack a systematic treatment of the philosophy of history, a discussion of the fundamentals of sociology, and a sufficiently encompassing consideration of the data psychology furnishes.

Other problems stem from philosophies different from that the individual thinker professes. However erroneous the basic conceptions of many of the philosophies known today may seem, it cannot be denied that the men who worked out these various systems sometimes became aware of questions which had been left aside by their opponents. It is not enough that these ideas be rejected as incompatible with those one recognizes oneself. The ideas must be examined, taken seriously, and restated in the terms of one's convictions.[1]

Certain problems become visible only from a definite standpoint. They may be peculiar to this standpoint and prove to be more or less of pseudo-problems if the standpoint is chosen so as to preclude a wider outlook. Other such problems, however, retain their significance also within the framework of another philosophy than that of their discoverer. The problems usually

[1] How this can be done is shown admirably by Professor E. Gilson in his recent work *L'Etre et l'essence* (Paris, 1948). One will do well to ponder on his remarks, p. 164: *"Le'qu'en dira-t-on' philosophique, pour ne dire rien de celui que connaissent les sciences positives, est une force d'inhibition redoutable, puisqu' elle retient d'excéllents esprits, par crainte d'on ne sait ridicule spéculatif, d'affirmer ce qu'ils aimeraient visiblement pouvoir dire."* One is tempted to repeat with Michel de Montaigne: *"Nous sçavons dire: 'Cicero dit ainsi; voilà les meurs de Platon; ce sont les mots mesmes d'Aristote.' Mais nous, que disons nous nous mesmes, que jugeons nous? que faisons nous? Autant en diroit bien un perroquet."* *Essais*, I., 21. ed. M. Rat (Paris, 1948), I, 146.

comprised under the heading of Plato's "theory of ideas" do not cease to exist when Plato's metaphysics has to be abandoned. Of this the history of philosophy since Aristotle gives evidence. One need not be an admirer of Hume, a follower of Kant, or a disciple of Hegel, to realize that these men have uncovered problematics which cannot be ignored.

On the other hand, there are problems which fail to achieve "actuality" because they refer to regions of empirical inquiry which have, for some reason, lost interest or even are viewed as unworthy of the endeavors of the "scientific" mind. To this class belong, at present, all questions related to introspective evidence. Contemporary psychology, on the whole, does not believe in the reliability and usefulness of such studies and, consequently, does not furnish to philosophy new material the elaboration of which might result in an enrichment of philosophical understanding. This attitude on the part of so many psychologists does not deprive either the facts or the problems, of man's inner life, of existence or significance.

In fact, introspective psychology has come to be alive again in the last several years in spite of the anathema by "scientific" psychology. This revival of introspective psychology has been the result of an inner necessity on one hand, of the impact of E. Husserl's phenomenology on the other. In regard to the work of this thinker the same thing holds as has been said above: whatever his views on metaphysics and other parts of philosophy be, his approach has made visible many problems which had either fallen into oblivion or had not yet been considered at all. If nothing else, we owe to Husserl, at least, that his phenomenological inquiries have aroused again the interest in the mind and its workings and also have sharpened our ability of observation and analysis.

Husserl required that the philosopher—and the psychologist, too—"go back to the things themselves." This means that any inquiry about facts, and the facts both of the mind and of the "world of ideas" are facts no less than those of the tangible world, that any such inquiry, then, begin with a simple contemplation of the given, irrespective of all notions one may harbor concerning the kind and order of this given. I intend to examine, in as unprejudiced a manner as I may be able to provide, the data of the intellect.

Certain primary assumptions must be made in all inquiries. Some of these assumptions may not allow for any further demonstration; they are self-evident or held, at least, to be indispensable. Others form part of the general philosophy in which the writer believes. Whether these are demonstrable or not is a question not to be raised here. Arguing with the setting provided by a definite philosophy, these assumptions are submitted as granted. It seems to me that for the intentions of this study the following presuppositions will suffice:

That the rational powers of the mind are of a nature other than those called sensory; that the former are justly labelled "immaterial"; that therefore,

their operations are other than those of the senses, although they depend on the latter as the sources of the "material" underlying the contents of the intellect; that this material is rendered intelligible by a peculiar operation called abstraction.

It is assumed, further, that every "product" of intellectual activity which cannot be reduced to another, as the latter's modification or complication, requires an intellectual operation of its own. This is, in a way, an application of the rule by which the diverse powers of the mind are distinguished. The distinction is based, as is known, both on the characteristics of operations and on those of objects. Some mental powers operate in such a manner that their operations are not accessible to direct observation but must be assumed because of their observable effects. We have no immediate awareness of the activities attributed to the *sensus communis;* neither have we any such awareness of the performances of memory. Nor are we conscious of the abstractive activity of the *intellectus agens.* In all these instances, our distinction of powers rests on the recognition of fundamental differences of the mental states resulting.

It appears permissible to apply the same methodological rule also to the operations of one and the same power. This is done, in fact, when the formation of the concept or the *verbum mentis* is viewed as a peculiar process, be it one which is passive rather than active, insofar as the *intellectus possibilis* is concerned. The justification of the procedure, in studying the intellectual operation, will be furnished, or so it is hoped, by the considerations to be submitted in this essay.

So far as I can see, the powers of rational cognition are usually credited with six different achievements. They are: that of abstraction and formation of concepts; that of judgment and the formation of propositions; that of discursive reasoning and the derivation of further judgments; that of "directed thought" or the arrangement of a multitude of propositions in an orderly sequence; that of intellectual memory; finally that of reflection.

There are problems as yet little considered, although important enough, in each of these six fields. The present study, however, is concerned only with certain questions related to the performances of concept-formation.[2]

Some points must be clarified before any attempt at an analysis of intellectual operations can be made.

The term "concept" is used in a threefold sense. It signifies, first, that modification or actualization which takes place in the *intellectus possibilis* in consequence of its being informed by the *species intelligibilis impressa.* Secondly, it refers to the mode in which this modification of the intellectual power

[2] I hope to deal with certain problems concerning judgment, ordered or directed thought, and reflection, in a further study. Some reference to one or the other question pertaining to these fields will be touched upon here because there is no possibility of neatly keeping apart the various operations of the intellect.

becomes a content of consciousness, immediately or in reflection. Thirdly, it names that of which the mind is rendered cognizant in this act of intellection, that of which the concept is.

Suarez stresses the first and the second meaning and distinguishes them as the "formal" and the "objective" concept. Neither the idea nor the terminology is original with Suarez, although he stated the difference, perhaps, more precisely than did any of his predecessors.[2a] The ambiguity of the terms formal and objective make it desirable that other terms be introduced. I propose to designate as a "conceptual act" the first sense of "concept," using the term "act" as well in its original sense as the result of actualization and in the sense in which it figures in the "psychology of act" of Brentano-Husserl. I shall call "concept" that which stands in consciousness for the "meaning" or the thing meant by the concept. Suarez' *conceptus objectivus* is defined as *res illa vel ratio, quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur.* But "objective concept" is a somewhat clumsy expression and one easily misinterpreted. It seems better that one avail himself of a term frequently used in modern literature and designate this third meaning as the "referent."

The relations of these three terms can be illustrated best by comparing the intellectual with the imaginative performance. As long as the fundamental differences of the two are not overlooked, there is no danger in such a comparison, which, in fact, St. Thomas often uses for the sake of clarification.[3]

When I recall or "re-present" to my mind a thing seen previously, a melody once heard, or any other sensory datum, I am conscious of a peculiar activity resulting in the production of an image. But it is not the image which I wish to "envisage"; rather, the image is an *id quo,* something which "stands for" the other thing perceived sometime before. The image standing before my consciousness may be very unlike the thing which it serves to recall; it may be incomplete or even not resemble at all its original. Nonetheless, it is perfectly sufficient as a representative rather than a representation, in the sense of the German *Vorstellung,* and enables me to think or speak significantly of its "referent."

The referent of an image is an individual thing or several of such, if one has to do with a "general image," comparable to a simplified or schematic illustration in a textbook.

Every cognitive state has a referent of a corresponding, peculiar kind. As the image refers to particulars, so the concept to generalities. Since the *concept* is expressed by a general name, its referent will be designated as a *"nominal referent."*

[2a] F. Suarez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (Paris, 1864), Disp. II., sec. 1., a. 1. *op.* XXVI. pp. 61 ff.

[3] See, for instance, *Summa Theol.,* I., q. 85. a. 3 c., a passage which will be referred to later, to some extent.

Judgments, too, refer to something different from the judgment as a mental state or from the proposition as formulated in words. They refer to "states of affairs" (*Sachverhalte*), to "it being the case that . . ." A judgment is "about" its (grammatical or logical) subject, but "on" the state of affairs rendered by the combination of subject and predicate. Judgments are expressed in propositions, and their referents will accordingly be called *"propositional."*

A whole *discourse,* a report, a tale, a speech, an essay, is "on" some topic which is unfolded in the sequence of propositions making up the discourse. The propositions or thoughts form, in their orderly arrangement, a context and refer to a *"contextual referent."* [4]

The difference of nominal and propositional referents is sufficient to prevent the confusion of the operations yielding concepts on one hand and judgments on the other. Less attention has been paid, it seems, to the peculiarities of contextual referents and the corresponding intellectual operations.

No one studying these matters could, of course, overlook that the nominal referents are not at all of one kind. A look at the table of contents of any grammar convinces one of this fact. The theory of intellectual operations, however, has apparently not taken full account of the questions arising in consequence of these differences.

It cannot be within the scope of an essay to discuss all the problems related to the differentiation of nominal referents. Only a few will be mentioned; but they will, it is hoped, suffice to show that there are very real problems and that they have a bearing on rather basic ideas.

All names, with the exception of proper names, of course, are general names, *nomina nata de pluribus praedicari.* This is, however, only a formal characterization. There are various kinds of generality and, therefore, of reference. The following survey is by far not complete but sufficient for demonstrating certain problems.

1. Names referring to species. It does not concern us here whether there are many or only a definite number of species; if there is one species and it is given a name, say, man, one has to do with a kind of name different from others.[5] Names of species, or the corresponding intellectual data, will be designated as *universals* and this term will be used exclusively in this sense.

2. *Generic names* can be predicated of several species, as it is with the term *animal,* and indirectly of individuals.

3. *Class-names* refer to a number of particulars united in a class by virtue of some feature or features. Universals and generic names, too, are class-names but founded on the "nature" of the particulars, whereas the term

[4] Husserl uses the terms "nominal" and "propositional" much in the same sense as indicated above.

[5] On the question of a definite or indefinite number of species, cf. M. Adler, *Problems for Thomists. The Problem of Species* (New York, 1940).

"class-name" is used here for all general names which are neither species, that is, determined by a specific form, nor genera. Class names may be made up arbitrarily as it was the case in the experiments of N. Ach [6] who, for instance, gave to the class of red, angular, heavy bodies a certain made-up name. They may be based on all kinds of accidental features as, for instance, the use to which they are put; in this sense a name like *furniture* or *tool* is a class name.

4. Names designate *properties* and will be called such. For example, weight, whiteness. They are general names of accidents considered in themselves, not as belonging to and characteristic of things. When we speak of whiteness we do not mean the class of white things, but rather that by virtue of which this class is constituted.

5. *Collective names* which designate an assembly of things, of the same kind or of many kinds, which for one reason or another appear somehow as a whole or as belonging together: landscape, forest, town, nation, group, tool, and so forth.

6. *Abstract names* by which term I refer to such referring to "ideas," like those designated by terms as: cause or causality, substance, concept, species.

7. In some way similar to the last mentioned are names which have come to be called *constructs;* leaving out those employed in mathematics, because we have considered as yet only terms pertaining to immediate experience or the "first degree of abstraction," [7] one may point at names like force, energy, electricity.

Compared with universals and generic names, the class names may be said to be secondary. They are not founded on an immediate awareness of things belonging together, but result from a subsequent elaboration on the basis of the knowledge that many different things have, in some respect, certain features in common which, however, are not sufficient for a full characterization of such a thing. Although it is difficult or, perhaps, impossible

[6] N. Ach, *Über die Begriffsbildung* (Bamberg, 1921). Ach points out, quite correctly, that his experiments refer to the "significative function of a word as a sign or symbol," and not to concepts either in the logical or the ontological sense. According to the terminology used in the present essay, he deals with class-names rather than with such of universals. Cf. also: A. Willwoll, *Begriffsbildung* (Leipzig, 1926). The experiments described in this study yield many interesting results and contribute noteworthily to our knowledge of mental operations. However, they are hardly on the formation of universals; they deal with generic concepts, sometimes of a rather artificial kind, or with class-names. It is probably impossible to study experimentally the formation of true universals, since these arise as soon as the agent intellect operates on the phantasm. The progress of the understanding of universals, however, may well lend itself to further analysis. In fact, most of the later studies on concept formation seem to deal chiefly with this process of gradually understanding the concept which the possible intellect already possesses or which, as one may say, it has become.

[7] The problem of the "degrees of abstraction" will be briefly referred to below but not discussed because this requires a consideration of judgments and other points not within the scope of this essay.

to indicate why the fact that a thing like a piece of furniture is of another nature from another thing as a man or a cat, the difference is nonetheless immediately apprehended by everyone. Class-names, be they as much a "matter of course" as anything, are always somehow artificial, whereas universals and generic names impress the mind as suggested by the things themselves.

There is no need to dwell on the formation of universals. The process of abstraction may be supposed as sufficiently clear, although here, too, there are more problems discoverable than the ordinary presentations reveal.

Abstraction is, primarily, that achievement on the part of the agent intellect which disengages either the specific substantial or an accidental form from the phantasm. As disengaged, this form is the *species intelligibilis impressa,* and it produces in the possible intellect, informing it, the *species expressa,* the *verbum mentis* or universal.

Abstraction is, however, supposed to furnish not only universals, but also generic concepts. Not only our knowledge of man or cat but also that of animal are credited to abstraction.

If abstraction is primarily that process which yields the knowledge of universals, that is, of specific natures, the question arises what is the relation of the "abstraction" of generic concepts to this original abstraction of specific natures? Accidents, too, are abstracted. The accident has a real existence in the substance to which it pertains, by virtue of an accidental form. The generic nature, however, has no reality; it is a "metaphysical part" of the specific nature and does not as such "give being." Prime matter is not united first with a generic and then with a specific form; this would be contrary to the principle of the unity of substantial forms. If one can speak of the generic nature as a form at all, it is only in an inappropriate sense.

The abstractive activity on the part of the agent intellect is destined to enable the possible intellect "to become what it knows," that is, to receive a form and thus to undergo an accidental modification. Consequently, what is abstracted must be itself of the nature of a form.

"The proportionate object of the intellect is the quiddity of sensible things; and by this term we understand not only substance but whatever may be conceived of by the name of some sort of nature, also the accidents." [8]

Conversely, what is not of the nature of a form cannot be known by abstraction. But in a concrete being there is only one substantial form to which a large number of accidental forms may be joined. The so-called generic form, however, is not a form in the strict sense of the term; it is

[8] "*Objectum proportionatum nostri intellectus pro hoc statu unionis ad corpus est quidditas rei sensibilis . . . et nomine quidditatis non solum substantiam praedicamentalem intelligimus, sed quidquid per nomen naturae alicuius et essentiae concipi potest, etiam accidentia . . .*" Joannes a St. Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus,* ed. B. Reiser (Turin, 1937), Nat. Phil. IV. q. 10., a. 3. Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I., q. 84, a. 7.

"part" of the specific form. It possesses a certain logical independence, so to speak, but not an ontological one.

One hears sometimes that to abstract the specific form and to attain knowledge of the universal, the mind must have encountered several instances, particulars of the same species. I have pointed out in a prior study that this conception is neither a necessary consequence of the theory of abstraction, nor countenanced by facts, and moreover self-contradictory.[9] If the *intellectus agens* has the ability to abstract the specific form, the number of antecedent encounters with particulars of the same species is irrelevant. One single particular contains the specific nature no less than several such particulars do. This conception is based on a confusion. The repetition of sensory experiences is not a necessary condition for the intellect *abstracting the specific* nature but a helpful circumstance for a better *understanding* of it. We shall see presently that abstraction, although it yields always the specific nature in its fullness, is not necessarily equivalent to a full knowledge of the universal or, rather, its referent.

Were it so that a "collection of evidence" were needed for abstraction to take place, some principle would have to be at work by which the particulars of one species are recognized as such. That is, the knowledge of the species would have to be credited either to the sensory powers, or an *a prioristic* factor would have to be assumed.

To say it once more, it may be well that in most cases the knowledge of a universal reaches perfect clarity only after several contacts with individuals of the species have realized. But the formation of the universal must have taken place at once when the first individual of the species had been encountered.

This idea is even stated expressly by John of St. Thomas since he says that once a "species" has been abstracted from one individual, it can be applied to another individual if encountered.[10]

It is, however, evident that in such a first encounter the mind does not always attain a clear and perfect knowledge or understanding of the universal. The recognition that a thing is of the same species as another may need study, repeated contact, and elaboration. Each time an individual of the same species comes to be known or when the same individual is met again, the process of abstraction repeats itself; but this is strictly a repetition and not a series of different abstractive performances.

What improves is the clarity of the information, the modification of the possible intellect which has been achieved the very first time. In fact, such a progress of understanding may occur also without any repetition of the

[9] R. Allers, "The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer," *The New Scholasticism,* XXV (1951) 184.

[10] Joannes a St. Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus, loc. cit.,* q. 10., a. 5. (vol. III. p. 337 b 16): "quod species semel abstracta ab uno individuo, si aliud individuum occurrat, pro eodem etiam applicari potest."

abstractive activity. The information has taken place once and for all. But the intellect may by some sort of reflection turn on what it already possesses and thus attain step by step a better understanding.[11]

It is, therefore, necessary that the *ordo abstractionis* and the *ordo cognitionis* be distinguished. Abstraction is the proper performance of the agent intellect; knowledge pertains to the possible intellect. Insofar as the possible intellect is informed by the species resulting from the activity of the agent intellect, the former behaves as recipient; in penetrating into the meaning of what it has received and hence possesses, the possible intellect operates in its own fashion.

The mere fact that an individual is recognized as being of the same species as one seen before, even if there was strictly only one such experience, is sufficient evidence of abstraction taking place when and as soon as one such individual is encountered. The history of philosophy provides us with a striking illustration. Anaximander assumed that there exist an indefinite—perhaps, even an infinite—number of "worlds" or universes. Like all of us, the great Ionian knew of one universe only; he could not have encountered several worlds. If he arrived at this notion, it must be because it was abstracted from this one universe.

The generic concept cannot be formed in the same manner. There is nothing in the universal which might point at other species sharing with the one under observation certain traits and not sharing others. The generic concept is formed on the basis of the knowledge of several species by means of some sort of comparison. This process requires that the universal be, as it were, broken up so that its various traits might be considered separately and their presence or absence in the various specific universals be recognized. Contrary, then, to the abstraction of the universal, the formation of a generic concept demands a certain number of data to be possible at all.

This view seems to conflict with that other which assumes that the generic nature may be known in some cases, at least, also by an immediate encounter with a particular and be abstracted from it by some sort of incomplete abstraction. In support of this view the passage in the *Summa* referred to above may be quoted. The decisive words are:

Sic autem potest cognosci tam totum universale, in quo partes continentur in potentia, quam etiam totum integrale; utrumque enim totum potest cognosci

[11] A similar process exists also in the level of judging. We come to understand better or more completely what some truth "really means." Or we realize that some two truths expressed differently or referring to different factual fields are fundamentally identical, e. g., when it was realized that the formal laws expressing the behavior of gases and those dealing with osmotic pressure are the same. There are many such instances in the history of science, and many examples may be found in everyday thinking. Here, too, a possession of the intellect is clarified and it is not a new judgmental operation which is achieved. One forms, indeed, a new judgment by saying that the judgment A and the judgment B are identical, that is, have the same propositional referent. But the novelty is only one of formulation, since the recognition of identity does not entail a combination of terms previously not present or not combined.

in quadam confusione, sine hoc quod partes distincte cognoscantur . . . Cognoscere autem animal indistincte est cognoscere animal in quantum est animal; cognoscere autem animal distincte est cognoscere animal in quantum est animal rationale vel irrationale.[12] [This is further explained:] *Dicendum quod universale magis commune comparatur ad universale commune ut totum et ut pars. Ut totum quidem, secundum quod in magis universale non solum continetur in potentia minus universale, sed etiam alia . . . Ut pars autem, secundum quod minus commune continet in sua ratione non solum magis commune, sed etiam alia.*[13]

St. Thomas holds that the *ordo cognitionis* is in all cognitive operations the same, that is, proceeds from the more general to the less general. This is presented as a special instance of a universal principle of actualization: All that proceeds from potency to act attains first an incomplete act which is between potency and perfect act.

Two questions arise in regard to this doctrine. The first concerns the absolute generality of the principle, the second the relation of the *ordo cognoscendi* and the *ordo abstractionis*.

It seems that there is, at least, one exception to the rule according to which all actualization proceeds by steps, namely the becoming real of any substantial form. Consider, for instance, the idea of St. Thomas that the rational soul informs the embryo which, at this moment, is animated by a sensitive soul. The embryo does not become gradually human but in one instant, when the rational soul replaces the sensitive. The embryo, which thus has become truly human, is certainly not "complete"; most of the properties man will show in his later years exist only potentially. But its "humanity" is complete. In fact, it is impossible to imagine any gradual progress in the achievement of the *actus essendi*. If there is one exception to the universality of the rule, it becomes permissible to consider whether or not there be other such exceptions.

The specific nature, in potency in the phantasm, is not the efficient cause of abstraction; it cannot be that, since it is in potency. It has been remarked above that the phantasm may be rather incomplete or indefinite and, in spite of this defectiveness, function as a perfect "representative" of the thing from which it stems. Its "standing for" is not dependent on the richness in details the phantasm may possess. If an incomplete phantasm—that is, one which as "image" or similitude is obviously defective—allows the mind to recall the thing in its totality, it is equally possible that an incomplete phantasm "contain" the specific form in its totality.

St. Thomas illustrates the principle of cognition by referring to sensory knowledge. A figure seen at a great distance is recognized first as a body, then as an animal, a man, and finally as Socrates. This passage refers to

[12] I, q. 85, a. 3.
[13] *Ibid.*, ad 2m.

re-cognitio rather than to the first acquisition of knowledge. The process described here presupposes that the observer know already of animal and man and even of Socrates. One may also imagine situations in which the progress of knowledge would be otherwise.

Any object seen at a great distance will be recognized, first, as a body, since only bodies can be objects of visual awareness. But suppose that one look across a wide plain and see far away a "white thing"; moving closer, one realizes, not with absolute certainty indeed, that it is a human figure clad in white. Finally the thing is revealed as Dominican Friar. The Friar shares whiteness with many things the generic nature of which he does not share. In this case the mind apprehends at first not a *magis commune* included in the specific form, but one which is founded on a purely accidental trait.

In other words, the progressive determination from a vague to a more and more definite cognition does not necessarily move from the genus, in the strict sense, to the species, though it does move, of course, from the more general to the more special.

Since that to which the generic concept refers has only a logical but not an ontological status—to credit with such would be tantamount to a hypostatization of all levels of the *arbor Porphyriana* and would lead into "exaggerated realism"— the generic concept cannot be attained directly by abstraction. It is known as a cluster of traits which are common, primarily, to several species and through these to an indefinite number of individuals. The generic nature is known implicitly in the universal by which the mind knows the specific nature.

In corroboration of this view, one may point at the fact that the quiddity of a thing may be known only incompletely even when the conditions appear as perfect. One comes to know a thing better not only by discovering accidents previously not noticed or not noticeable, but also by penetrating, as it were, more deeply into its very nature.

What is abstracted is a form, in the ontological sense of the term. This form is either the substantial form, and mediates the knowledge of the specific nature, or it may be some accidental form. The specific nature is abstracted in its totality, but it is not necessarily known in the same manner. The *ordo cognoscendi* is not the same as the *ordo abstrahendi*.

In this regard, too, one may avail oneself of a parallel taken from sensory cognition. If the refractory power of the eye is not adjusted to the distance of the object, the image projected on the background of the eye is blurred and lacks sharpness. It is nonetheless a complete image; all the rays of light parting from the object enter the eye and they all affect the receptory cells of the retina. Distinctness and completeness are not the same thing. In some cases it is possible, by concentrating on the indistinct image, to make out more details than were apparent at first. Likewise, an existing thing will present (or the corresponding phantasm) its quiddity in all instances and

under all conditions to the agent intellect. But the features making up the quiddity need not be given distinctly. Sometimes, the quiddity may be abstracted totally and distinctly and nonetheless not be known to the same degree. Just as we may look at a thing under optimal perception conditions and not realize all that is to be seen, although the retinal image contains every detail that may be seen.

Thus, it also happens that we apprehend the quiddity or specific nature of a thing not seen before, but its generic nature is not discovered. There are, for instance, animals whose animality is not obvious to the untrained observer; the sea-anemone is thereof an example. Were it so that the abstraction of the generic nature precedes necessarily that of the specific nature, such failures would be inexplicable.

I submit that the foregoing analysis suggests a difference of the two orders, that of knowledge and that of abstraction. This difference is not amazing since the two achievements are of two powers: abstraction of the agent, knowledge of the possible intellect.

The formation of the generic concept, then, rests on an elaboration on the part of the possible intellect of that universal it brings forth by virtue of being informed by the *species intelligibilis impressa.* This elaboration is one by which the complex of features that is the universal is "broken down" and the single features are "envisaged" separately.

There can be no doubt that the intellect possesses the capacity of such a separating consideration of distinguishable traits in a universal. If it did not possess this capacity, one could not understand how the intellect arrives at analytic judgments, that is, at those which explicitly state as single traits all the notes which form the integrated whole of the universal. Neither could one understand how the intellect arrives at the notion of "proper accidents." This notion affirms precisely that the specific nature, for all its being a whole, allows for the distinction of traits it "contains."

Consequently, one must attribute to the intellect a particular operation which may appropriately be called that of *isolation.*[14] This operation consists in detaching the distinguishable traits in the universal from the whole to which they pertain. It is this operation of isolation which underlies also the formation of class-names.

Classes are not formed by abstraction, since they do not rest on any ontological characteristic. The class of the "red, heavy, angular things" is an artifact. Not quite in the same sense, but in one not unlike, are also the collective names of artifacts. The assembly of objects comprised under one such name does not belong together otherwise than by accidental or contingent circumstances.

[14] I prefer to speak of "isolation" and not of "separation" because the latter term is used by St. Thomas as a name for the "third degree of abstraction," that of metaphysics. It is better to employ a new name than to risk a confusion of terms. Cf. *In Boethii de Trin.* q. 5., a. 3.

The operation by which the mind forms a class-name and, therefore, considers a number of things together, for one reason or the other, is again an achievement *sui generis*. It is consequent to an isolating consideration of accidental features, a comparison, which realizes the presence of the accident, or accidents, in several things, and groups these together as "sharing in the same accidental form." [15]

Were one to follow blindly the way in which the usual treatises present the problems referred to above, one would have to qualify the ideas submitted as "innovations." But in reading St. Thomas one comes across passages in which intellectual operations are mentioned which are commonly omitted by the text-books.

First, St. Thomas speaks of the intellect "contemplating perfect truth" once it has been attained. And it seems that he has in mind not only the *visio in patria* but also knowledge attainable *in statu viae*.[16]

Another performance of the intellect is that of *remotio*. We are unable to know incorporeal substances in this life unless *per remotionem et aliquam comparationem ad corporalia*.[17]

If a substance is considered apart from quantity, this is an operation more kindred to "separation" than to abstraction.[18]

There is a reference to an achievement of the intellect called "consideration" by which the intellect apprehends a multitude of data in one.[19]

The intellect is also said to be able *ex praeconceptis speciebus formare alias species*. This is illustrated by the example of the idea of a golden mountain. Thus, it seems to refer to imagination rather than to intellect; but the passages speak of the intellect.[20] One may compare with this utterance that where St. Thomas points at a "certain opposition" to a corporeal thing whose quiddity the intellect accepts primarily and *per se,* in the case of the notion of the indivisible point. This remark, together with that on the formation of new species may well serve as a basis for a theory of "constructs." [21]

These references could be easily complemented by others; but they will suffice to show that St. Thomas recognized intellectual operations other than those of abstraction, judgment and reasoning, which seem to be the only ones the usual treatises consider.

St. Thomas discussed problems and facts of psychology not for their own sake but because of their relevance for metaphysical or theological specula-

[15] A more extensive study of these matters would have to take account of the difference between "classes" and "types." It is not here the place to discuss these further questions.

[16] *Summa Theol.,* I. q. 104., a. I., ad 2m.

[17] *Ibid.,* I. q. 84, a. 7., ad 3m.

[18] *In Boethii de Trin.* q. 5., a. 3., c.

[19] *Ibid.,* q. 6., a. 3., and ad IIIm par.

[20] *Summa Theol.,* I. q., 12., a. 9., ad 2 m.

[21] *Summa Theol.,* I. q. 85., a. 8., c. Cf. also q. 84, a. 6., a. 7.

tion. It is, therefore, understandable that he did not dwell to any length on the operations which are not related directly to his main problems. Abstraction, indeed, has a direct reference to metaphysics, since it is the process by which essences come to be known; and so has judgment in regard to truth and existence. But the elaboration of further species or of "constructs," the "consideration" by which a truth once recognized becomes clearer, and other performances of the intellect, are of less importance in this respect. That these operations are mentioned at all shows not only the analytic ability of St. Thomas as a psychologist but also that he was perfectly aware of the possibilities that this field of knowledge might be enlarged and more details added.

Thus it would seem that abstraction is always complete, but that knowledge often is not. Knowledge proceeds from a vaguer to an ever more definite, from an incomplete to a more complete state.

Two arguments may be alleged as supporting this view. One is empirical and based on certain facts concerning both sensory and intellectual knowledge. The other is taken from some general principles.

It is not uncommon that sensory impressions pass unnoticed at the time when the *species impressa* informs the sense. We recall sometimes having seen something of which we were not aware at the time. It is not that we simply fail to remember; a report made immediately after the moment of experience may be incomplete and show that only a limited amount of details has been consciously apprehended. Later, a memory image may arise in consciousness which is recognized as referring to the past experience, although one wonders whether or not it is an illusion, since there is no definite consciousness of such a visual impression. In other instances, however, one realizes that this detail had been present and "seen," although not "observed."

Thus we hardly ever notice that by closing one eye we do not cease to "see" with this eye; we usually say, that we see only with the other eye. In fact, we see darkness; but this datum passes unnoticed because it has no particular significance.[22] Or it happens that unnoticed features re-emerge by virtue of an association or some other process.[23]

A similar process occurs also in intellectual cognition. We are far from "understanding" perfectly all concepts the very moment they are formed. By "thinking them over," we discover new features, attain a deeper understanding, are enabled to see relations, a knowledge which, at first, was hidden to our consciousness. This happens particularly with concepts of greater

[22] The efficacy of unnoticed but "seen" darkness has been demonstrated in a series of experiments in my study "Über einige Unterschiede zwischen dem ein- und beidäugigen Sehen," *Sitz. Ber. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss., Math. Nat. Wiss. Kl.* CXLIV (1935) 35.

[23] I have furnished experimental proof for the return of unnoticed data in the course of association 2 in R. Allers and J. Teler, "Über die Verwertung unbemerkter Eindrücke in Assoziationen," *Zschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psych.* LXXXIX (1929) 492.

abstractedness, but also with others. One is hardly able to state, at first sight, as it were, all that might be affirmed of a concept, say, to enumerate all the proper accidents of the nature to which the concept refers. Knowledge grows not only by discursive reasoning, but also by a deepening of the understanding of the concepts. The "analytical judgment" does indeed not add anything that was not contained in the subject; but it may nevertheless increase our knowledge, since we do not think at once all that may be affirmed of the concept.

This achievement presupposes that the intellect be able to contemplate, so to speak, the concept already formed, to distinguish therein features not or only imperfectly noticed, and to arrive thus at a better understanding of what in a way is already known.

The other argument in favor of abstraction being complete under all circumstances may be taken from the rôle the specific form, potentially contained in the phantasm, plays in the process of abstraction.

Because the phantasm belongs to the material, the intellect to the immaterial order, the former is denied any efficient causal influence on the latter. It is said to be an "instrumental" cause. This notion is far from being as clear as one would wish. It is, however, clear enough in its negative aspect, that is, as precluding efficient causality.

The instrumental cause cannot be said to "operate" in the full sense of the term. But, whatever its function be, it certainly is, at least, a co-determinant of the final outcome. With a blunt knife one cannot carve the wood, and a certain kind of material permits fashioning in one manner and not in another. It does not make a difference whether one speaks, in these cases, of operation or uses another expression. The co-determining function depends, in all instances, on the nature of the thing instrumentally causal. The principle *operari sequitur esse* applies here too.

In regard to the phantasm and its rôle in abstraction, this means that this rôle depends on the *esse* of the phantasm, be it an *esse in potentia.* The phantasm functions in the process of abstraction insofar as it offers to the agent intellect, so to speak, an opportunity to operate. The intellect cannot operate without some real substratum; non-being is unattainable to any power. Full reality is only in the composite; its materiality is beyond the grasp of the intellect, its formal aspects furnish the opportunity for intellectual, abstractive operation. They do so, apparently, both in the case of the substantial and of the accidental forms. The "generic form" is, as has been pointed out, not a form in the full sense of the term. If it is, apparently, abstracted prior to the specific form, it is only by, so to speak, a happy coincidence; it so happens that a number of traits are comprehended which pertain to the genus. But it happens also, as in the case of the Dominican Friar, that these traits do not constitute the knowledge of the genus. The genus has not an independent being; it is, when known, an *ens rationis cum fundamento in conceptu.*

The substantial form does not "consist" of parts, although the mind may distinguish several aspects or features, as the proper accidents. If the form has no real parts, it cannot display any partial function. Also when it functions only by way of being an instrumental cause, it does so in virtue of and by its total being.[24]

Hence, if abstraction takes place at all, it cannot be but complete, that is, transmit to the possible intellect the substantial or specific form in its totality; or also, correspondingly, the accidental forms.

The deeper understanding, achieved by "thinking over," the analytic judgments developed step by step by a further consideration of the concept already in possession of the possible intellect, and all similar elaborations, require that operation on the part of the possible intellect which has been called above that of "isolation."

This operation is also effective insofar as the product of abstraction may comprise not only the specific form but many accidental forms as well. It is by subsequent analysis that the mind realizes what pertains to the species and what is accidental to it.

Having achieved possession of the universal, the intellect proceeds to formulate judgments on the universal. These judgments result from "combination and division." But one cannot combine things unless they have been separated before.

In some instances, the mind is conscious of this isolating operation; in others, it knows only about its results. For this, too, there is an analogy in certain performances on the sensory level. The impressions received by the senses are committed to memory in the manner in which they are received. There, they not only become associated to each other in manifold ways, each of which requires that a particular aspect stand in the foreground, they are not only transformed, deteriorated, modified, to an often astonishing degree, but they are also decomposed so that certain aspects may be united with a complex of others to which originally they had been alien. As St. Augustine remarks, it is easy to transfer in imagination the black color of the raven to the swan, a bird which we know as white.[25]

It would be a topic of a special study to inquire whether some analogous operation may be assumed on the part of intellectual memory, and whether there arise in the intellect, spontaneously, new concepts, as new images may arise in imagination. The operations, however, by which a concept comes to be known better or by which we know sides previously unknown when subjected to further consideration, or by which these sides are isolated and identified with those of other concepts, and similar achievements, exist undoubtedly and can be discovered by unprejudiced description of intellectual phenomena.

[24] Any admission of something like parts in the specific form would inevitably lead to a plurality of forms.

[25] Black swans were unknown prior to the discovery of Australia.

The intellectual operation of isolation may also serve for distinguishing universals from class-names. The universals are presented to the possible intellect; they result from the information by the *species intelligibilis impressa;* their peculiarities are discovered by analysis which turns on, so to speak, a readymade material. The class-names are produced by the possible intellect out of the material furnished by preceding abstraction and information. One discovers a universal, but one fashions a class-name. This difference may not help, in some concrete instances, to ensure reliable knowledge whether or not a concept is an universal, that is, refers to a species, or is of the nature of a class-name. But the mere existence of this difference shows that by far not all notions predicable of many can be regarded as universals.

The operation by which the intellect forms classes may be justly called "construction." It is not always of the same kind; its different modes deserve special study. What is important for the present is that the "constructs" of which one speaks to-day are not a unique sort of product; they are only a particular instance of the results of a general operation.

Construction is possible only when there is first isolation. All recombination requires that the elements to be combined be first considered in themselves. This isolation is not abstraction; it cannot be since the basic characteristic of abstraction is missing, namely the "stripping" of the material component. Construction following isolation operates not on phantasms but on concepts.

Constructs, as they are called, play a great rôle in mathematics and mathematical physics. To discuss the underlying intellectual operations in detail one would have to review the whole question of "degrees of abstraction." This term, too, hides a number of problems which apparently are overlooked. One speaks of the three degrees of abstraction as if everything were perfectly clear. This, however, is not the case.

The name "degrees of abstraction" is in itself somewhat misleading. They are not degrees, as if the second would follow the first, and the third the second. They are degrees only insofar as they are more or less far removed from corporeal matter. But the abstraction of the second degree does not make use of the products of the first as its material, nor does the third stand in such a relation to the second. Although St. Thomas speaks of these degrees, it seems that he did not consider them as related to the manner of successive steps; the particular name he uses for the third degree, namely "separation," is thereof indicative.[26]

It has become customary to view these degrees as degrees of "formal abstraction," wherein the authors follow the ideas of Cajetan and of John of

[26] F. Russell Wilson, S. J., has pointed out, in an unpublished doctoral thesis of Georgetown University, that it would be preferable to use the expression "modes of abstraction." See his (unpublished) doctoral dissertation *The Modes of Abstraction according to St. Thomas Aquinas,* Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., 1949.

St. Thomas. Other interpretations are possible. The question is too complicated to be discussed in a few lines. I limit myself to submitting only one consideration.[27]

The quantity with which mathematics deals is, of course, related to that which is abstracted, as an accident, or discovered as proper to a universal, in the "first degree of abstraction." But the former is not an elaboration on or a refinement of the latter. Quantity as an accident of a corporeal thing is more of the nature of "measure" than of that of pure dimension or mathematical quantity.[28] It is the quantity of something, and pure quantity does not result by leaving out or dropping this something but requires to be apprehended by a totally different approach. The history of mathematics and the procedure of instruction suggest that mathematical thinking is some refinement of practical measuring or counting (*geo-metria*). But historical and psychological sequence are not always identical with objective relations.

When one tries to make clear to one's self the meaning of the doctrine of St. Thomas on "abstraction," one must take account of the fact that for him and his readers the term was much more alive, so to speak, than it is with us, however accustomed we may be to read Latin. At the time of Aquinas, Latin was the language of the schools, of a large part of diplomatic correspondence, of political controversies. Dead though Latin had become, it was at least widely known, a language in which one not only wrote but which was spoken on many occasions. The words retained, on one hand, much of their original significance and, on the other, could be understood in a more special sense according to the context in which they figured. For us, however, "abstraction" has become a strictly technical term. Hearing the word, we are reminded of the agent intellect and all that pertaining to the "process of abstraction." But for St. Thomas and his contemporaries, abstraction still conveyed the literal meaning of "taking" or "drawing off"; and it was not difficult for these men to understand this in various manners, according to the nature of that from which and the nature of that which is taken away.

In other words, it is not certain at all that "abstraction" has exactly the same significance whenever the term is used by Aquinas. It is possible that we read into his utterances a sense which he did not intend to convey. He speaks, indeed, of "degrees of abstraction," in a sense referred to above. But by calling the "third degree" by a new name ("separation"), he seems to

[27] For recent comments on this problem, see V. E. Smith, *Philosophical Physics* (New York, 1950) *pass.;* E. A. Maziarz, *The Philosophy of Mathematics* (New York, 1950), esp. pp. 164 ff. Also, L. E. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après S. Thomas," *Rev. Sc. Phil. Théol.,* XXXI (1947) 3.

[28] One may disagree thoroughly with Hegel and still profit by considering his discussion of quality, quantity, and measure. On the latter, see *Encyclopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Berlin, 1840), *Werke,* vol. VI, p. 215.

indicate that "abstraction" means, here and there, something not quite identical.[29]

If abstraction is defined as the process by means of which the agent intellect provides the species capable of informing the possible intellect, then—as has been said before—that which is abstracted has to be of the nature of a form, in the strictest sense. What is not contained in the phantasm as a form cannot become the content of the abstracted species.

The so-called second degree of abstraction yields the knowledge of quantity as related to "intelligible matter" only. This quantity is not that which as an accident pertains to the characteristics of a corporeal being. The corporeal being has "measurements" or "dimensions"; its quantitative aspect is intimately linked up with sensible matter.

One need only consider the development of mathematics in the last two centuries to realize how far away from sensible matter the concepts of this science have moved, even though they still retain a relation to "intelligible matter," a relation which is, of course, easier to detect when one deals with geometry, even in its highest and most "abstract" forms, than in algebraic speculations.

The quantity which is the concern of mathematics is not an accident, but something other; neither it is an accident of an accident. It is not of the nature of a "form." If one wishes to retain the expression "abstraction" in reference to mathematical thought, one has to be aware of this being an abstraction of another kind than that which yields the universals.

The problems of this essay are those of abstraction. There is, consequently no need to enter into a discussion of the relations obtaining between mathematics and logic, or of the question of "axiomatic thinking," and the other controversies preoccupying the students of a philosophy of mathematics. There is only one point to be considered, that of the nature of the intellectual achievement commonly labelled the "second degree of abstraction."

A literal interpretation of this expression, as if it referred to a performance

[29] It is, indeed, misleading if one assumes that a term has always precisely that meaning which we are accustomed to find in it. Take, for instance the term *scientia.* One must distinguish between *scientia ut cognitio rei sc., essentiae,* on one hand, and *scientia ut disciplina,* on the other. We use "science" almost exclusively in the latter sense. Maritain remarks (*The Degrees of Knowledge* [New York, 1938], p. 41, note 2) that there would be as many specifically different sciences as there were essences known, provided we could know essences exhaustively. He quotes in this regard John of St. Thomas: *si quaelibet res perfecte comprehenderetur, quaelibet res fundaret scientiam sibi propriam.* But this *scientia propria* would not be a *scientia ut disciplina* because this implies the knowledge of relations obtaining among many things. A discipline has a contextual, nominal or propositional referent. An exhaustive knowledge of essences would found a number of propositions concerning the thing and its properties. But no such knowledge would lead to a systematic comprehension of the relational context within which things stand. The motion, e. g., of a cosmic order could not flow from any, however exhaustive, knowledge of individual things.

of the same kind of abstraction, seems not to be *ad mentem doctoris*. St. Thomas could not, of course, foresee the development mathematics went through. At his time, mathematical knowledge was still rather restricted. Nor was there any particular reason for him to deal with such questions *ex professo*.

E. A. Maziarz defines the "formal abstraction" of mathematics or the second degree as "prescinding from what the thing is . . . and forming a signification of the thing merely as indicative of the order of its parts." [30] He goes on to say that "quantity, being an accident of bodies, cannot exist or be conceived apart from some reference to matter . . . technically referred to as intelligible matter."

The author is, however, quite definite in what concerns the relation of the second to the first degree of abstraction. He does not view the former as a sort of continuation or prolongation of the latter, as if the same process were repeated a second time or carried out on a higher level. Mathematical abstraction is something other than the abstraction of the universals.

It is questionable whether to speak, as if it were an accident, of quantity as dealt with in mathematics. If the mathematical concept is "merely indicative of the order of parts," and if this applies to a geometrical figure as well as to a "set," one is, it seems, at a loss to see of what this accident is an accident. The "order of parts" is, indeed, some sort of feature in a thing; but it is such a feature also in referents which are not things. A system of thought is ordered and its "members" stand to each other in an ordered relation. But a system is not a thing, nor a substance.

The relation of pure quantity, as studied by mathematics, and accidental quantity, as found in the objects of experience, is in some manner comparable to that obtaining between genus and species. As the knowledge of genus results not from abstraction in the strict sense but from an elaboration on the concept the possible intellect already possesses, so mathematical quantity comes to be known by an elaboration on the abstracted accidental form or the concept which refers to quantity-accident.

A further discussion would have to consider, first of all, the notion of "number." Number as such is not an accident, though it pertains to the category of quantity. If I have five things, there is no substance of which "fiveness" might be an accident. If I distinguish several parts in one thing, I neither can call the number I obtain an accident of the thing. I may speak of the thing as potentially yielding five parts, under certain circumstances, especially when I consider material divisibility. But I do not refer to an accident of quantity, strictly speaking, when I say that a certain thing possesses so and so many characteristic features. This non-accidental nature of quantity is still more apparent when the referent is not a thing but a concept. In the case of an

[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

artificial class-name, there are several determinants; I may speak significantly of there being, say, three (heavy, angular, red).

Nor is number when used in reference to material things always so simple a notion. Looking at some mountains, I may say that there are three or that there is one with three peaks. I have before me two piles of books or two packs of cards. Each is "one," but in a non-genuine sense, since pile or pack is not indicative of a substance which alone can underlie the accident of quantity. Nor can I say that the pile or pack "is" many, books or cards. There are, indeed, many individuals which make up the pile or the pack; nonetheless it is one pile, one pack. In what sense is it one? Not in the same sense in which one is said to be convertible with *ens,* because the "things" before me are not *entia* in the true sense. Pile or pack are "collective" names in regard to which, as one sees, many problems arise which deserve discussion.

The problems of the "second degree of abstraction" are not solved by declaring that this abstraction is from sensible matter but retains the relation to intelligible matter. Likewise, it is not enough to refer to the "third degree" as abstracting also from intelligible matter.

I mention these points not to discuss them any further which would require a lengthy inquiry not to be undertaken here. They are mentioned to indicate the wealth of unsolved questions which await analysis and whose existence ought to be recognized.

But even their being mentioned in such an incidental manner suffices, I believe, to show that there must be more intellectual operations than are usually listed.

It is, of course, true that most, perhaps all, new discoveries concerning concepts already formed by the possible intellect become known in the form of judgments. But this does not amount to a proof that it is the judgmental operation by means of which the enlargement of our knowledge takes place. Rather, for a judgment to be formed, it is necessary that the terms which are therein combined or divided, be known, somehow, beforehand. Thus, it is not the judgment: that A causes B, by which I come to know of cause or causation. In performing a judgment the relation between terms becomes clear and, therefore, the terms, too, are better understood. But they must be intelligible in some manner before they appear as "elements" of a propositional referent.

These questions, however, pertain to a discussion of judgments and the underlying performances on the part of the intellect and will be the subject-matter of a second study.

A further question is that of the relations obtaining between the operations called here of isolation and construction on one hand and that of reflection on the other. Reflection is a name which covers several operations that are similar in some and dissimilar in other respects. Reflection refers, first, to the consciousness the intellect has of its own activities; we know that we are

reasoning, or ordering our ideas, or raising a question. This knowledge does not deserve to be called reflection in the strict sense because it is "unreflected," that is, immediate. The mind knows simultaneously that and how it is active, and also that these activities are its own; this is known by virtue of the elusive awareness of the "ego that must accompany all my thoughts," to use Kant's words. But this immediate knowledge furnishes the basis for reflection; the mind may focus on it and, doing so, knows that the same knowledge concerning its activities had been present all the time, though in another kind of "givenness." Reflection operates in a somewhat different manner in the *reflexio super phantasma* and all those reflective steps by which the intellect is enabled to aver the way it went to attain the knowledge of an universal. Reflection, however, turns not only on the activities of the intellect but also on the results of its operations. The concept formed may be made an object of further "vision"; the mind in some way contemplates what it already knows. The *intelligibilia* have to be known by means of abstraction, and their knowledge is mediated by the phantasms and not achieved by direct intuition;[31] but there is an intuition of the *intellecta*. In this sense one may speak, with St. Augustine, of an intellectual vision. By this vision or contemplation of the data the intellect has in possession the mind arrives at a better understanding of what it knows.

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The foregoing discussions deal only with a part of the context of problems related to the division of intellectual operations. Even this part is not treated exhaustively. A truly comprehensive treatment can be attempted only after other operations of the intellect, especially those of judging and reflecting, will have been considered. The distinction of various intellectual operations is perfectly justified, but they cannot be separated. In actual performance, judging and gaining knowledge of an abstractively formed concept are linked with each other so intimately, that the analysis of one requires the consideration of the other. The incompleteness of the presentation is also caused by the factual difficulties the description and analysis of so intangible performances encounter. It is particularly the lack of suitable terms and the ambiguity of those at our disposal which prove a hindrance. On the other hand, one feels a natural reluctance against creating a new vocabulary, even if this should prove feasible.

The last named circumstance renders difficult also an attempt at summarizing the ideas here submitted. I have tried, in the preceding pages, to make clear in what sense the various terms are employed. Each of them has, of course, several other meanings. These terminological clarifications cannot, obviously, be repeated. Hence, there is the danger that a reader will interpret this or that term in a sense different from that intended. This is

[31] For some further discussion, see R. Allers, "Abstraction and Intuition," *The Franciscan Studies,* VIII (1948) 47.

unavoidable. I can only ask the reader to take account of the explanations given above before he rejects the brief formulae to follow.

I have tried to show:

1. Abstraction, in the strict and true sense of the term, refers exclusively to that operation by which the agent intellect puts at the disposal of the possible intellect those species which produce in the latter an accidental modification, that is, "inform" the possible intellect by the specific or accidental forms potentially existing in the phantasm.

(a) that, therefore, whatever is in the intellect but has no counterpart as really existing, though only potentially, in the phantasm cannot be the direct product of abstractive operation.

(b) and that this applies to generic concepts as well as to those which are best designated as "class-names."

2. The *ordo abstractionis* is not the same as the *ordo cognitionis*. That is to say, that the product of abstraction, the universal of species or accident, is formed in its completeness as seen and whenever abstraction takes place;

(a) whereas the presence of a complete universal, or other concept, in the possible intellect is not necessarily accompanied by an equally complete knowledge or understanding;

(b) which frequently is rather the result of subsequent operations on the part of the possible intellect.

(c) it follows, as a corollary, that specific and accidental forms are abstracted on the occasion of the first encounter of the phantasm and the agent intellect, and that repeated presentations may be helpful, even necessary, for the perfection of knowledge but not for the information of the possible intellect.

3. No particularly meticulous phenomenological analysis of intellectual achievements is required to make one realize that generic concepts, the nominal referents of class-names, and what to-day are called "constructs," since they are not furnished by abstraction, demand the existence of other intellectual operations.

(a) these operations must be attributed to the possible intellect, the agent intellect being engaged, as it were, exclusively in abstraction.

(b) and St. Thomas himself recognized the existence of such operations, though he did not deal with them in detail.

4. That St. Thomas uses the term "abstraction" both in a literal and a narrower technical sense, the latter referring to the peculiar performance of the agent intellect.

(a) that the so-called "degrees" are such of abstractedness rather than of abstraction, because the second "degree" is not a continuation or intensification of the first, nor does the third stand in such a relation to the second, wherefore it might be advisable to speak, with F. R. Wilson, of "modes" instead of "degrees";

(b) and that St. Thomas was quite aware of this and, therefore, spoke of the operation of the "third degree" not as of "abstraction" but "separation."

4. The perfection of knowledge or understanding finds its definite formulation in a judgment; but the judgment which, e. g., expresses the specific differences or names the attributes of a species cannot be formed unless there be previously an operation which I propose to call that of "isolation" and which allows the intellect to envisage one by one the distinguishable features in a concept.

(a) The formation of the generic concept presupposes that the traits common to all species of the genus be distinguished and isolated from the rest so that they may be recognized in each of the species;

(b) likewise, for the forming of a class-name it is necessary that one particular feature, or a group of such, be isolated from the rest and all objects examined in regard to the presence or absence of these characteristics.

(c) The operation of isolation is likewise necessary for the perfection of understanding; the concept already possessed by the possible intellect must be dismembered, as it were, for an "analytic judgment" becoming possible.

5. The referent of a class-name is a multitude of things (corporeal or other) which possess these characteristics. But the identification of these things as falling under this class is possible only if the class-concept is formed first, that is, if the characteristics decided upon—a decision which may be quite arbitrary—are united, put together by a peculiar operation best called "construction."

The foregoing discussions have tried to make clear that the list of intellectual operations ought to be expanded so as to comprise also, as distinct operations, those of "isolation" and of "construction." They have also been submitted to emphasize the numerous problems deserving consideration in this field.

Some lines of approach have been indicated. On the whole, the intention of this essay is more to present problems than to offer solutions. As it was said in the beginning, it is the discovery of problems and the ability to find ways of approach to them by which a philosophy proves its actuality and aliveness. It is not at all a criticism or, even less, a disparagement of an existing philosophy if attention is drawn to questions hitherto not sufficiently studied or not raised. The ideas here developed are not submitted that they may end but rather that they may start a discussion.

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THE SUBJECTIVE AND THE OBJECTIVE *

By Rudolf Allers

When Husserl addressed to the philosophical world his now famous admonition "back to the things themselves," what he had then in mind were not the things with which we deal in daily intercourse. Quite to the contrary, he set out to "bracket" the whole realm of existence, of concreteness, of becoming. Phenomenology, as he then understood it, did not, as he said in a note in his *Ideas,* "tell any stories." Did he consider the *epoché* as only a methodological device and did he intend from the very beginning to find the way back to the world of concreteness? If so, he did not furnish any information. In any case, we know today that in his subsequent reflections, the problem of the concrete world, the *Lebenswelt* as he called it, assumed increasing importance.

The influence that the meditations of Husserl's later years may have had on the younger generation is, as yet, difficult to assess. And it is, in fact, not important whether this question can or cannot be answered. Husserl, obviously, was not less sensitive to the problems arising from the intellectual and cultural situation as it developed around 1920, than were those who have emphatically made the *Lebenswelt* the primary object of their inquiries and the starting point for the reconstruction of philosophy.[1]

Many of the idioms which characterize recent philosophies refer to this world of ordinary experience. Being-in-a-world, being-with, situation, *engagement,* commitment, and other such formulae all point in the same direction.

The statement: "to-be-in-a-world is constitutive for the Being of the human being," is not to be understood as establishing a relationship between two independent entities. I-being-in-my-world, on one hand, and my-world-including-me, on the other, are two indissoluble sides of one and the same "state of affairs." This, however, is true of "my" world, not of "the world." "The world" is what is referred to by ordinary language; it is this which enables each one of us to come to some "understanding," to agree or disagree, to co-operate, and so on. By virtue of certain idiosyncrasies each "private" world differs from each other, and the degree of difference determines what

* Read, with some omissions, as the Presidential Address at the tenth meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, Brooklyn College, March 20, 1959.

[1] On the existence of such parallel but largely independent developments, cf. H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (New York, 1958). It is also noteworthy that many of the ideas and terms that are used today so generally have been anticipated by Ortega y Gasset. Thus, in his *Meditaciones del Quijote* (Madrid, 1914), he fully recognizes the constitutive role of the situation—*circumstancia*—for the man's being. For further parallels, cf. J. Ferrater Mora, *Ortega y Gasset* (New Haven, 1957), pp. 46 ff.

we call normalcy. People who live in an "abnormal world" are themselves abnormal. Normalcy consists precisely in that the several private worlds overlap so far as to render possible generally intelligible formulations. The "common world of people who are awake"—the words are those of Heraclitus—is intersubjective and insofar independent of the single human being.

In other words, it is not as if this being-in-a-world were something added to my being, as if there were a human being which then would—or perhaps would not—enter into a relation with the world. This, in fact, is the original meaning of the designation of man as an *animal sociale.* For this name does not indicate a capacity on the part of man of which he might or might not avail himself. It refers rather to an essential or fundamental trait which is not less constitutive and characteristic of man as is his being an *animal rationale,* or a biped, or able to speak. If it was necessary that being-with, *Mitsein,* had to be pointed out explicitly, it was because the original understanding, Aristotle's, had been lost in consequence of certain developments in post-Cartesian philosophy, developments which, in truth, were not implied in Descartes' conception.

If it is said that "all men awake live in one and the same common world" and that they are aware of this fact by means of ordinary language, the objection rises that there are many ordinary languages and, therefore, not one, but many common worlds. Much emphasis has been placed, in recent times, on the great differences obtaining among the several languages and, consequently, the corresponding world-pictures. But the same writers who stress these differences so much and pretend that no one living in one universe of discourse can truly understand what a member of another such universe means, explain to us carefully what the differences are; that is, they tell us, after all, what the allegedly incomprehensible utterances mean. They are so much concerned with the differences that they pay little attention to the fact of the many things the most divergent languages have in common. And they have much in common because they all deal with one and the same common world.

This common world is where each of us lives, that with which he deals, the origin of all questions, and the place where our endeavors to answer the questions must prove themselves to be reliable, or, at least, tenable for the present. It is the world of the ordinary man not less than that of the scientist when he returns from his calculations and experiments to his daily existence.

But even so, this world is not spread out before us in perfect clarity. It has to be uncovered, for it is overlaid by the manifold theoretical explanations which science has furnished in the course of centuries and which have become part also of the world-picture of average people.[2] And this applies

[2] Husserl refers repeatedly to this circumstance. Cf. also L. Landgrebe in his Introduction to Husserl's *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Hamburg, 1948), pp. 38 ff.

not only to the world of advanced, especially Western, civilization. It is equally true of the so-called primitive civilizations. If these are poorer in implements and lack scientific knowledge, their worlds are not less overlaid by institutions and interpretations.[3]

If then we take the call "back to the things themselves" in its widest sense, as referring not only to ideal but to concrete things as well, we are faced by the task of working out an encompassing phenomenology of the ordinary world, for we cannot hope otherwise to arrive at an ontology of the *Lebenswelt,* of which Husserl speaks as of a *desideratum.* To comply with this task it is not only necessary that one free oneself of all admixtures, scientific, metaphysical, mythological, or what else, but also that one behave as what Husserl calls a "disinterested observer." [4]

This, however, implies that we are not allowed to credit any datum which we may discover with particular importance. That we are inclined to consider certain data or aspects as more important and tend to choose them as a center, so to speak, for mapping out the ordinary world, has to be taken just as one more datum among others. It is not less one such datum among others that we look "naturally" at those sides of the world as more important that concern us immediately. In other words: from the standpoint of phenomenology or of the "disinterested observer" the preference accorded to "existence" or the individual person is a premature decision which is not *a priori* justified but requires justification.

I submit that the neglect of the task just outlined is the reason, or one of the reasons, why contemporary philosophy has contributed astonishingly little to the phenomenology of the ordinary world. It seems, if one may say so, that in the formula "Being-in-a-world" they are concerned only with the "Being," and they either take the world for granted or view it as something secondary. Or one might speak of a subjectivistic prejudice, understandably as a reaction against the depersonalizing conceptions that prevailed previously, but nonetheless a prejudice.

The position of the "disinterested observer," however, can never be realized. Not because it is impossible to disregard or bracket all one's prejudices and preferences, but because the position is self-contradictory. For disinterestedness itself would also have to be considered as one datum among others; that is, it would, so to speak, require a disinterestedness of a second degree, and this would repeat itself *ad infinitum.*

Hence, it seems that a choice is inevitable. But must choosing mean the adoption of only one viewpoint? Is it not conceivable that one might take account simultaneously of two—or even, if it were necessary, of more—

[3] Cf. E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* trans. R. Manheim (New Haven, 1955), II, 71 ff.

[4] *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale Phänomenologie* (Haag, 1945), pp. 160, 183.

viewpoints? That is to say, is it not possible for one to give due consideration to the approach recognized by the "existentialists" and, at the same time, consider all that which is not existential? Or, what amounts to the same, that equal attention be paid to the person or the *Dasein* or the existent, on the one hand, and the world wherein he is, on the other?

Such a two-pronged approach is, I believe, not only possible, but, in truth, indispensable. The subject (ego, person, *Dasein,* existent) continually transcends himself; where to? His being is "ecstatic" (ek-sistens);[5] but this, too, implies a regions so to speak, into which this ecstasis reaches. And it is not left to the arbitrary decision of the subject in what direction he transcends himself. For he is not surrounded by a void but precisely by a world which has a structure of its own.

To the urge, if one may say so, of self-transcendence corresponds, as its indispensable correlative, the "opportunity" supplied by the transcendent world which extends a "solicitation" to the subject, which "invites" him to respond by "inserting" himself, in an indeed peculiar manner, into the world that is. Without such an invitation, challenge, or solicitation on the part of the world self-transcendence cannot happen.[6] There must be a "whereto," a direction, for this movement by which man apparently passes beyond the boundaries of his being. Emphasis has to be placed on "apparently." For, in fact, there is no such passing beyond. One is easily misled by certain phrases: a man may say that he was completely lost in the contemplation of a painting, or that he forgot himself altogether while absorbed by some activity or impression.[7] But these phrases are, as closer examina-

[5] H. Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1928), speaks of "excentricity," a notion not unrelated to that of self-transcendence. It is, however, not feasible that all the ideas be discussed which somehow converge towards that of being-in-a world.

It may be noted, however, in passing that the idea of "being-with" as constitutive of man's being holds a prominent place in the thought of Marx and also of L. Feuerbach. "A perfectly isolated individual would disappear undistinguishably in the chaos of nature." (*Das Wesen des Christentums* [Leipzig, 1841].) Both are, of course, dependent on Hegel.

[6] Self-transcendence and ekstasis, too, depend on choice, and the choice is between anticipated situations which are to be realized. Hence, it is the picture of a possible world which determines the direction of transcendence. The absolute indetermination and unlimited freedom of the "project" in the philosophy of J. P. Sartre is purely fictitious.

[7] This losing oneself has always been known, of course. Its extreme form is, probably, the *unio mystica.* The statements, however, on an apparent abolition of the subject must be taken *cum grano salis.* For the ego finds itself again after the ekstasis is over, and this finding again would be incomprehensible if there had taken place a real abolition or annihilation of the ego. This is true, at least, of Christian mystic experience. *Plus est qui amat ubi amat quam ubi animat,* says the *Opusculum De Adhaerendo Deo,* ascribed to Albert the Great; *plus,* but not wholly. The emphasis placed on participation, bridging or abolishing the gap between subject and object, etc. has given rise, on the part of French and German writers, to the curious use of "exist" as a transitive verb. (E.G., Jeanne Delhomme, *La pensée interrogative* (Paris, 1954), "J'existe le tableau.") Time and again one is reminded of the language in which the mystics, Eastern

tion will show, only metaphors. What actually goes on is of a much more complicated nature. Some philosophers contend that with the recognition of man's being-in-a-world and of his self-transcendence the gap between subject and object, a heritage of idealism, has finally been closed. This statement I hold to be false or even meaningless; it results from an insufficient clarification of the term "object."

It is not for this study to survey critically the several meanings and to do away with the many equivocations.[8] I must content myself with defining the sense in which I shall use some terms.

The domain to which the terms "object" and "objective" apply shall be co-extensive with that comprising all which is non-ego.[9] This objective domain must be understood as being, on one hand, "intrasubjective" and, on the other, "transsubjective."[10] Intrasubjective are all "intentional objects," all those to which Brentano referred as having *inexistentia intentionalis et mentalis.* The intrasubjective is not *of* the ego or the subject, although it may be said, metaphorically, to be *in* the subject. One cannot help using such metaphors taken from space; but one ought to be always conscious of their inadequacy and of the dangers arising whenever they are taken too literally.[11]

Intrasubjective are not only the "objects" of knowledge, constituting the

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and Western, expressed themselves when talking of the *unio mystica.* What one reads today often sounds rather like a sort of "secularization" of mystical experience. But several, at least, of the Christian mystics warned against assuming a true and substantial unification of divine and human being. "I speak not of the reality but of the appearance, the impression that is felt." So Johannes Tauler, as quoted by M. C. D'Arcy, *The Meeting of Love and Knowledge* (London, 1958), p. 74.

[8] Lalande, *Vocabulaire,* 7th ed. (Paris, 1956), enumerates six meanings of "objective" and four of "object." The list is not even complete. It does not mention, e.g., the sense in which A. von Meinong uses the two terms in his Gegenstandstheorie; see Über emotionale Präsentation," *Sitz. Ber. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. (Phil. Hist. Kl.)* 1917.

[9] Non-ego is not meant here, obviously, in the sense of Fichte. The distinctions here proposed are strictly phenomenological and leave at first undecided all epistemological and ontological questions.

[10] I borrow these expressions from Johannes Volkelt, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit* (Munich, 1918), who, however, uses them in a different sense.

[11] It may not be superfluous to point out that certain meanings of "object" and "objective" are excluded. (1) That which is implied in our speaking of objective truth, objective knowledge, as in science. It is an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation to restrict the meaning of "object" to that with which science is preoccupied. (2) In English and French (but not in German), there exist idioms in which "subject" and "object" are used as interchangeable terms. One can equally say "the subject" or "the object" of this essay. The underlying difference of viewpoints is usually neglected. (3) In English, French, Italian, but again not in German, "object" may also mean "goal," by virtue of the equation: object = project = goal. In fact, *"objectum"* may designate not only *id quod objicitur mihi,* but also *quod objicio.* Anything I hold before myself, say, for the sake of protection, may be called an object. It is the same with "problem"; this names not only what is "thrown before me" but also that which I "pose"—that is, a question.

Gegenstandsbewusstsein, but also all that is envisaged as possible goal, all that is desired, evaluated, preferred or rejected.

To each intrasubjectively given corresponds something transsubjective. This holds for veridical perceptions and judgments not less than for erroneous and fictitious creations of the mind. Transsubjectivity is not synonymous with "real existence" nor with "objective validity."

The relationship between the transsubjective and the intrasubjective (the intentional object or, in the parlance of Nicolai Hartmann, the objectivated) is basically constitutive of the being-in-a-world and the being-with of the existent or the *Dasein.* This relationship is an ultimate which cannot be analyzed any further although it may be described more precisely. As an ultimate and as constitutive it can never be "abolished" or "overcome." Without it there cannot be either a human mind or a human life.[12]

One of the most outstanding characteristics of this relationship is the discrepancy of the two terms. The intrasubjective does not exhaust the transsubjective; the latter is always richer than the former. The awareness of this discrepancy constitutes what I have called the solicitation or the challenge. For the mere fact that the mind needs or desires further acquaintance with the transsubjective would by itself not suffice for its moving, so to speak, towards the transsubjective. It is necessary that the latter permit of being approached. It is a one-sided view to assume that the expanding relationship of the subject and his world is dependent exclusively on the former. "All men by nature want to know"; certainly. But this tendency would be utterly idle were not the transsubjective of such a nature as to allow its being approached.

The transsubjective is more than the intrasubjective, and not only when one has to do with reality. This is, I suppose sufficiently evident to render further elaboration superfluous. But it is doubtlessly the real world which challenges first of all.[13]

Intentionally apprehended, the transsubjective is "present" to and in the mind neither in its concreteness nor in its completeness. However paradoxical it may be, it is an undeniable fact that the discrepancy between the transsubjective and the intrasubjective is one of the fundamental data of consciousness. Whether metaphysics can offer a satisfactory explanation is a question not to be raised within the context of this talk. But it must be noted that this discrepancy is the *conditio sine qua non* of all transcendence on the part of the subject. For it is this discrepancy, which opens, on the one hand, a way by which to transcend and, on the other hand, which constitutes the challenge to which transcendence is the reply.

This reply is of more than one kind. Philosophy has been mainly con-

[12] *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis,* 2nd ed. (Berlin-Leipzig, 1925), esp. pp. 429 ff.

[13] A man who climbed one of the giants of the Himalaya was asked what made him undertake this daring enterprise; "Well," said he, "it—the mountain—was there."

cerned, at least since Kant, with knowledge, and has more or less ignored the kind of transcendence called "work." To the question "how is knowledge possible?" corresponds the equally important question: "how is work possible?" The possibility of work, that is, of the transformation of the world through man's activity has been taken, it would seem, for granted. The fact is, of course, obvious. There is no need to point out that this fact and the correlated notion of the *homo faber* [14] which served as models for the metaphysical speculations of Plato, Aristotle, and innumerable other thinkers. But, as it happens frequently, it is the obvious which presents us with the most difficult problem. On previous occasions I have suggested that there is a need to devote greater attention to this problem which I propose to call that of "ergology." [15]

Creativity is one particular form of transcendence. It is often said that the creative spirit "passes over" into the work it creates. This cannot be taken literally. For the spirit "remains," if one may say so, what and where it was. Here one has to recall what I pointed out before: that the intrasubjective is "in" but not "of" the mind. It is not "part" of the subjective spirit, to use an Hegelian term. It is rather the counterpart of the objective spirit, if this term is taken in a wider sense than Hegel gave to it. The statement that the intrasubjective be "in" but not "of" the mind may require some explanation. It is, in fact, a common belief, or so it seems to me, that all that is found in the mind be "mental" in the sense of being of the same nature as the mind. Also the expression *inexistentia mentalis* seems to imply the same notion. But closer examination will show that this cannot be the case.

The mind is a real existent, whether it be viewed as a substance of some sort or as an accident. As real, it is subject to change. It is a "stream of consciousness"; it is active in many respects and responds to external impressions with corresponding alterations. But the intrasubjective is unchangeable. Husserl's at first sight somewhat paradoxical statement that the real tree may burn down, but that this can never happen to the intentional-object tree, must be taken literally. For it is incorrect to say that an idea or any other "content" of the mind undergoes change. No intrasubjective changes; it is replaced. And replaced so that the original remains. When I say: "I have changed my opinion," it means that I have formed a new opinion which now takes the place of the former. But the former is unchanged; it persists exactly as it was. This applies to any intrasubjective content whatsoever. One memory image may supplant another; but this does not prevent the latter from remaining what and how it was.

Consequently, the intrasubjective has to be considered as nontemporal. But

[14] For a provocative, but in some respects debatable, analysis of the notion of *homo faber,* see H. Arendt, *The Human Situation* (Chicago, 1958).

[15] In a paper read at the 1957 convention of the Amer. Philos. Assoc. and one communicated to the 12th Internat. Congress of Philosophy at Venice, September 1958.

"temporality" is an essential trait of the human being or the human mind. The *modus essendi* of the intrasubjective is, therefore, not that of the mind "in" which the former occurs.

If the intrasubjective is not of the mind, it can neither be said to be in the same mode of being as the mind or the subjective spirit. Brentano, following the Scholastics, had spoken of an *inexistentia mentalis objecti* and thus reintroduced the notion of intentionality. I suggest that we adopt another term; first because *inexistentia* is somewhat ambiguous; but mainly because the same mode of being is found also within the transsubjective. The mode which is proper to the objective spirit, the spiritual traces—if one may say so—deposited by man in his works, corresponds to the mode of *insistence,* as I propose to call it, of the intrasubjective.

The insistence of the spirit in the work and the insistence of the transsubjective in the mind are correlatives. In other words, one has to do with a mutual relationship, but one which is not symmetrical since the transsubjective is indifferent to and unaffected by its giving rise to the formation of the intrasubjective, whereas the latter depends in more than one respect on the transsubjective. The mutuality of this relationship, however, renders questionable the claim that "transcendence" is peculiar only to the subject. For it seems justified to say that the transsubjective, too, "transcends" itself by permitting its apprehension by a subject.

Because the transsubjective permits apprehension and reveals itself as always richer than its intrasubjective correlate it is at once indifferent and active or—envisaged from the standpoint of the subject—it is simultaneously apprehended and not apprehended. It is the former as that which is "given in evidence" and the latter as "challenge" or solicitation.

The capacity—metaphorically speaking, the willingness—on the part of the transsubjective to let itself be both known and transformed appears to me as of paramount metaphysical significance. If it has not been given, hitherto, all the attention it deserves, at least, as far as I know, it is because of the domineering influence which subjectivism has exercised throughout the centuries of the modern age. This influence is felt also today, even with thinkers who turn against subjectivism. I have remarked before that the recognition of the being-in-a-world, of being-in-a-situation, being engaged, and so forth,[16] requires an analysis of the second term as much as it does of the first.

[16] Historical justice requires, at least, a brief reference to the fact that this idea of being-in-a-situation, as constitutive of the human being, had been stated explicitly by Ortega y Gasset long before the emergence of the several "existential" philosophies. Compare the following passage from Ernst Mayer (a follower of Jaspers), *Dialektik des Nichtwissens* (Basle, 1950), p. 25: "Denn ich finde mich nicht nur in einer Situation, sondern diese Situation, in der ich mich finde, bin ich eigentlich selbst," with the words of Ortega, written in 1914: "Yo son yo y la mi circumstancia" (*Meditaciones del Quijote,* ed. J. Marías [Madrid, 1957], p. 43). Marías points out in his commentary (p. 239), that

I have also implied that the expressions like "transcedence," "ek-stasis" and so on must be used with caution and that their metaphorical nature should not be forgotten. For when they are taken all too literally, they cease to refer adequately to the phenomena they claim to describe and easily lead into sometimes fantastic falsifications.

If, for instance, one were to understand the term "transcendence" literally, it would mean that that which transcends will be found, after executing this movement, there whereto it transcended. But this is, obviously, not the case. The transcending—call it "being," "existence" or by any other name,—does not "leave" itself or its former "place"; (these very inappropriate terms are of course suggested by the spatial and motor imagery implied in "trancendence,") just as the subjective spirit does not pass over into its creation. It is only within the framework of a spiritualistic monism, as that of Hegel, that such a statement makes sense. As long as we move on the terrain of phenomenological analysis, we cannot speak of such a "passing over."

As little as the spirit can leave itself or, as it were, split off a part of itself to incorporate it in its work, as little can the subject leave itself, lose its identity and become one with the transsubjective. Not only is it impossible that the opposition of subject and object ever be abolished, it is indispensable that it persist because otherwise the subject would lose its identity and literally cease to be.

It would be by far too long were I to explain why I consider this thesis as untenable and as lacking substantiation by an all-sided phenomenological analysis. Nor can I dwell on its consequences which I believe to be pernicious. I may, however, be allowed to say one word on one of the reasons which have brought about this new position. This reason is the failure to realize the manifold meanings in which the terms "object" and "objective" are used. I have referred to these ambiguities before. Those thinkers who so emphatically proclaim the "abolition" of the subject-object distance take "object" as signifying that with which "objective" science is concerned. Now, it must be admitted that the way we envisage our fellow men is not that in which we look at other data of our experience. I am, indeed, far from denying that the philosophies of which I speak have contributed new and valuable insights. It is perfectly true that a person is not an object in the same sense as is a stone. But a stone is neither an object in the same sense as, say, a mathematical proposition or a concept. Envisaging a person as a "Thou" is not the same as envisaging him as a "He" (Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel). But, again, recognizing a transsubjective as a "He" and recognizing it is an inanimate thing also are not identical attitudes. And the same may be said in regard to an element of nature and an artifact. But, different though these several "objects" may be, they have in common that they are transsubjective, pertain

in 1932 Ortega characterized this formula as the shortest summary of his philosophical thought.

to the non-ego, and can in no way become identical with the subject entering in some relationship with them.

Few will deny today that the philosophies—commonly, though with questionable right, comprised under the one name of "existentialism"—have widened the horizon of philosophical inquiry. They have, however, contributed mainly to the extension of philosophical problematic, and have not offered solutions to the eternal quest of metaphysics. If they have failed in this latter respect, it is because of the one-sidedness of their approach. And this, in turn, is related to the incompleteness of the phenomenological basis on which these philosophies try to build their constructions.[17] I need not repeat what I have said before; namely, that the unilateral consideration of the subject, existent, *Dasein,* or by whatever name it may be called, has prevented the due consideration of all that is the not-ego.

By viewing transcendence, ek-stasis, commitment, and so forth, exclusively from the standpoint of the subject, one risks overlooking the enormous variety of the situations or world-aspects involved. To be committed does not mean the same for the priest, the judge, the physician, or the educator, on one hand, and the betrothed, the friend, the soldier, or the member of a ship's crew, on the other. The "existential significance" of these several situations can be found out only by a phenomenological analysis of the situation.

Even the I-Thou relationship is differentiated in many ways.

It is only in passing that I want to point out that this undifferentiated manner of looking at the situations and the commitments which they require may have rather serious consequences in the field of ethics. If *engagement* or commitment is conceived of as of an absolute requirement, then it will be right whatever that be to which one is committed.

The references to transcendence, being-with, or communion likewise need to be rendered more precise. All these expressions are metaphors based on images taken from spatial experience. If the metaphor, say, of transcendence is to be taken literally, one would have to ask: who or what transcends what whereto? Furthermore, being-with designates a state; it is said to be constitutive of human being. If then the being is already "beyond" or "outside" of himself, what is the meaning of transcendence? [18]

Most of the time the reference is to human relationships. But is it true that man becomes "engaged" only where his fellows are involved?

If these questions have been studied at all, it has been in an imperfect

[17] Not only has the phenomenology of the world and the situation been neglected, but even the phenomenology of subjectivity is far from sufficient. Thus, Heidegger's much praised analysis of anguish appears to me as incomplete. Cf. my article, "Les ténèbres, le silence et le néant," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,* LXIV (1956), p. 131.

[18] There are also considerable terminological difficulties. In the parlance of Jaspers, e.g., transcendence means as well that whereto the subject transcends—in his case primarily the "encompassing"—as the movement by which this "going beyond the limits," if one may say so, is effected.

manner, so far as I know. But they must be answered if the phenomena justly pointed out in contemporary philosophies are to lead to a metaphysical interpretation. I submit that an approach may be found in the consideration of that transcendence which does not entail a "movement" towards a person or society or a human situation, but forms the essential foundation of human creativity.

It has, I am afraid, not become clear why I have referred to the fact of work in the context of this discussion. The reason is that I believe the transformation of the given world by man's creativity to be a definite kind of "transcendence," and particularly one which allows us to discover, if not a final answer, at least a way that may lead to an answer to the questions mentioned a moment ago.

For, as I have said, something "passes over" from the subject or the subjective spirit into the work. It is the presence of this something which distinguishes the artifact from a thing of "nature." I shall call this something, so far as it is present in the work or artifact, the latter's "message." Message is, of course, a *denominatio a potiori,* but not an inappropriate one. For every artifact "speaks" to us, that is, reveals itself as man-made and, in most cases, also as belonging to this or that sphere of human existence. It is, therefore, permissible that the message be viewed as standing paradigmatically for all the phenomena here envisaged.

"Message" is an equivocal term. It names the physical "carrier," by means of which communication is established between a "sender" and a "recipient," but also that which is communicated, that is, the "meaning." [19] I shall use the term "message" in the second sense only. It is preferable to "meaning" because one and the same message may convey more than one meaning, as in parabolic or allegoric parlance, or in the case when there is a meaning hidden by a code or evident only to the initiate. But similar conditions prevail also in ordinary speech; otherwise the question: "What does it really mean?" could not arise.

Sent forth, the message becomes incorporated in something physical, by means of what Husserl called *bedeutungsverleihende Akte,* and may be taken out again, in a *bedeutungsentnehmenden Akt* [20] by the recipient. Thus, the message has its being as well in the consciousness of sender and recipient as in the carrier wherein it is embodied. This trait alone suffices to show that the being of the message cannot be either that of existence or that of essence. Neither can it be considered as an accident. It has a peculiar and, in fact, unique mode of being—precisely that which I designate by "insistence." [21]

[19] The same ambiguity is found with "information." Its neglect has caused some confusion in the theory of communication.

[20] The two terms may be taken in a wider sense than is the case with Husserl. Every creation of the mind becomes significant or meaningful by virtue of such acts.

[21] In further elaborating on this point one would have to examine the relationship—

Only by giving to the term an unwarranted width—and thus an undesirable vagueness—could one subsume the mode of being peculiar to the message, i.e., insistence, under the notion of essence. Is it meaningful to say that the essence of this article consists in the message it tries to convey? I do not think that it is. It may be that all knowledge of essence is, at least potentially, a message,[22] but it does not follow that all messages are also the grasp or presentation of an essence.

Finally, insistence cannot be viewed as potential being. It is, of course, possible for one to refer to the reception of a message as an actualization. As long as the text is not read, the inscription not deciphered, the usability of a tool not recognized, so long all this remains "hidden." But the reception of the message does not alter the being of that which carries the message or that in which the message has been incorporated. The actualization pertains rather to the recipient than to the received. The message operates as an actualizing agent rather than as something passively subjected to actualization.

A further characteristic of insistent being becomes apparent here, namely its actualizing capacity. The message does not exist and thus is not endowed with reality. On the other hand, it possesses an actualizing power. The vocabulary of German philosophy—and also ordinary German language—knows of two terms: *Realität* and *Wirklichkeit*. The first emphasizes thingness or thereness, the second efficacy.[23] One might say that insistent being lacks *Realität* but belongs to the realm of *Wirklichkeit* inasmuch as it is *wirksam*, that is, displays efficacy, produces effects.

Obviously the questions, here adumbrated rather than answered, imply many more. Some of these refer to the similarities or dissimilarities of the views submitted and those found in several philosophies, sometimes of a very different nature. Since it is not possible to discuss these relationships, it would be useless to mention the ideas requiring consideration.[24]

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the non-identity—of insistence with the several notices of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy. This would, however, require a discussion much too long to be undertaken here.

[22] In fact, every intrasubjective is potentially a message by virtue of that being-with which is constitutive of man's being. (This idea is, for that matter, not unlike that of the *animal sociale* of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy.) "Every impression is destined to become expression.": R. Hoenigswald, *Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie,* 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1926).

[23] This distinction plays a great role in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. The two terms have been rendered as "reality" and "factuality" by O. Samuel, *A Foundation of Ontology* (New York, 1953).

[24] Among the philosophies of which account should be taken, Hegel's is, of course, outstanding. Likewise, all those philosophies which are influenced in one way or another by Hegel; the ontology of Nicolai Hartmann is particularly interesting here. There is, furthermore, the notion of a "third realm" that is neither subjective nor objective, as found with G. Simmel, and the philosophy of *Sinn* developed by Paul Hofmann. One would also have to discuss the notions of the subject-object relationship in the several so-called existential philosophies, for they differ considerably in this respect. Martin

Other questions may be raised concerning further consequences and ramifications of the notion of insistent being. However, at least one of these questions must find a brief answer.

Exemplifying insistent being by the "message" may give rise to the impression that insistent being originates exclusively in the subjective spirit. The intrasubjective acquires this sort of being by virtue of being apprehended; by virtue of the "incorporation" of the intrasubjective in a material carrier insistent being is, if one may say so, conferred on the transsubjective. Hence, it would seem that insistent being is found only in subjectivity and its externalizations, that is, the artifact. This, I take it, would be too narrow a conception.

Man is always in some sort of situation. But not every situation is relevant; not everyone has "meaning" for this or that individual man. Not every situation possesses the character of challenge or solicitation. Obviously, whether or not this character be present depends on the "standpoint" from which the situation is envisaged. But the standpoint does not create relevance; it only renders possible its discovery. I believe that one is justified in holding that relevance, significance, meaning, or whatever a term may be chosen, "insist" in the situation.

That engagement in, or commitment to a situation become possible, it is necessary that there be solicitation on part of the situation. Consciousness of problems cannot arise, unless the situation be problematic. An I-Thou relationship—as opposed to the I-He or I-It—presupposes that the other reveal himself [25] and be accessible. There is no communion without communication. And communication implies the mediation by insistence.

The philosophies that grew out of the "crisis of our age," under the pressure of the societal and cultural plight of these times, the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, the revolt against the exaggerated "objectivity" of scientific thinking, in consequence of the spreading of the ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and by virtue of numerous other factors—these philosophies have been characterized as the "Triumph of Subjectivity." [26] This triumph appears to me as rather precarious and hardly destined to last. The turn towards subjectivity may well have been a necessary corrective of a mentality which tended to forget the subject. But a corrective retains its significance only as long as account is taken of that which it aims to correct. If the subject is not an object among objects, it is neither the source and origin of the latter. The

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Buber's way of interpreting the I-Thou relationship apparently would admit the notion of "mediation" as proposed here, whereas other "existentialists" reject, if I understand them correctly, all such mediation and claim that there is a direct "communion." For a thorough and, on the whole, appreciative presentation of Buber's ideas, cf. P. E. Pfuetze, *The Social Self* (New York, 1954), pp. 117 ff.

[25] Cf. M. Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, 5th ed. (Frankfurt a. M. 1948), p. 241 et passim.

[26] J. Q. Lauer, *The Triumph of Subjectivity* (New York, 1958).

world may be there to be transformed by man; but one can transform only what first is put, as it were, at one's disposal. One-sided emphasis on the subject or on "existence" is as much a falsification as is the neglect of these aspects of reality.

It is not going too far if one sees in the "triumph of subjectivity" and in "existentialism" the latest form of man's imperialistic *hybris*. It has found its clearest formulation, not in regard to philosophy but to art, in the affirmation of A. Malraux; [27] finally man has reached the point where he frees himself completely from the bondage of things and the world, creating thus a universe of his own. But this man-made universe is one of fancies and shadows. And "then play with him the clouds and the winds." [28]

It may well be that the ideas current today mark a definite advance in metaphysical thinking. But one would risk losing what has been gained, were one to forget that the understanding of "being-in-a-world" requires that account be taken of the world not less than of him who is there. Or, in other words, if one were to forget that this formula reads more correctly: "being-in-a-world that *is*." We should not be so fascinated by subjectivity or existence that we overlook the wealth and multiformity of being.

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[27] *Les voix du silence* (Paris, 1951).

[28] Goethe, in "Grenzen der Menschheit,": "Nirgends haften dann/Die unsicheren Sohlen,/Und mit ihm spielen/Wolken und Winde."

ETHICS AND ANTHROPOLOGY *

By Rudolf Allers

If one were to define ethics broadly enough to include all kinds of moral philosophy, one might submit that ethics is the science of those principles by the application of which man is enabled to arrange his conduct so as to attain his end and fulfill his destiny. It is the view one has of the end and the destiny which determines the particular system of moral philosophy he adopts.

Because dealing with principles, this science is essentially philosophic. This is true even of those ideas on ethics which deny the existence of immutable principles, and hold that ethical doctrines or the moral code change with the changing historical, cultural, or social conditions. Such a relativistic or naturalistic theory is under the obligation to state the general principle which governs the alleged transformations of morals, and requires, therefore, a philosophy of history and civilization as its basis.

A mere description of the moral ideas prevalent at a certain time and in a certain place is not a work of ethics. It may pertain to the history of morals, or form a chapter in cultural anthropology. It is, however, an indispensable work even for a moral philosophy which believes in immutable principles. Such a philosophy may be labeled "dogmatic," with more or less justice; however dogmatic it be, it cannot dispense with the knowledge of empirical facts.

The task of a science of ethics is not, in fact, restricted to statements on principle with, perhaps, some additional remarks of casuistic nature. Account must be rendered of the fact that there are and have been widely different conceptions of morality, and it must be explained why it happens that men diverge so much on such questions.

More important is it that ethics implies the application of the principles it exposes. It has, therefore, to consider the factual situations in which men exist and the factors which determine or modify this application. The situations and factors are either those of an individual, taken in isolation and viewed only insofar as his idiosyncrasies, opportunities, intelligence, and so forth become influential; or one has to deal with the situations and factors to which a whole group, a people, a nation, is subjected at a certain time and in a certain place.

Thus it becomes necessary that ethics be concerned with an analysis of the circumstances of human existence. Without such an analysis, ethics is bound to be a bloodless, abstract, unappealing collection of propositions.

* Paper read at the meeting of the District of Columbia-Maryland Conference of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, December 2, 1949.

Ethics is placed, indeed, "between" speculative philosophy on one hand and empirical anthropology on the other. Its inbetweenness is of a peculiar kind, unlike that of other philosophical disciplines.

Cosmology, for instance, is also placed between speculation and empirical knowledge; the former needs to consider the factual evidence the latter provides. Another kind of inbetweenness is that of philosophical psychology which depends on one hand on the principles of metaphysics, on the other on the facts observation and experiment furnish. Part of this evidence is easily found and does not necessitate any particular inquiry; thus it is of common observation that there are cognitive and appetitive performances. But in regard to many other questions careful analysis of facts and a comprehensive knowledge of all the facts available are indispensable, if the speculative psychologist is not to arrive at statements not countenanced by reality. There is reason to be afraid that philosophical psychology, by not taking sufficient account of observable facts, may one day find itself in a situation comparable to that of the speculative philosophy of nature at the time of Galileo.

One might, perhaps, mention as another philosophical discipline standing in between speculation and observation, that of aesthetics. If aesthetics is conceived of as stating the conditions for the presence or absence of aesthetic values in an object, it becomes a normative science and, at the same time, one concerned with the facts of the history of art, the psychology of artistic or poetic creation, and also with the psychology of aesthetic enjoyment and understanding.

Ethics is viewed, by whatever philosophical school, as being essentially normative. It deals not with human conduct as it actually is, but as it ought to be if it is to be commensurate to man's ends and the fulfillment of his destiny. The note of "oughtness" is characteristic of all systems of ethics, including those of a strictly relativistic nature. At least, for the time being, under the momentarily prevailing circumstances, man ought to behave in this or that manner.

No statement on what man ought to do, no commandment, law, or rule, can be significant, unless account be taken of the capacities of human nature. The often quoted principle of the Roman law is universally true: *Nemo obligetur ultra posse.* Hence, ethics needs to know what are human nature and its abilities in general and how the latter are modified by personal or environmental conditions. Ethics requires a "moral psychology" of which we, unfortunately, as yet know not enough. Since contemporary psychology is not infrequently unwilling to admit anything like will as a distinct power of the mind [1] one need not wonder that there are hardly any studies of the

[1] "Will is merely a troublesome word that the psychologist would prefer not to bother the student with. But psychology has inherited it together with many other ambiguous notions, upon which time must be spent, if for no other reason than to demonstrate how little they mean." E. Freeman, *Principles of General Psychology* (New York, 1939), pp. 273 ff.

problems related to the exercise of will. This is one point among others, where the determining role of philosophical opinions on empirical research becomes evident. Although everyone caring to observe his experiences may realize that there is a peculiar state of mind, usually called willing, this observation is simply disregarded, because such a thing as will does not figure in the world picture the psychologist happens to have made his own.

As the psychology of the individual so is the sociology of the group of the greatest importance for the science of ethics. As ethics remains mostly sterile when it loses contact with moral psychology, so it cannot answer a number of its urgent questions if it does not seek information from cultural anthropology.

One may call all sciences dealing with human nature, man as an individual and as a member of the group, anthropology in a wide sense. The concern of ethics with anthropology is, then, twofold. It has a positive aspect, which may be defined as the "justification of ethics by anthropology," and a negative aspect, to be described as the "justification of ethics before anthropology."

The first refers to the demonstration that a given kind of ethics is, if one may say so, commensurate to human nature, that is, that it does not make demands which man cannot meet. This implies the further demonstration of the practicality of the rules laid down by the code of morals under investigation. It has to be shown that the demands ethics makes on man can be fulfilled also under the actually existing conditions.

The other task may be called one of apologetics. In fact, many of the criticisms launched against the Christian code of morals claim to be based on factual evidence supplied by anthropology. This is, of course, a point which needs careful examination.

Nothing deserves more of critical analysis than those statements which purport to be about facts and nothing but facts and which are, in truth, something different. They are reports on "findings" clad in the language of a theory or a philosophy.

It requires not much of analysis to discover that many of the so-called factual statements urged against the principles of Christian morality are anything else than simple statements of "facts." They are the outcome of definite philosophical "prejudices"—taking this word in its literal sense without any disparaging connotation—which pertain to the set of ideas known as psychologism, naturalistic "humanism," and relativism.

The criticisms brought forth are first directed against the basic assumption that there are immutable principles of morals which retain their validity whatever the cultural and social situation may be. These criticisms must be met otherwise than by merely reasserting one's own standpoint. Such a procedure does not lead anywhere. It is necessary that the fight be carried into the opponent's own terrain.

The affirmation of immutable principles is based, within a philosophical

consideration,[2] on the notion that human nature is the same under all circumstances, in particular that it is the same however widely different the state of civilization may be.

The idea that man's nature is not stable but has changed notably in the course of the thousands of years of his way from the pre-paleolithic age to our times, that between our way of thinking and acting on one hand and that of the primitives there is a profound gap, and therewith the further notion that a man cannot truly understand another if the other is a member of a totally different civilization and, especially, speaks a language of a totally different structure, all these notions had found a powerful support in the theory proposed by the eminent French philosopher and sociologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in 1910.

The ideas of Lévy-Bruhl are known well enough as to make any detailed report unnecessary. His main contentions were: that the primitive mind does not operate by means of the principle of contradiction, that this principle is replaced in the mind of the primitive by the "law of participation," and that the essence of "archaic" mentality is to be described as "magic thinking." Lévy-Bruhl's ideas were sharply criticized by some outstanding students of cultural anthropology, among whom the late B. Malinovski deserves mention. They were criticized also by a number of psychologists. It was pointed out that the "magic" way of thinking is limited to very definite fields, that the primitive is quite capable of reasoning as we do in all practical questions, that he displays ingenuousness and appears to be sufficiently "logical" to allow him to cope with the situations he encounters.

These criticisms were, however, not able to stem the enthusiastic reception the theory of Lévy-Bruhl was given by a great many psychologists and anthropologists. The reason for this widespread approval was, probably, the close alliance these ideas formed with Freudian psychoanalysis. This doctrine came, as is known, to be almost generally accepted and to be considered as the greatest achievement first in the field of psychology, but soon in all studies concerned with human nature and human affairs.

Freud had conceived of certain abnormal mental states as being caused by what he called regression: that is a return to a developmental stage which the individual has passed and on which he falls back when unable to come to terms with reality. But Freud had introduced in his theory still another idea. He believed that the laws of development as they are seen in the mental growth of the individual are the same as those which govern the development of mankind in the history of civilization. He simply applied the so-called principle of ontogenesis to history. This principle, as formulated by Haeckel, states that individual development recapitulates in a much abbreviated form the history of the race; the fertilized egg-cell corresponds thus to the hypothetical unicellular ancestor of all living beings; a later stage corresponds to organisms

[2] That is, leaving aside all reference to divine commandments and revealed truth.

of a more complex structure; the human embryo passes through a stage reminiscent of the anatomy of fishes, and so forth. Freud assumed that individual mental development likewise recapitulates history, not of the race as a biological unit, but of the series of cultural stages which preceded the time when modern man emerged from the stone age and marched onwards until he reached his present kind of civilization. The infant is still an animal, and the small child has the mentality of a primitive.

Freud and many of his followers were convinced that there are definite similarities to be found between the mentality of the small child and that of the primitive. They also believed that the mind of the child operates on principles other than those which govern normal adult behavior. The theory of Lévy-Bruhl, which stated an equally profound difference between the primitive and the modern civilized mentality, seemed to furnish a clear proof of the psychoanalytic conceptions. Further similarities were discovered between the mental operations of the schizophrenic mind and those of children and primitives. This mental disease was said to be characterized by "archaic" and "magic" ways of thinking and thus to be the manifestation of a "regression" to a much lower level of mentality than is that of the sane person.

This theory rests in fact, on a rather weak foundation. As I have tried to explain elsewhere, it is possible only if the whole system of psychoanalytic psychology is admitted as true. The psychoanalytic school has never considered the possibility that the observations referred to, which are correct to some extent, might allow for a different explanation.

Such an explanation could be found by considering that like responses are bound to ensue when the human mind encounters like situations. It is not difficult to realize that the primitive and the child find themselves insofar in very similar situations as they are both faced with an unknown, mysterious, and threatening reality. The schizophrenic, too, finds himself in a new world with which he is almost as little acquainted as the child with his world.

A short time ago one of the pillars on which this psychoanalytic conception rests has been pulled down. Lévy-Bruhl had already modified his theory notably in many of his later works. After his death appeared an article which published some of the notes this scholar had made in preparation of a new book which he was never to write.[3] This posthumous publication amounts to a thorough recantation.

One cannot but admire the intellectual honesty with which the octogenarian scholar intended to admit the error to which he had fallen prey. There is, he declares, no such thing as a primitive or archaic logic. The primitive mind operates according to the same principles which we know. The law of

[3] "Les carnets de L. Lévy-Bruhl," *Revue Philosophique,* LXXII (1947) 258. For a more detailed discussion of the implications for psychology and psychiatry, cf. R. Allers, "Über die Begriffe eines 'archaischen Denkens' und der 'Regression,'" *Wiener Zschr.f. Nervenheilhunde u. deren Grenzgebiete,* I (1948) 309.

participation does not exist. He had made the mistake, Lévy-Bruhl says, "to make the facts speak, instead of letting them speak by themselves." This is tantamount to saying that he had been blinded by certain preconceived ideas the truth of which he took so much for granted that he neglected to examine their trustworthiness.

The argument which the theory of Lévy-Bruhl seemed to furnish has thus come to naught. This will not convince those who have availed themselves of this argument; they welcomed the statements of Lévy-Bruhl because they fitted with their already firmly established convictions, and these are so deeply rooted that they will withstand even greater shocks. They are rooted, in fact, not in empirical evidence but in preconceived philosophies.

The argument that human nature or, at least, human ways are so different that one cannot truly understand the mentality of a foreign people, particularly if the language, too, is widely different, is not of a kind to carry much weight. Those who tell us that we do not understand what the other peoples think or feel are at pains to prove this contention by explaining carefully what it is the others mean and we do not understand. But this seems to show that we are capable of understanding, if we only apply ourselves to this task and do not rashly read into the statements of the foreigners our own meanings.[4]

The approach to such problems has been vitiated by the preponderant "subjectivism." By this I refer to the habit of considering, almost exclusively in psychological and anthropological analysis, the way the mind is supposed to function without regard to the contents with which this mind is preoccupied. In other words: the differences one observes in human conduct may as well spring from differences in mental operations as from differences of the world in which individuals or peoples exist.

For a man to be fearful when he lives in a world of relatively great security is, probably, a symptom of his somehow abnormal mentality; but to be fearful if one is actually surrounded by a number of dangers, especially without the possibility of either foreseeing them or of warding them off effectively, is not a "symptom" but a perfectly normal form of behavior. In such cases we do, indeed, take account of the environmental circumstances. But the same consideration applies in numerous other cases in which such a consideration is usually disregarded.

If one were, for instance, to ask oneself whether he would not behave much as the primitive does, were one to live under the same conditions, with the same lack of knowledge and the same deficiency of technological means, one might easily discover that the apparently unintelligible behavior and the curious utterances of the primitive would then be his own. There is nothing strange in man's hitting on magical explanations and magical procedures if he is surrounded by mysterious forces the action of which he can neither calculate nor turn to his advantage.

[4] See, for instance, S. Hayakawa, *Language in Action* (New York, 1939).

Perhaps the best illustration of this subjectivism in psychology is furnished by certain classifications of psychological or personality types. Most of these typologies may be characterized as being "formal," insofar as they are based on the preponderance of certain mental functions or general attitudes. But a person is not at all characterized by his being labelled, say, as an introvert. There are many differences among the so-called introverts. And these differences depend on that particular aspect of reality, innner reality be it, with which the person is primarily concerned.[5]

A consideration of the facts as they are and not as they appear in the light of some preconceived philosophies may, therefore, make us confident that human nature is everywhere and at all times the same. If it can be shown that the demands of a moral code are at all "commensurate" to human nature, then they must stay so under all circumstances.

We might even go one step farther. It might be possible to develop from an analysis of human nature a series of moral demands with which man has to comply to be wholly himself, that is, to achieve the highest degree of perfection of which he is capable.[6] Such attempts have been made, in fact, recently, on the part of a philosopher and on that of psychologists or psychiatrists. Paul Weiss has not yet stated his ethical conceptions; but the work which he intends as a sort of prolegomena to such an ethics is sufficiently indicative of his viewpoint. Apart from the general metaphysics on which this conception is based, it may be briefly characterized as aiming at the establishment of an universally valid system of morals developed from an analysis of human nature.[7]

Erich Fromm is more explicit. It is not necessary to discuss here his special ideas and his criticism of what he terms "authoritarian ethics." It suffices to point out that he, too, is dissatisfied by and worrying about the hopeless relativism in which modern ethics has become involved. His ethics is strictly naturalistic. But it differs from other such proposals by its claim of universal validity. This validity is to be ensured by founding ethics on the study of human nature and deriving therefrom a system of rules which man ought to obey if he is to attain his perfection and the best possible state of society.[8]

It is interesting to note that even a man so completely addicted to the tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis, as Dr. E. Bergler is, arrives at similar conclusions, at least on one point. He defends monogamy and, to a certain extent, the lastingness, though not, of course, the indissolubility, of marriage. It does not matter that he bases his argument on the "Oedipus-complex"

[5] A "material" typology has been established by E. Spranger and modified as well as been made practical by G. W. Allport, in his *Personality* (New York, 1937).

[6] Perfection means here the greatest possible degree of actualization, and thus does not refer only to moral perfection.

[7] P. Weiss, *Nature and Man* (New York, 1947).

[8] E. Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York, 1947).

which he believes to be a common and inevitable factor in human life. The point is that he, too, believes in a moral precept as deducible from an analysis of human nature.[9]

If such an analysis were to proceed without any naturalistic or other prejudices, it might furnish useful results. One would have to renounce any foregone conclusions and start with a descriptive study. This requires a good deal of self-criticism as well as that one free oneself from the current ideas of psychology and anthropology. Whatever its difficulties, the task is important. That it has been considered sufficiently by moral philosophy is doubtful.

Among other things, it is highly to be desired that psychology be more occupied with the study of volitional performances than it is today. The work done in this field is mostly vitiated by a marked preference for the "approach from below." This approach is chosen not so much because it is believed to be "scientific," although this idol plays a great role,[10] but chiefly because of the underlying philosophy which denies free will even before it has come to ascertain the facts.

Our understanding of volitional operations is not furthered by renaming them results of "conditioning." The psychologists have, generally, a much too high opinion of the explanatory value of the notion of "conditioned reflexes" which as have shown, for instance, E. Straus [11] and K. Goldstein [12] are in truth rather different from what psychologists believe them to be. Like many other ideas cherished by the psychologists, this one, too, belongs to the neurophysiological mythology which, unfortunately, holds so large a place in modern psychological thought.

If the statements on motivation and volition are not couched in the language of such a more or less fantastic "brain-mythology," they are dependent on the psychoanalytic conceptions of the instincts and their transformations. The use of the terms must not, but usually does, mean also an adoption of the ways of thought. Psychoanalysis, as conceived of by Freud and his school, is unavoidably deterministic. It also considers conscious motivations as misleading and as not representing the forces which in fact prompt human behavior. Because of this and other features, the approach to a "moral psychology" is closed to this manner of looking at the human mind.

The emphasis either on neural processes or on instincts reveals the influence philosophical convictions exercise on the formation of psychological ideas. The differences between the various schools of psychology are fundamentally differences of the underlying philosophies. The categories by the means of

[9] E. Bergler, *Divorce Won't Help* (New York, 1948).

[10] R. Allers, "Ideas, Ideals, and Idols," *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture,* ed. L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and F. McIver (New York, 1947) p. 475.

[11] E. Straus, *Die Einheit der Sinne* (Berlin, 1932).

[12] K. Goldstein, *The Organism* (New York, 1938); *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939).

which observations are stated are not imposed on the student by the facts; they are derived from philosophical prejudices.

All this is, however, not tantamount to a denial of the usefulness of the work done by the psychologists. Our knowledge of habit-formation, for instance, of attitudes, of the influence of emotional states, especially of such one might call "chronic," has been notably broadened, and it would be a serious neglect if moral philosophy would fail to take account of these things. But it is also evident that many problems are still awaiting adequate study, although they are of primary importance for our understanding of moral behavior. There is almost nothing to be found on the psychological factors at work in the building up of virtues or, for that matter, the psychology of vices either.

If one turns from psychology, as the individual aspect of anthropology, to cultural anthropology, one does well to realize that the advance of these studies is owed not so much to the, indeed great, widening of factual knowledge as to the improvement of methods of inquiry.

The cultural anthropologist has learned to view a culture, as it were, "from within" and has come to realize that such a phenomenon cannot be understood unless it be considered in its totality.

The procedure used by almost all students of these matters previously consisted mainly in viewing one or the other side of a culture without integrating it with all the others. Furthermore, they often evaluated such civilizations simply by comparing them with their own, which resulted in labelling the former "inferior." By viewing a culture "from within" one discovers that many traits which appear, at first sight, either shocking or unintelligible have their definite place and significance within the totality of such a culture.

This approach has deepened markedly our understanding of foreign peoples. It has not, however, proceeded far enough or become sufficiently general for most people to realize that the same approach must be used also in regard to varieties of our own civilization, that is, that the type of western civilization represented, for instance, by France or by Spain, has to be understood on its own terms, in the light of the history, the folkways, the general attitude of the population.

Feeling that they had failed to do justice to foreign civilizations, the cultural anthropologists have become anxious to avoid what they call "ethnocentrism." [13] By this term one refers to the natural inclination to judge of other civilizations by making one's own the measure, automatically assuming that it is also simply the best. There is no doubt that such an attitude may become and has become an obstacle to understanding. But this fact does not allow us to conclude that, therefore, all civilizations are of the same value. It may happen that one's preference for his own civilization is objectively

[13] See, for instance, M. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York, 1948), pp. 68 ff. and *passim*.

correct, although its statement rests on a purely subjective factor. Subjectivity and objectivity are not simply correlated to falsehood and truth. A man may hit on the truth also when arguing from false premises. The mere fact of preference has no direct relation to the goodness of the thing preferred. It is a logical error to assume that a thing cannot be better than another only because I happen to like it. But this is precisely the way in which many cultural anthropologists seem to reason.

This confusion is rather amazing. One should expect that ever so little ability in handling the rules of logic would help to avoid falling prey to this fallacy. So, one reads not without astonishment:

> It is not chance that a philosophy of cultural relativism . . . has had to wait the development of adequate ethnographic knowledge. As long as the customs of peoples could not be studied in terms of their context of values, they of necessity had to be evaluated in terms of the ethnocentrism of the appraiser.[14]

The latter part of the passage is, indeed, correct. But the first is open to serious objections. Particularly, it is not true that the development of ethnographic knowledge led to cultural relativism. Rather, this view is but the application of the generally prevailing relativism to the special field of ethnographic knowledge. In other words, the fact that different peoples conceive in different manners of the order of value has nothing to do with the question whether or not there is an objectively justified order of values. It must be admitted previously that no such order exists, or at least is discoverable, for such a conclusion to be drawn.

The defenders of "cultural relativism" deceive themselves when they believe that their work furnishes a confirmation of even a foundation to this relativism. It does this only if its results are interpreted in terms of such a relativism. The argument is a classical example of circular reasoning.

From the eminently valuable data collected by the incessant and self-sacrificing work of the cultural anthropologists conclusions may be drawn which differ strangely from those these authors themselves present. It seems rather that the material of ethnography supplies quite an amount of evidence in favor of the thesis that there is a common stock of values found everywhere. The differences in moral evaluations are not so much such of content as of extent.

This may be illustrated, for instance, by considering "love of one's neighbor."

To love his neighbor man was enjoined not only in the Old Covenant. If the commandment received its full significance only by the teachings of Christ, to extend love even to one's enemies, it has been somehow written into the hearts of men at all times. The change in the advance of mankind is

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

not the birth of the idea that one has to love one's neighbor, but the growing width of the definition.

For the primitive, the neighbor is only a member of his own tribe. Later, he may be of other tribes with whom the former is on friendly terms. The stranger, the guest, the tradesman are gradually included. With the spreading of the Roman Republic first, then the Empire, the notion is still more widened. Many inhabitants of the countries outside of Italy become Roman citizens; St. Paul is an example. Afterwards, every subject of the Empire is considered *civis Romanus*. The Stoa develops the idea of humanity and of human dignity inherent in man as such, independently of nation or social status.

The notion of a certain obligation of man in regard to some of his fellows is found everywhere. Finally, with Christianity, even the kind of relations between man and man, whether of friendship or of enmity, cease to be relevant.

The development of other moral notions runs parallel to that of the neighbor. There is, probably, no civilization however primitive which would not forbid murder. But murder may be defined in a wider and a narrower sense. To kill a slave is not deemed murder; he is the property of the master and not recognized as being endowed with rights. Nor is it thought murder to kill the member of a hostile tribe but a meritorious act of "preventive war," so to speak. There may be other factors. The primitive warrior has a definite esteem for the prowess of his actual or potential enemy; thus he enhances his greatness by killing the other. He may do more, and proceed to feed on his enemy. Anthropophagy has shocked all who come across it. But one has to consider that this custom is not a failure to recognize the other's worth; quite to the contrary, in the anthropophagic feast those who participate believe that they will acquire something of the valor of the dead. Paradoxical though it seems, one might risk the statement that the anthropophage manifests a greater appreciation of human worth than does the slaveholder.

A moral idea may be recognized but expressed in a manner which is so alien to the observer that he does not identify the idea. It would be an interesting topic to discuss how charity manifested itself at different times and under varying conditions. It is questionable whether a member of the early Church would recognize charity in the forms in which it appears today.

If one starts with the presumption that differences of civilization bring about, necessarily, differences in basic evaluations, and if he thus makes evaluation totally dependent on culture, one may overlook the fundamental identity of the recognized moral values because of the far-going differences in their applications or manifestations.

Could it be ascertained that the basic values are everywhere and at all times the same, a severe blow could be dealt to the conception that all morality is but a product of the prevailing social and cultural conditions. That this is not the case is shown by the fact of differences existing within one and the same civilization. The existence, side by side, of widely different ideas

on mortality during the first centuries of the Christian era might be used for an illustration.

It is obvious that the material situations which demand the application of certain basic principles may vary considerably. New obligations may arise because new situations emerge. One need only remember that in times of war forms of behavior become obligatory which in peacetime are almost non-existent. Thus, suspiciousness, attention to what another says, those with whom he has contacts, denunciation, secrecy, attain an importance which they do not possess outside of such unusual conditions and some things may become duties which in normal times have to be avoided.

Certain social and political conditions create new duties and make their fulfillment imperative. Thus, we have the obligation for dynastic loyalty in monarchies, or that of intelligent political cooperation in democracies.

Several of the remarks made above pertain to what had been called the "apologetic" approach. This approach has also been characterized as a negative one. It is negative because its emphasis is on the refutation of the claims made by the other side, and it carries conviction much more with those of one's own side than with the opponents.

Important though this approach is, it has its definite drawbacks. It is, so to speak, secondary; that is, it is a reply and therefore dependent on the attack. It seldom forestalls attacks, since this can be done, indeed, only by a more positive procedure. One has to prove the legitimacy of one's position with sufficient reliable evidence so as to render it impregnable, so far as this is feasible. The apologetic reply creates, almost inevitably, the impression that it is forced on the defender by the attack and is, as it were, something of an afterthought.

The sharpest criticism of traditional morals comes from those who profess a psychologistic interpretation of moral behavior. In recent times, this view has chiefly operated by means of the "genetic approach."

It should be noted that this theory does not necessarily lead to ethical relativism, though there is generally a close association of the two notions. It has been reported above that there are today some who conceive of founding a non-relativistic system of ethics on inquiries of such a nature.

The genetic approach is held today in the highest esteem. The theory of evolution on one hand, the ideas of Freud on the other have contributed to the common belief that genetic analysis is all that can and ought to be done.

However, it is well to bear in mind that, as J. Laird remarked,[15] a genetic argument is on nothing but on genesis. And the late Morris Cohen emphasized that no however detailed genetic analysis can dispense us from a careful study and description of the state whose origin we thus explain.[16]

In view of the fact that most of the "psychological critique" of traditional

[15] J. Laird, *Problems of the Self* (London, 1917).
[16] M. R. Cohen, *Studies in Philosophy and Science* (New York, 1949).

ethics uses arguments based on genetic analysis and theories derived therefrom, a brief consideration of the "genetic approach" and its relevance is not out of place.

By heeding such remarks as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph one is rendered aware of a serious gap in knowledge which cannot fail to exist if the genetic approach is the only one used. If we know, as evolutionists, all factors and antecedents of the cat, we still do not know the cat. By being told all about the instinctual forces entering into a work of art or a poem, we learning nothing of its essence. No inquiry into the psychogenesis of a sentiment of guilt can make us realize what it means to feel guilty. The most detailed discussion of the social and psychological conditions back of the phenomenon of conscience leaves us in the dark concerning its nature. To identify conscience with the performances of a hypothetical "super-ego" may be interesting, perhaps give us some insight, but it does not help us truly to understand what conscience is.

It is particularly the almost general acceptance of Freudian views which has, more than anything else, brought about the preference for the genetic approach. The particular conception of genesis in Freudian doctrine deserves brief consideration because a certain methodological fallacy becomes more apparent here than in other instances.

The procedure of genetic analysis, as employed by Freud and his school, rests on the assumption that the discovery of significance is also that of causes. Analysis is supposed to trace back any phenomenon of the mind or of human behavior to certain early antecedents which are said to be expressed or "symbolized" by the phenomenon analyzed. Thus, part of a dream is said to symbolize some infantile experience and, at the same time, to be caused by it. It is, of course, true that this particular phenomenon would not have emerged, if it is a "symbol," had the antecedent experience not taken place. But this is not the same thing as to say that this previous occurrence is the cause of the fact under consideration.

It seems to me that back of such statements is a confusion in the notion of causation. The antecedent symbolized is the material cause of the so-called symbol. But it need not be the efficient cause. That which is expressed need not be the reason why expression is sought.

The same criticism applies to the reasonings of certain students of cultural anthropology. It deserves to be noted in passing that, the opposition of eminent scholars notwithstanding, there is a close alliance of psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology.[17] This is, it seems, more than a coincidence or the effect of personal idiosyncrasies. It is indicative of a deep-seated likeness in the mode of thinking here and there.

[17] Cf. e.g. C. Kluckhohn, "Some Aspects of Navaho Infancy and Early Childhood," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, ed. G. Róheim (New York, 1947) 37.; *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture*, ed. C. Kluckhohn (New York, 1948).

If human behavior and human work, all that could be comprised under the Hegelian term of the "objective spirit," are envisaged exclusively as "expressions," that is, if absolute preference is given to the "subjectivistic" angle, the consequence cannot be but a thoroughgoing relativism.

The claim that the moral code must change with changing cultural conditions is the most evident manifestation of this relativism.

A few years ago Dr. Chisholm stated this idea in a rather blunt manner. His argument may be summarized by saying that he starts from the premise that mental health must be preserved. Secondly, that mental health is endangered by conflicts which the individual proves unable to solve. Conflicts are found in the history of most persons afflicted with mental troubles, especially of the kind termed neurotic. Conflict, therefore, ought to be eliminated as far as possible. It arises chiefly between the "natural inclinations" of man and the demands made on him by the existing moral code. Since the natural inclinations cannot be changed, the moral code must be changed according to man's needs.[18]

In this reasoning there is an obvious fallacy. It is based on the cases the psychiatrist or the social worker or the psychologist in a child-guidance clinic observes. It is true that many of these cases have suffered and do suffer from all sorts of conflicts and that these apparently are important factors in the genesis and the continuation of their symptoms. It is equally true that among "problem children," maladjusted older people, delinquents, and other such types, there are many who show a history of "frustration." But there are many more people who are involved in conflicts or have been exposed to frustration and are neither notably neurotic nor maladjusted. These people, however, are unknown to the observers. Hence, it follows that the conclusions drawn with so much assurance rest on a rather unreliable basis.

In surveying these discussions one is struck by a curious inconsistency on the part of the critics of the traditional morality. They are, largely, the same men who argue, and not without violence, against the notion of a stable and unchanging human nature. Progress, as they understand it, is not only an increase of scientific and technological knowledge, but a gradual change of human nature for the better. Thinly disguised, the old notion of an "infinite perfectibility" of man, as advocated by Condorcet, is easily recognized. But, suppose that human nature had changed—which in fact it has not—so as to find difficult the obedience to the moral code, it still does not follow that this code is false. One might as well conclude that man has to change further, so as to become again capable of making the moral precepts the rules of his conduct.

If this argument does not occur to the prophets of a new morality, it is because they envision progress as a rectilinear movement and as a prolonga-

[18] G. Chisholm, "The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress (The Re-establishment of Peacetime Society)," *Psychiatry*, IX (1946).

tion, so to speak, of evolution into history. The similarity of this idea with those of Freudian psychology, as outlined above, is striking. In the case of this sort of theory in cultural anthropology one observes the same identification of evolution and history as in Freud.

Not all "naturalistic" minded scholars, however, indulge in this way of thinking. One of the outstanding naturalists of our times, Prof. Julian Huxley, writes: "Progress is a major fact of past evolution; but it is limited to a few selected stocks. It may continue in the future, but it is not inevitable; man, by now become the trustee of evolution, must work and plan if he is to achieve further progress for himself and so for life." [19] Although this reads at first as if the author would, too, envisage "progress," that is, history as a "prolongation" of organic evolution, one has but to ponder a little on his words to discover that this is not so. Evolution has never, nor could it, required the conscious and intentional cooperation of the evolving species. In these words, there is not only the recognition of a definitely new mode of "progress," as set over against the "origin of species," but also of the unique place man holds in the order of nature.

There are other inconsistencies too. The inclinations the frustration of which is considered as so harmful, are selected according to some principle difficult to discover and more difficult to justify. If some person's inclination for committing theft is frustrated, nobody thinks it wrong. Also, aggressiveness is viewed as a secondary result of frustration, though in older times it was believed to belong to the basic equipment of human nature. After the legend of the "noble savage" lost credit, it became the fashion to imagine primitive man, the cave-dweller, as a brutal, cruel, highly aggressive being. One cannot see, indeed, why one inclination should be considered as more "natural" than another. Little perspicacity is necessary to realize that the so-called frustrations of modern man refer mostly to sexual behavior. The reform of morals which is urged, is mostly one of sexual behavior. One critic of the famous "Kinsey Report" has emphatically pointed out: if a similar report were made on, e.g., the frequency of theft, nobody would think of drawing the consequences many have found fit to draw from Dr. Kinsey's data.

Back of all these ideas is the ethical relativism which prevails today. This relativism is, of course, not a product of modern cultural anthropology, as some seem to believe, but a characteristic of a mentality which developed since the beginning of the modern age, or rather preceded it. The discovery of the great differences of moral codes in various places, added to the older knowledge of such differences in history, was only a corroboration of and an argument for the relativistic conception.

The history of ethical relativism has yet to be written. Those who adhere to this view have pointed out that late medieval nominalism is one of the

[19] J. Huxley, *Evolution, A Modern Synthesis* (New York, 1942) p. 578.

ancestors of relativism. In doing so, they distort usually the meaning of these medieval systems. It is, however, true that nominalism has prepared the terrain. The story is indubitably much more complicated. Both the idealistic trend and the reaction against it, in the shape of positivism and pragmatism, have contributed in bringing forth the relativistic position.

It had not been the intention of idealism to undermine the certitude of moral precepts. But in denying to any endeavor surpassing the boundaries of reason the right to claim "scientific" certitude, Kant seriously endangered the convincingness of any attempt to establish an objectively true system of morality.

Another factor in the development of modern relativism is the idea of "progress." Its influence goes much farther than is generally acknowledged. The view that the latest stage is also the highest hitherto attained, and by the fact of being the latest proves itself to be better than any of its precedents, has done much to make the theory of evolution popular.[20] Succession becomes evolution, that is, progress. We are said to possess today a civilization superior to all which went before. Here is the link between the ideas of progress and ethnocentrism. That the latter had to be abandoned, as a methodological fallacy, has not been seen as a warning against the former or, at least, its uncritical generalizations.

To the insufficiently clarified philosophies back of the criticism of morals is added the incapacity of the modern mind to form an adequate notion of human nature. Naturalism, when dealing with man, is the most unnatural philosophy conceivable.

In no other period of human knowledge has man ever become more problematic to himself as in our own days. We have a scientific, a philosophical and a theological anthropology which know nothing of each other. The ever growing multiplicity of the particular sciences engaged in the study of man has much more confused and obscured than elucidated our concept of man.[21] Science has failed to do what it seemed to promise, namely to furnish a frame of reference for all the various aspects of man and his existence. Relativistic, naturalistic, pragmatistic philosophies have not been able to provide for the much desired integration.

[20] In a novel by Th. Fontane, a once widely read German writer, an old gentleman makes more or less this remark: "I recall well when this affair with the monkeys started. That was quite something. As long as people were told that they were children of God, it did not impress them particularly. But when they heard that their grandfather had been an ape, then you ought to have seen them, how enthusiastic they waxed." The eminent sociologist and economist Werner Sombart, in commenting on this reaction, suggests that the theory of evolution was so much welcomed because it offered a splendid excuse for man's baser instincts to become alone "natural." W. Sombart (*Der Mensch*, Berlin, 1936).

[21] M. Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (Darmstadt, 1928), pp. 13 ff. E. Cassirer, could repeat these words in 1944 as still describing the situation, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, 1944).

The believers in traditional morality, in a universal natural law,[22] in one word, those who hold true the *philosophia perennis,* are the only ones who may point the way out of the present confusion. But to do so and thus to answer the call of the times, it is of imperative necessity that the reply to the criticisms brought forth by either psychology or cultural anthropology be based on independent factual research, research carried on without any particular "apologetic" intentions and without a slavish imitation of the methodologies in use. These latter are too much pervaded by the philosophical ideas back of them and latent, but influential, in the minds of so many scholars, as to allow for uncritical adoption. It is not so much the mere collection of facts, important though it be, but their interpretation and integration which counts.

Strictly methodological analysis has fallen into discredit. It is considered sterile. Only facts are valuable. But in this, very common, idea it is overlooked that the so-called facts seldom are merely that, as has been stated above. To discover the specific "coloring" by preconceived ideas, the analysis of methodology is indispensable. One need only think of the use of psychoanalytic categories in cultural anthropology to become aware of this need.

Ethics, because of its essential "in-betweenness," requires reliable and extensive factual knowledge. We still have no treatise which might achieve for our times what the *tractatus de homine* of St. Thomas did for the past.

The emergence and the success of the conceptions usually subsumed under the title of "existentialism"—although these ideas differ so much that to put them together is a rather questionable enterprise—are a proof of the general need for a new philosophy of human nature. To a large part, however, these existentialistic philosophies are unable to comply with the demands of the times. They are reactions, indeed, but at the same time, very much children of their age, subjectivistic, relativistic, atheistic.

A comprehensive, truly philosophical anthropology which would also render account of the facts—*salvare apparentia*—is still a desideratum. Without such a foundation, the science of ethics cannot either cope with the present situation or successfully answer its critics.

Man needs to understand himself again. He must be given back the assurance of his personal worth. Without knowing of this worth he cannot withstand the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune." Without consciousness of his unique dignity he cannot be expected to overcome manifold temptations. To act according to the principles of ethics he must believe that he is capable of such achievement. But he will not conceive of himself in such a manner, as long as he thinks of himself only as "a little above the white rat" and not, as he well might, as "a little below the angels."

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[22] For an interesting restatement of the idea of natural law, see M. Hillenbrand, *Power and Morals* (New York, 1949).

REFLECTIONS ON CO-OPERATION AND COMMUNICATION

(*Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medalist's Address*)

By Rudolf Allers

It would be an abuse of your time, and mine, were I to explain at length how greatly I feel honored and how deeply I am moved by the award just conferred on me. And even if I were to make such an attempt, I would hardly know what words to chose. The expression of my profound gratitude is also due to the Most Rev. Bishop of Jefferson City for his all too kind citation. I have to admit, however, that I am not a little embarassed by seeing me, as it were, anatomized in public. The more so, since the Thomas Aquinas Medal has not been awarded to me because I happen to be this person and having this history, but for what I may have achieved as a scholar and as a teacher.

The biography of a scholar is, in most cases, not particularly interesting; it does not furnish the material out of which is made what newspaper people call a "human interest story," which for that matter may tell much of what is human but little of what is of interest. A scholar disappears behind his work; only what he has done counts. Only few of those engaged in scholarly activities may hope that their work will last or be known to future generations, and how much of it will be of permanent significance the author himself does not know. One has to be a poet, and therefore something of a prophet, to claim with Horace *Exegi monumentum aere perennius.* But the contributions of those whose names and writings have been forgotten and are remembered only when a candidate looks for a topic on which to write his dissertation or because they were fortunate enough to have had among their pupils a real great man, even those humble collaborators in the unending task of scholarly endeavor have not labored in vain. For each of them co-operates, in an however modest degree, in this unending task and is, if nothing other, a link between those who went before and those still to come. Communication, indeed, exists not only between contemporaries; it is perfectly meaningful to say that Plato or Aristotle, Thomas or Kant "speak to us" to-day as they spoke to so many generations and will speak to many more.

It is in consequence of considerations of this kind that I propose to talk to you on certain "Reflections on Co-operation and Communication."

The problems falling under these titles have been present at all times. But they have come to the fore with a particular urgency in these our days. We are witnessing, as is generally known, a shrinking of our planet; distance disappears; isolation is no longer possible. What happens to individuals or

to nations depends on the intricate network of global relations. The time is past in which a man or a people could remain indifferent to what went on in some distant part of the globe.

Accordingly, Norbert Wiener distinguishes three main periods of technological endeavor; the first period is characterized by the tendency to diminish the amount of human effort; the second by the measures aiming at the best possible utilization of energy; the third by the development of means of communication. This term must be understood in a wide sense so as to comprise not only transmission of verbal messages but also transportation of material things. The importance of the last named aspect is easily realized when one considers the decentralization of industrial production, that is the fact that parts of a complex product are made in often very distant places, and also by the need of importing raw materials from far off countries.

But communication is seen in such considerations exclusively as taking place in the present. One all too easily forgets that the present is significant only by virtue of its containing and continuing the past. Without the past's "speaking to the living" the present would be meaningless. And it is the study of the communication coming to us from the past which may serve best for an elucidation of the nature of communication.

Such a study involves two problems which, without being independent of each other, are sufficiently distinct to allow separate treatment. There is, first, the problem, or the set of problems, which may be comprised under the heading of a phenomenology of communication. We know by far not enough about the characteristics of the several communicative situations, means of communication, conditions of efficacy, and so on, in spite of the analysis worked out by Husserl and his emphasis on intersubjectivity and in spite also of the contributions made by analytic philosophy and semantics. Of this problem, however, I do not intend to talk.

The second problem may be designated as that of an ontology of communication. One has to ask: What makes communication possible? What is the ontological status of that which is communicated? What place holds within the framework of an encompassing ontology what we call "meaning?"

Similar questions have to be asked in regard to co-operation, and—even more fundamentally—in regard to "operation," that is, to man's creativity, the production of works, and so on.

These are, I submit, very important questions to which one has not, perhaps, given all the attention they deserve. Some of these questions have arisen in the context of contemporary, so-called "existentialistic" philosophies. When Heidegger speaks of being-with, *Mitsein,* as a constitutive aspect of the human situation, or J.-P.Sartre makes similar statements, though with a very different slant, or Gabriel Marcel stresses *être-avec* and *communion,* they imply, of course, that one has to do not simply with a statement on human nature or man's situation, but also with a datum of human experience.

But none of these thinkers asks, so far as I know, what renders this experience possible. And when the students of semantics or of analytic philosophy inquiry into the meaning of words they likewise presuppose that this meaning may be conveyed from a sender to a recepient without, however, inquiring into the ontological conditions which make this transmission of meaning possible.

Antecedent to all such questions one has to ask another. It is clear that communication, and subsequently co-operation, is an intersubjective event. We do not communicate in the strict sense of the term with any non-human being; if we flatter ourselves that we do, it is by means of an imaginative transforming an animal into a quasi-person. And it is only by means of a more or less sentimental metaphore that one may speak of "communing with nature." Hence, the presupposition of all communication is that the one to whom we address ourselves be recognized as our like. Now, the question of how we know that a certain thing within our environment is a human is not one to be answered by psychology, or at least, not only by psychology. It may be that the question cannot be answered because one has to do with a fundamental trait of human nature. But before we decide to resign ourselves to a simple acceptance of the fact, we have to try all we may possibly do to find a satisfactory solution.

But this is neither a matter on which I want to talk, the more so, since to discuss it much more time would be needed than I have at my disposal. But it seemed advisable to mention these topics, be it only in passing, to show how far the problematics extend which appear before us, once we approach the facts of communication within the framework of ontological reasoning. It may also be that by doing so we become aware of vistas of which we have been almost ignorant up to now.

The central problem related to communication is, I believe, that of the ontological status of the matter which is communicated. Only when we can achieve clarity on this point will it be possibe to inquire into the nature of the relation between the means of communication and that to which they refer or that which they are to convey.

I have remarked that communication exists not only among contemporaries but also among our predecessors and ourselves. The fact that the past "speaks to us" may even be particularly revealing. The past speaks in many ways, but obviously most intelligibly when the words spoken and put down centuries ago have been preserved and deciphered. Here the problem becomes most obvious: what sort of ontological status can be attributed to the "message"? What the inscription newly excavated, the papyrus deciphered have to say was there, indeed, all the time; but it cannot be said to have existed, although it persisted. But this it did because the material thing, the stone or the paper were not destroyed; they were and are existent realities. But what they mean cannot be said to be "real" in the same sense.

In such cases the meaning or message remains hidden; it persists unimpaired through many centuries. In fact, however, this is something that happens continually in the communicative situation and appears only magnified, as it were, in the case of the deciphered inscription. Any message cast in a code is mute for someone who cannot decode the text, as the hieroglyphs were mute before Champollion found the key. But mute or not, the message is "there" and the manner in which it is there, in its material setting, is a problem of ontology. It is in fact, *the* problem to be studied if one wants to arrive at an understanding of the phenomena which constitute the universal human fact of communication.

For the same relation between the message and its material support or setting exists whenever people communicate with each other. A letter is an instance of the same phenomenon one observes in the case of the unearthed inscription; while the letter travels from the writer to the addressee the message remains hidden, inactive, but again it is "there." A letter takes hours or days to reach its destination; only a fraction of a second elapses between the utterance of a speaker and the understanding of the listener. But one easily sees that the situation is the same.

Be the time long or short that passes from the moment the message became enshrouded in the material phenomena which convey it, there is always a time during which the message has a peculiar mode of being. Peculiarity does not say much; one must try to characterize this mode of being more precisely. This I believe to be feasible, first, by indicating certain features which can be stated in an affirmative manner, and secondly, by pointing out, negatively, what differences there are between this mode of being and others which ontology recognizes.

What strikes one first is, no doubt, that one has to do with "dependent being." The message requires a physical medium in which it is enshrined and by which it is supported and conveyed. Whether there may be also a non-material support is a question to be taken up later. In any case, the message has its being only insofar as it is supported. I have suggested, on previous occasions, that this mode of being might appropriately be designated as that of "insistence."

A short time ago I referred to the fact that "insistent being" does not exist as a reality. What exists is the supporting medium. But insistent being, on the other hand, shares with existing being the power of efficiency. In fact, there is no other power as effective as that of insistent being on the level of rationality and human co-existence. All what renders intersubjective relations possible rests on the efficacy of messages; information, persuasion, command, questioning, all ways of coming to a mutual understanding, hence also all co-operation are founded, at least in an overwhelming majority of cases, on actual, present or on antecedent transmission of a message. It is certainly not the physical form in which the message is transmitted which releases a

response on the part of the recipient. One and the same message may be conveyed by very different supporting media; this is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that one and the same message can be conveyed in very different manners, different words, different languages, orally or by writing, and so on. The message becomes effective only when it is "understood," that is, when it is, if one may say so, "taken out" by the recipient of its material support. The sounds we hear, the letters we read, have as such no power; they neither convince us nor do they make us act.

One has to realize, however, that not much is said by simply referring to "understanding." A more detailed examination of this operation will reveal that there are several operations falling under this title. One understands a work when one knows its meaning as stated in a dictionary. But every word is surrounded by a halo of connotations, different in each language and also within the same language according to the particular universe of discourse in which the word appears. This higher level of understanding may be called the apprehension of the "concrete concept" in the sense in which Hegel uses this term. Understanding a context is again another operation and may require what is commonly called "interpretation." I cannot here elaborate on these matters which, however, appear to me as of paramount importance for a philosophy of communication and, hence, of all kinds of "being-with."

But I beg to avail myself of this opportunity for coming back to a remark I made in the discussion on existentialism at the last meeting of this Association. I then qualified the etymological and interpretative acrobatics in which Mr. Heidegger indulges as "tricks." Someone, more charitable than I ever can hope to be, suggested that one replace the term "trick" by that of "technique." Well, all right: technique. But I would like to remind you that there are also the techniques of pick-pockets and magicians, and very effective techniques they are.

Insistent being, therefore, is endowed with efficacy and nevertheless not real.

These two features, dependency and efficacy, are, I submit, perfectly obvious. They are also, for the moment, all that may be said of insistent being in an affirmative way. Other characteristics can be discovered only by comparing the mode of insistence with other modes of being, hence, negatively.

Insistent being evidently is *esse in alio*. But is it the same *esse in* as that proper to accidents? At first sight it seems that it is. That the message is intelligible only under certain conditions is not an objection against its being viewed as an accident; there are accidents which become manifest only by virtue of some situation, as e.g. magnetism to be manifest requires the presence of a piece of iron. But an accident needs a substance in which to inhere. And it is hardly possible to attribute substantiality to a word, a sentence, or to whatever support a message may have. Here arises another problem which, I believe, has not as yet been sufficiently investigated: that of the ontological status of the means of communication. Though this is not

the place for any further discussion of this problem, I might point out, nevertheless, its significance by referring to the fact that not only single words or sentences but whole contexts of the latter convey a definite message. A poem, for instance, is certainly a whole and the message it conveys is supported not by the individual words but by this whole. And it is the message which confers wholenesss on the poem. While all this is rather obvious, the nature or the ontological status of both message and poem remain obscure. But if this point cannot be clarified an appraisal of "analytic philosophy" or the "analysis of language" will lack foundation.

Since that wherein the message insists cannot well be considered as a substance, it is neither possible to envisage the message as an accident. But both, message and accident, are *entia in alio*. Consequently, it would deem that this term *esse in alio* is not as unequivocal as it is generally assumed.

The insistent being insists in its support but becomes manifest only if and when the message is understood or appears as meaningful to some recipient. As long as this is not the case the message remains latent. But this latency must not be identified with *esse in potentia*. For nothing is actualized in the supporting being by the act of understanding. Buried and unread, the inscription is the same as it is after it has been excavated and deciphered. An actualization, indeed, takes place; but in the mind of the recipient. Which is another way to say that insistent being is effective without being real or existent.

Actualization, however, presupposes some *esse in actu*. But can insistent being be said to be in act? It has to be, for otherwise it could not convey anything to the mind of the recipient and thus become "information" in the strict sense of the term. Since the message "informs," the question arises whether or in what sense the message may be considered as of the nature of a form.

Undoubtedly, it shares with the form the property of being able to become detached from something and to pass over into something other as it happens in all kinds of cognition (in other instances, too, which need not concern us). The message passes from the mind of the sender into the physical medium of communication and from there into the mind of the recipient. Communication is essentially imparting of information. For the sharp division many to-day make between factual and emotive utterances is, I daresay, rather artificial. Every utterance is at once presentation, appeal and expression. Understanding a message means under all circumstances receiving some sort of information.

As soon, however, as one tries to argue on the basis of this apparent similarity of formal and insistent being one encounters unsurmountable difficulties. Of what could the message possibly be the form? If it is feasible, though not without doing some violence to the notion, to consider the message as a form, accidental form, of the mind either of the sender or of the recipient,

it is not possible to view in the same manner the relation of the message and its material support. Furthermore, there is the fact that one and the same message may be conveyed by very different media, stated in this language or that other one, transmitted by acoustical or electric waves, put down in writing or recorded on a tape. One must not be misled by the use of the term "form" in regard to works of literature or art. There is certainly some similarity of this meaning of "form" or also "structure" and the notion of form as used in ontology. But the differences are equally evident and, I believe, greater than any similarities. In innumerable instances such similarities are not found at all; a message may be conveyed by a single word or a single gesture in which case one cannot speak of structure or anything resembling the "form" of a poem or an essay.

That what constitutes the "meaning" of a word, a sentence, a treatise, or—to use an expression I have suggested previously—the verbal, propositional and contextual referents, cannot be viewed as form or as something akin to form. Nor can the mental operation by the means of which the recipient becomes cognizant of the message be said to be of the same kind as that of "abstraction." We neither abstract meaning in general, nor the particular message conveyed in a single instance. "Understanding" a sentence or a speech is something other than apprehending the nature of a substantial being. One has to do with an intellectual operation of which animals, no doubt, are incapable; they do not truly "understand" words, but respond to them, by virtue of appropriate training, as acoustical signals, that is, as concrete elements of a concrete, actual situation. But the operation commonly called understanding cannot be subsumed under any of the types of intellectual operations we enumerate in psychology, empirical or philosophical.

Notwithstanding the peculiar nature of understanding and of what is understood, that is the message or the insistent being, there is something characteristic of a message which makes it resemble form. Namely, its timelessness. As the being of forms is independent of their being actualized in an existent, so that of insistent being is not affected by its being incorporated in a material support, by its being or not being understood, or by its being encountered by a potential recipient. We do not and cannot know what the message was the lost parts of a philosophical work, say, of Heraclitus, did convey; but this is only because the material support has been lost, not because the message itself perished. Once a message has been, as it were, born it may persist for ever. Nor is it ever "replaced" by another. If I have come to realize that an opinion I believed to be true has been disproved, I withdraw my consent to it; but the message, now labelled erroneous, does not vanish. It persists in the mode of negation. If I say: previously I thought this, but now I know that I have to think that, the false notion stays with me; otherwise I could not make such a statement. Were it not so that the message is exempt of all destruction, one could not speak of a "history of ideas."

It would be interesting to inquire into the significance the tacitly recognized timelessness of the message played in certain philosophical conceptions. It is not impossible that this feature, together with the peculiar efficacy proper to the message to some extent determined Plato to ascribe reality, even of the highest order, to the "ideas." But it is not here the place to pursue any further this line of thought.

From all I have said hitherto, however incomplete and sketchy it be, follows, or so it seems to me, that "insistent being" constitutes an ontological region *sui generis*. And that it is by virtue of this "participation" in this ontological region that human individuals can communicate with each other and, therefore, also co-operate in a common enterprise. Mere rationality of human nature and the ability to speak are not enough to render communication and co-operation possible.

Human beings encounter each other, run into each other, are welcome or a nuisance to each other in the world of things, of space and of time. But as minds and, therefore, as persons they meet in the realm of insistent being.

For this realm extends farther than the foregoing remarks implied. First, it is obviously the same mode of being that is proper to the message when it has become incorporated in a conveying support and when it is still present only in the mind of the sender or apprehended and understood by the mind of the recipient. Intentional being or the mode of being belonging to the intentional object is, I submit, the same as that of the message insistent in its support. Prior to the invention of script there was no other way for insistent being to persist than its retention in the mind of an individual. Seen from the angle of ontology there is no essential difference between oral and scriptural tradition. And the "messenger" who originally conveyed a message from one person to another was not the written word but the message was entrusted to a person who acted as mediator between a sender and a recipient. And it is still so in innumerable instances to-day.

Secondly, human understanding apprehends not only messages properly so called but also situations. Not only persons but things, too, "speak to us." A situation is meaningful to one and void of meaning to another. One understands it and the other fails to do so. To one a given situation presents a challenge, while another remains unaffected. The relation, then, between a person and the situation by which he is faced, is not unlike that between him and the message which reaches him and which he either understands or fails to recognize as what it is.

It is with good reason that language knows of the expression "understanding a situation," that is, realizing what demands it makes on one, and acting in accord with these demands. A situation, indeed, becomes humanly relevant inasmuch as it is "understood." One might say, without expanding unduly the meaning of the term, that a situation, when understood, has a message for us. This message takes on several forms which to describe is a task

of philosophical anthropology, not to be undertaken now. It is not enough simply to say that it pertains to man's nature that he be in a world; the several modes of this being-in—as also those of being-with—have to be distinguished and characterized.

Being-in-a-world and being-with-others is mediated through the message insisting in all sorts of situations, be they those of communication by words and their substitutes or those requiring action, individual or concerted. Insistent being is the one and only means by which human relations as well as the relations of man to his environment come to be established. It seems to me that the failure to recognize this all-important rôle of insistent being underlies the claim of contemporary "existentialist" philosophy to have "abolished" the cleavage between subject and object, a cleavage which, according to the words of one author, "has bedevilled the human mind since the beginning of the modern age." The reference is, obviously, to the Cartesian doctrine of the two substances, the *res extensae* and the *res cogitantes*. This doctrine has, as one knows, become a stumbling block to philosophical speculation, especially in regard to the mind-body relation and the problem of epistemology. This needs no further illustration. But it may be pointed out that one of the difficulties arising from the position of Descartes is the impossibility of their being any trait common to the two substances. As long as the sharp distinction of the two substances is maintained, there is, indeed, no way to arrive at an understanding of the unity of the human person and the interaction of mind and body on one hand, and of the mind's reaching out into the surrounding world and knowing or transforming it on the other hand. The notion of the one substance with the attributes of spirit and matter in Spinoza, the appeal to God as mediator in occasionalism, the idea of pre-established harmony of Leibniz, to some extent also Kant's philosophy, they all aim at overcoming this difficulty.

Now, no one will deny that there is a profound difference between mind and matter, and that their interaction requires an explanation. Nor that an ontological foundation must be assumed for all intersubjectivity. But it seems impossible to find a way out of the subject, to conceive of him otherwise than as enclosed in himself, as long as one places oneself on the standpoint of the pure *cogito*. This has been recognized, for instance, by Leibniz who pointed out that the mere *cogito* does not allow for an explanation of the diversity of the *cogitationes* and that, therefore, account must be taken of the *cogitata* as independent of, and given to, the subject. M. Gilson has not long ago emphasized the impossibility to arrive at a metaphysics of given reality when the *cogito* is chosen as the starting point. Particularly, it is the fact of intersubjectivity, of communication and co-operation, which remains inexplicable if envisaged from the Cartesian standpoint. Husserl was keenly aware of the necessity to find an ontological basis for intersubjectivity and also for the totality of the immediately given, the "lived world,"

Lebenswelt; but it does not seem that he has been able to transcend the walls Descartes has built around the solitary *ego cogitans.* Notwithstanding all the efforts Husserl made there is, so far as I can see, no means to pass over from the transcendental consciousness which "constitutes" all that is given in a transsubjective reality which would be, if one may say so, self-supporting.

Nor can I see that the existentialists have been able really to bridge the gap between subject and object. In fact, one does not find in their writings much more than the mere affirmation that this feat has been achieved. I confess that this affirmation is to me unintelligible. It does not convey any message with the exception of that it reveals the problem-blindness with which these thinkers are not less afflicted than many others. As color-blindness so problem-blindness exists in several forms; the positivist, the naturalist, the materialist, the existentialist suffer each of their own kind of problem-blindness. That the subject be set over against an object, that the ego knows himself as distinct from all that constitutes the non-ego, that all consciousness—as Husserl himself emphasized—is of something other than itself—these are primordial facts which cannot be explained away.

A critical analysis of existentialism would have to raise the question why this so-called bridging of the gap between subject and object appears to these thinkers as an important advance over the philosophical conceptions hitherto accepted. Although this inquiry is beyond the scope of my talk, I would like to point out that there are apparently several reasons. There is, first, the belief that all metaphysics has to start somehow from the Cartesian standpoint, and that the one conception which may be said to bridge this gap, namely Hegelian idealism, is unacceptable. Secondly, there is the claim of naturalism and materialism to have closed the gap by viewing the subject as part or element of nature, so that subjectivity would no longer appear as a feature by which the world of the given is split into two parts. A similar influence is exercized by Marxism which has penetrated also minds which want to be anything but Marxists. Thirdly, there is the fact that many of the contemporary thinkers—and not only the existentialists—harbor an all too narrow conception of "object." They seem to believe—Gabriel Marcel for instance—that "object" must be defined in terms of science, therefore, as something which does not concern the person *qua* person and is, in fact, independent of individual experience because, being "objectively true," it is exactly the same for all persons. What is overlooked in such arguments is that "object" is not an univocal term. All that is apprehended by the subject as pertaining to the non-ego is "object," is "set-over-against," whatever the nature of the apprehending act may be—intuition, love, awareness of mystery, or what not.

I venture to submit that the problem of the subject-object relation takes on a different aspect if the mediating rôle of insistent being is recognized.

For this being, as I tried to make clear, is indifferent in regard to the nature of its support. It is the same as insistent in the mind—as the intentional object—and as constituting the meaning or message of an utterance or any other creation of the human mind. Because it is neither an *esse existentiae* nor an *esse essentiae* but *sui generis* it may be seen as bridging the gap between subject and object, not by abolishing it but by mediating between two worlds.

It furthermore seems to me that the recognition of this mode of being may well enable us to construct an ontology of civilization or to outline a metaphysics of culture. For civilization consists in the gradual transformation of the given raw material of experience into meaningful artifacts. The ontology of the artifact, however, has always been a moot question. A metaphysics of civilization or a philosophy of culture has to take account of the phenomena of development and continuity. Culture and its advance are rendered possible by the communication of the past with the present. One may even say that there is also a co-operation of the present with the past inasmuch as we continue and sometimes complete the work initiated by our ancestors.

In a poem by the Swiss poet Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, *Der Chor der Toten,* the dead speak to the living:

> Und was wir an gültigen Sätzen gefunden,
> Dran bleibt aller irdischer Wandel gebunden.

The truths we, your predecessors, have found go on determining all human affairs. They that went before are no more. What exists in this sublunar world is bound to vanish. But man has been endowed by his Creator with the power of creativity, not indeed, to bring forth existence but to transform that which merely exists into a meaningful world. It is man's prerogative that he may, by inserting messages into the world that is merely there, by incorporating what insists but lacks existence into the material world bring forth what without him would not be at all: the whole world of artifacts, of products, institutions, interpretations, in one word the world of culture which is that in which man truly lives and moves and has his being.

The realm of insistent being is timeless, and as such not a moving image of eternity, as Plato said of time, but a stable one. Not that it were exempt of change; but this change is not that of coming and ceasing to be; it is the succession of being believed to be true and recognized to be false. But what to-day is recognized as an error still persists, though in the form of negation. And as such it is far from having lost all significance; not only does the error of the past serve as a warning to the present—at least, it should, even if man does not always heed the voices of the past—, it also happens that what one generation discarded as obsolete re-emerges in the next generation and takes on a new significance. That the history of ideas knows of what may be termed the "neo-phenomena"—neo-Platonism, neo-Classicism, neo-Thomism, and so on—finds its explanation in the timelessness of insistent being.

It is part of the unique position bestowed on man by his Creator that he, man, be entrusted not only with the preservation but also with the transformation of this sublunar world.

This is, I take it, the meaning—or one of the meanings—of the words that have been said of man:

Gloria et honore coronasti eum,
Et posuisti eum super opera manuum Tuarum.

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MICROCOSMUS

From Anaximandros To Paracelsus

By Rudolf Allers

The ideas expressed by the names of Microcosmus and Macrocosmus have never lost their attraction for speculative minds since the time they first made their appearance in early Greek philosophy. There have been ages in which these ideas receded more or less into the background, others in which they played a rather dominating rôle. It seems worth while to inquire into the nature of these ideas and to study the spirit of those ages which felt them congenial to their total mentality. One might also try to determine those notions and principles with which the idea of the microcosm came to be associated during its long history. Even a superficial survey of the ages to which the notion of microcosm particularly appealed, and of the ideas with which it entered into combinations, seems to show that this idea might be considered as a kind of "symptom", a characteristic to be found mainly with a certain type of historical mentality.[1]

. . .

One vague and broad conception is shared by all authors who ever speculated on the microcosmus and its relation to the macrocosmus. The former, which the Latin writers usually call *minor mundus,* has certain features or principles in common with the macrocosmus or the universe. This idea allows for various interpretations which are listed here.

1. The simplest form of microcosmism is apparently expressed in the idea that man contains within his being all the elements of which the world consists. He belongs to the realm of dead matter, he shares mere life with the plants, sensory activity with the brutes, reason and, generally speaking, rational faculties with the suprahuman beings, spirits, angels, demons, *intelligentiae,* and the like. He may be even credited with possessing something of divine nature. Man alone integrates within himself the constituents of reality. Although inferior to the pure spirits, he occupies at the same time an absolutely unique position by containing the whole world on a minor scale. Thus, he is placed in the "middle" of the universe. His nature is the dividing line and, accord-

[1] This article is concerned exclusively with the philosophy of the Western world. There are parallels to microcosmistic speculations in the philosophy of India and the Far East. This is an interesting fact, which apparently indicates a deep rooted tendency in the human mind for such like ideas. The information on these Eastern philosophies I could find is, however, not sufficient for any systematic treatment. Also, to include these things here would lead too far afield.

ingly, also the bond between the material and the spiritual world. He is called, therefore, *nodus et vinculum mundi*. His uniqueness is, however, not one of ontological dignity but one of position within the order of being. He is not at all the "crown of creation"; there are beings of greater dignity, higher rank than is allotted to man. But he alone belongs to the two universe worlds, he is matter and spirit. Only in this sense he is called the "center" of the universe. This term does not imply, as is often thought, the notion that the universe exists for the sake of man or revolves around him. This may be characterized as "elementaristic" microcosmism.

2. This still rather simple idea may be developed so that man is conceived not only as mirroring the universe or the macrocosmus by his composition, but also by duplicating the context and order of the principles prevailing in the *maior mundus*. If human nature is envisioned in such a manner, man is not simply subjected to the univeral laws, because he is part of the universe, but he is himself, as it were, these laws, and he may become aware of them by looking into himself.[2] To this system the name of "structural" microcosmism seems appropriate. This interpretation may be worked out on two different lines.

a) Man is compared to the universe of which he is the reproduction or reduplication. Within this view, the discovery of the world in man becomes possible. The relation between the micro- and the macrocosmic laws may be one of identity or one of analogy; in any case it is in man that the key to the cosmological riddle may be found. Man thus understands himself as imbedded in the whole of the κόσμος, an organic part of the latter, and determined by pancosmic principles. One arrives at the conception of an all-pervading harmony and correspondence (cosmocentric microcosmism).

This view may be differentiated still further. It becomes the starting point for a more or less pantheistic conception, micro- and macrocosmus being merged one into the other in such a manner that man participates by his being and doing in the maintainance of the universe and, eventually, the perfection of the whole. Or, man is viewed as passively subjected to supraindividual cosmic laws which by their inexorability deprive him ultimately of his freedom.

If the last named view is given a more dynamic turn one arrives at postulating an exact correspondence between the parts of the universe and those of man; and also such a correspondence between the macrocosmic events and individual human fate. The second idea is obviously, if not the only one on back of, at lease closely allied to astrology. The "static" correspondence has played a prominent rôle in several types of philosophical anthropology of which the one of Paracelsus is best known.[3]

If man is conceived, on the other hand, as a complete κόσμος in himself, be

[2] One is reminded of Goethe's word: "Ist nicht der Kern der Natur, Menschen im Herzen?"

[3] *V. infr.* p. 395 ff.

it only the κόσμος μικρός, and is thus set over against, in opposition to, and eventually even in enmity against, the macrocosmus—asserting himself and striving for, although never attaining, complete autarchical mastery and independence—we find ourselves on the threshold of magic.

b) Or the universe may be compared to man. The macrocosmus then becomes an enormously enlarged microcosm (anthropocentric microcosmism). This was the idea of Plato. Within the frame of this interpretation, similar developments may ensue as were listed before. But there is nonetheless this difference that here the cosmic laws appear as projections, as it were, of those governing human nature. The primary standpoint being chosen within man, the whole perspective is another. This view leads, with a certain necessity, to the assumption of a World-Soul as the intrinsic principle of existence and growth within the universe.

3. The idea which has just been characterized, may be extended from man's individual being to the totality of his life and his achievements. Man creates order around himself. He does this in a twofold manner, either by establishing a well ordered society or by expressing his idea of order in art (taking this word in its widest sense so that it encompasses every kind of beauty in man's works). Since the frame of reference is supplied here by wholes, one may speak of "holistic" microcosmism. The interpretation rests on the fundamental conviction that κόσμος, i.e. the order of any somewhat orderly ("organized") entity is always and everywhere essentially of the same kind. Whether it be the κόσμος αἰσθητός or the νοητός, or the πολιτικός, these κόσμοι correspond to one another not only in the general and formal sense that they are, all of them, ordered in some way, but in the strict sense that they are, each in its particular manner, representatives or, better, manifestations, concretizations of the one selfsame order. There is but one order, and whatever there is ordered is so according to one principle.

a) The first form of this interpretation is what has been called "sociological" microcosmism, or the "organic conception of the state." Within the framework of this interpretation, a number of equations may be established which look sometimes rather strange to anyone who does not realize the metaphysical background. Here too one may look at the human organism as the *exemplar,* and then arrives at the organological theory in politics, or one may start from the ordered political body, and envision man as a "cell state."

The way the *res publica universi* is viewed depends, obviously, on the political forms known to, or believed by the writers to be the ideal of statehood. On the other hand, an existing political form, e.g. a more or less absolute monarchy, may be likened to the universe. The person of the monarch becomes invested with a quasi-divine dignity, his immediate servants become "planets revolving around the sacred person of the king", and so on. Similarly, the universe appears as a monarchy with a great number of subordinate spiritual powers serving the almighty ruler. The idea of the celestial bodies

being either themselves spiritual entities, or being moved by such finds here its place, although it can equally be connected with the conception of the *anima mundi.*

If the idea of an all-pervading and throughout identical order is consistently followed up, every being appears as "mirroring" the structure of the whole, and accordingly, also of every constituent part. Every substantial whole then becomes a microcosmus, even though the universal order may be more perfectly and more completely realized in one being than in another. These differences may be conceived as being related to the different levels of existence. This allows for combining this patricular type of microcosmism with the notion of the *analogia entis,* so that the dignity and the ontological characteristics of the various classes of beings are safeguarded, the uniformity of the cosmic law notwithstanding. The same conception, however, may be worked out in the sense of Leibniz' monadology. By linking up this interpretation with the other one, *viz.* of man alone uniting in his nature all the elements of the macrocosmus, the particular position of man is maintained without introducing explicitly the principle of the analogy of being.

This view may develop so as to result in a set of ideas very much contradictory to the original ones. As soon, namely, as the principle of a "hierarchy of being" is abandoned and replaced by the principle of continuity, the way is opened for declaring all qualitative differences as "mere appearances". Both these ideas (of fundamental differences between the "monads" and of continuity) coexist strangely in the philosophy of Leibniz. This intrinsic contradiction is, perhaps, one of the reasons why this system did not exercize any greater influence. According to where the emphasis is placed, one obtains either a hylozoistic or a materialistic monism.

It should be noted, incidentally, that the term of "mirroring" is quite ambiguous. One cannot well avoid it, but one should be aware of its equivocity. This term may be used either to designate a structural identity, referring to the substance and the very nature of the beings, or only an accidental relationship as it obtains between the (physical) mirror image and the mirrored thing.

To ensure the unity of the universal whole, consisting of "windowless" monads, Leibniz invented, as one knows, his principle of pre-established harmony. Applied to the relation between mind and body, within the microcosmus, this principle became the theory of "psycho-physical parallelism". The history of the problem shows that this notion contains intrinsically a disruptive factor. The non-causal parallelism makes, in fact, the very existence of mental phenomena unnecessary; they degenerate into mere epiphenomena, to shrink farther into mere aspects of cerebral activities. The impulse coming from Descartes' conception of the animal body as a machine contributed, of course, to this development. The monistic acosmism of Spinoza too supplied arguments which finally led up to a purely materialistic monism.

Spinoza's philosophy is not less related to ancient and medieval microcosmism than is the system of Leibniz. Spinozism too may easily develop in materialistic monism, simply by shifting the emphasis in the famous identity *Deus sive natura,* from the first to the second term. The *amor intellectualis Dei* is then replaced by the spirit of scientific inquiry. The *anima mundi* and the animated κόσμος which still were present, somewhat disguised, in Spinoza's system, became the strictly determined universe as envisioned by Laplace. The human monad which still held a prominent place in Leibniz' monadology was transformed into the homme machine of La Mettrie. The *res cogitans* of Descartes lost its thingness and dwindled to a physico-chemical process.

This study is not occupied with tracing the latest offsprings of microcosmism. But it is well to realize that the ideas of old are still alive, however distorted and disguised. Ideas, in fact, never die. They live on, although sometimes hidden, as it were, in inaccessible vaults or discovered and cherished only by some few people "born out of time". History, however, has witnessed more than once a revival of ideas which, a short time before, were known only to the historian and even by him treated mostly as curiosities. It would be interesting to ask, although this line cannot be followed here, whether or not there are in contemporary mentality any traces indicative of a revival of microcosmistic speculation. This is not quite improbable. There is a close relation between microcosmism and the Averroistic conception of the "unity of the intellect", the link being supplied by the notion of the *anima mundi.* The fact cannot be overlooked that ideas very similar to those of the "Commentator" have met with approval in recent times.[4] Perhaps one might also refer to the, however erroneous, idea of 'freedom' existing in the infra-atomic world. The similarities between this notion and microcosmism, or certain forms of it, of older times is recognizable.[5]

[4] I have, in my classes, often referred to the similarities obtaining, e.g., between Averroism and the idea of C. G. Jung of a "collective unconscious". See also Sr. M. D. Hayes, *Various Group Mind Theories Viewed in the Light of Thomistic Principles* (Washington, D.C., 1942). The ideas of L. Klages on "spirit" (*Geist*) deserve mention since they seem to point into the same direction.

[5] It may be permitted to comment briefly on the importance of the microcosmistic conceptions discussed above for certain types of metaphysical speculation. I refer particularly to the well known argument St. Anselm of Canterbury proposed as a proof for the existence of God. This so-called ontological argument—the name was, it seems, given to it by Kant—is criticized for "jumping" in a wholly unwarranted manner from the logical into the real or ontological sphere. This was the gist already of Gaunilo's objections. In reading St. Anselm, especially his answer to Gaunilo (*Liber contra insipientem*) one is amazed by the trust he put into his reasonings. Anselm was a powerful thinker and hardly so easily deceived by a specious argument. His proof also appealed to several of his successors, to Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel. It seems probably that Anselm himself and the other philosophers who approved of his argument (even though they might have to "color" it, as Duns Scotus says) envisioned it on a background which allowed to "shift" from the logical into the ontological field, in fact made such a shifting not only permissible but let it appear as no "shift" at all. If it is assumed that

b) The other possible interpretation, which one may call "aesthetic" microcosmism apparently has never been systematically developed. It is doubtful whether the frequent phrase of "God as the great artist" can be traced back to such a view. It is, however, not improbable that ideas of such a kind were active in periods of Romanticism. Also, sayings like "to live one's life as a work of art" or of similar intent, might be indicative of some veiled connection with microcosmism. Anyhow, since this interpretation seems to be altogether absent during the periods of history with which this study is concerned, nothing more can be said on this point.

4. Structural microcosmism, whether anthropo- or cosmoscentric, develops into a further type of interpretation, of which it is hard to say whether or not it ought to be distinguished from its ancestor. It is needless to point out that here as everywhere the terms of "developing from", "deriving from", and suchlike more are to be taken in a strictly non-temporal sense. In fact, all the various forms of interpretation coexist, at least after speculation had advanced somewhat beyond primitivism. This interpretation, however, possesses sufficiently clear characteristics to be distinguished from structural as well as from holistic microcosmism. One may speak of "symbolistic" microcosmism insofar as the microcosm is not conceived, either as obeying exactly the same laws as the macrocosm, or as duplicating and reproducing on a minor scale the latter's construction, but as "corresponding to", being "symbolic of" the universe, in its totality or some of its parts.

By symbolically representing the macrocosm, the microcosm again becomes a substrate from which the inquisitive and adequately instructed mind may gather knowledge of the universe. But the procedure is no longer comparable to studying a miniature, for the sake of knowing the much bigger original, nor to considering the mirrored image to gather knowledge of the reflected object. These procedures, too, necessitate some kind of interpretative completion, insofar as the miniature cannot give a perfect idea of the original, and the mirror reflects only one side or aspect of the object. To gain knowledge of the original object the data have to be transposed, by enlargement or reconstruction, into the true scale and, as it were, three-dimensionality. The process, on the other hand, of symbolism demands for "translation". One has to know, so to speak, the "code" to decipher the microcosmic language.

Some more humble minds may be satisfied with the knowledge that there is hidden behind the phenomenal microcosmus a meaning, embodied in the universe, but the details of which remain unattainable to the finite mind. To these minds it is enough to feel that the confused and partly unintelligible happen-

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the *mundus intelligibilis*—whatever its ontological standard—is built according to the same fundamental principle as the *mundus sensibilis v. realis,* then the Anselmian argument may well be considered as conclusive. It then becomes possible to argue from the *rationes necesariae* here to real facts there. A similar spirit seems to prevail as well in Leibniz' monadology as in Hegel's so-called pan-logism.

ings of this world point at a *per se* intelligible sense which will be revealed perhaps in a "better world", or be for ever beyond the capacities of man. This may have been the idea of Heraclitus when he spoke of the "divine child, the *logos*". It is also probably the idea of Irenaeus when he declares that *nihil vacuum neque sine signo apud Deum*.[6] God knows the significance of everything, also of this contingent world. But man cannot place himself on God's viewpoint. Irenaeus, like many others, obviously believes that everything has a significance beyond what it appears to be or, rather, actually is on the level of factuality. Besides being this or that, any thing or event also points at a deeper meaning which it owes to its place in the order of being and of time, ultimately in its relation to eternity and God's creative plans.

The more curious or inquisitive mind, however, is not satisfied with believing in the significance of things. Such resignation is not for those who are anxious to penetrate the riddles of being and who rely on the powers of reason, as such or as aided by faith. They desire to find the "code" by which to translate the language of tangible reality into the language of the deeper meaning. The numerous attempts of this sort differ widely in regard to the "text" they want to interpret and in regard to the "region" where the final meaning is to be discovered. Modern science is, in fact, no so distant, in its fundamental aspirations, from ancient and medieval mentality as the admirers of "progress" love to believe. The answer of the scientist[7] telling us that ultimate reality consists in atoms, electrons, "wavicles", or what not, becomes an interpretation of the universe in terms of the transsensual. The table, to use Sir Arthur Eddington's famous example, on which I write is "in truth" but a whirl of particles and does exist as a table but for us. Thus, this world exists, to the symbolistic way of thought, only in a superficial manner, so to speak, and owes its existence as well as its deeper significance to that of which it is the symbol. There is, of course, an enormous difference between the symbolistic attitude and the one of the modern scientist. The latter considers that the transsensual is, however inaccessible to direct observation, nonetheless fundamentally of the same kind as the visible world. The symbolistic interpretation looks for a higher reality, very much different from the one of immediate experience. Reason to the modern mind is the "handmaid of the senses",[8]

[6] Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 21 (P.G., 7, 1046).

[7] However, one should not forget, that "it is not always science which speaks, when the scientist talks", as E. Husserl remarked. The relation between medieval symbolism and modern science can be illustrated by the use of the metaphorical expression "book of nature", which is common to both. "The true book of philosophy is the book of nature . . . written in letters others than those of our alphabet; the letters are triangles, squares, circles, cones, pyramids, and other mathematical figures", Galileo, *opp.* ed. Alberti, VII, 354. The "code" was another one with Galileo and the medieval symbolists; but to both it was a code to be decoded. K. Jaspers uses the term "decipher" to indicate the philosopher's activity in interpreting the given.

[8] Cf. P. A. Sorokin's notion of "sensate culture".

whereas to older ages it was but a tool by which to pass beyond the sensible world into a reality of quite another nature.

Messages writen in a code seldom make sense at first sight, or if they make, this sense seems insignificant and out of place. It is just this discrepancy between the signs used and the total setting which arouses supicion and lets us think of the possibility of a code-message. But the message the sensible world conveys to the symbolistic mind makes sense such as it appears. There are signs which mean nothing outside of what they signify. Words are of this kind, and so are other conventional or natural signs. But symbols and allegories are characterized by being meaningful as such and by implying moreover a reference to something "beyond". The statues, for instance, which adorn the Gothic cathedrals, have a meaning in themselves; they are men and women, clad in the garments of their times, carrying objects one knows, like swords, or palms, or a balance. But to the knowing spectator they also convey a meaning different from the one their mere appearance indicates, of martyrdom and the duty to place God's commandments highest, or of justice, and so forth.

It cannot be the task of the present article to deal extensively with the principles of symbolism, a topic still in need of clarification notwithstanding the enormous literature. What the authors employing symbolic interpretation think of their method, is of interest. H. F. Dunbar distinguishes three kinds of symbols, described as arbitrary or extrinsic, descriptive or intrinsic, and insight symbols.[9] The first class comprises symbols based on some external, more or less superficial relation of contiguity or of convention; the symbols of the second class rest on some similarity; the insight symbols open somehow a view on deeper and more essential things, an underlying reality of greater dignity, the fundamentals of being itself. One might add, in amplification of Dunbar's ideas, that the two first kinds of symbols simply refer to, or point at, some thing not necessarily of a higher nature, whereas the insight symbol becomes, as it were, transparent and allows a glance on things hidden beneath the tangible reality. This third type of symbolism is the one which acquired such high importance in medieval thought.

There are instances of descriptive symbols in microcosmism, too. It is descriptive symbolism, e.g., when the parts of the human body are likened to various objects of the non-human world or to parts of the universe.[10] The main field of symbolic interpretation is, however, not the world but the Scriptures. Other writings, too, are subjected to such a "translation" whenever they appeared to reveal some concealed significance different from the obvious meaning. Thus Vergilius' *Aeneis,* the poems of Ovid and other works were subjected to such, often—to the modern mind—utterly fantastic interpretations.

[9] H. F. Dunbar, *Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divine Comedy* (New Haven, 1929), p. 5 ff.

[10] *V. infr.* p. 348 f.

The idea of interpretation is summarized in some *versus memoriales:*

Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria,
Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia.

Thus there are four ways of approach to a text. One is historical or factual; this is not yet interpretation in the sense in which this term is used here. The story is simply taken as it is told, as a report. But it can be envisioned, e.g., as a "prefiguration" of some other event; a story of the Old Testament thus becomes an allegory of the Redemption. It may serve as an example for personal conduct, either directly or by some "translation". Finally, it may be a veiled presentation of some of the mysteries of faith. It seems appropriate to quote here the explanation given by Dante in his letter to Can Grande; referring to the exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt he writes:

"If we consider merely the letter, the meaning is the exodus of the children of Israel from Egypt . . . ; if we look at the allegorical signification, it is the Redemption by Christ; taken in the moral sense it indicates the turning of the soul from the sorrow and misery of sin to the state of grace; anagogically viewed, it is the exodus of the saintly soul from the slavery of corruptibility to the liberty of glory eternal."

Perhaps it was Philo of Alexandria who first applied symbolistic interpretation to the texts of the Old Testament. He insists indeed that the literal meaning never should be neglected, but also that every passage, even the purely ceremonial rule, has a deeper meaning too.[11] Among Christian authors, it was apparently Clement of Alexandria who first explicitly stated and applied the symbolic interpretation of the Scriptures. He distinguishes but three levels: literal, moral, and mystical. There was, of course, the Epistle to the Hebrews in which clear indications of symbolic interpretation could be found. But Clement and, after him, Origen made consciously use of the procedure and were the first to develop a methodological justification and systematization. What Clement calls mystical interpretation corresponds to the anagogic or tropic level of later times. His moral interpretation comprises both the allegorical and moral approach of his successors.

The emphasis on a non-literal meaning of the Scriptures rests partly on the well known words of St. Paul: *Litera occidit, spiritus vivificat.* To discover the *spiritus* behind the *littera* therefore seemed important. Johannes Cassianus, one of the first Latin authors to attempt a discussion of interpretative method, also distinguishes three levels: *interpretatio historica* is set over against *intelligentia spiritalis*, which is divided into *tropologia, allegoria, anagoge.*[12] The real ancestor of medieval interpretative method or its principle became Gregory the Great. He coined the formula which to later authors was more or less a *locus communis*, so that they did not even refer to its origin. Gregory,

[11] See, for instance, *De migr. Abr.* 16, 92 (*Opera*, edd. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, II, Berlin, 1895, p. 285).

[12] Joh. Cassianus, *Collat.* XIV (ed. M. Petschenig, *Corp. S.S. Eccl. Lat.* vol. 13).

in the introduction to his explanation of the Canticles, writes: *Allegoria enim animae longe a Deo positae quasi quandam machinam facit, ut per illam levetur ad Deum.* The choice of the term *machina* indicates that the writer realized clearly his dealing with a question of method.[13]

The two terms of symbolic relation are often called *typi.* The fact of higher dignity is as well a *typus* of the symbol, as the latter may be a *typus* of the former. Thus, with Junilius Africanus, the resuurrection of Christ is the *typus* of man's resurrection, or the fault of Adam a *typus* of divine justice, or the sacrament of baptism a *typus* of the death of Christ. This author already has a fourfold division.[13a] But of greater influence was no doubt the declaration by Rabanus Maurus:

> In nostrae ergo animae domo historia fundamentum ponit, allegoria paries erigit, anagogia tectum opponit, tropologia vera tam interius per affectum quam exterius per effectum boni operis, variis ornatibus dependit.[14]

It is not needless to remark that this multiplicity of interpretations does not, according to the medieval conception, introduce any ambiguity. The words themselves retain absolutely the sense they have. They do not assume different meanings. The word is a sign of a thing, and this thing, in its turn, may be the sign or symbol of something different. Aquinas is careful to emphasize this point. Referring to a passage in St. Gregory, which might give rise to some misunderstandings,[15] he states:

> Multiplicitas sensuum non facit aequivocationem . . . sensus isti non multiplicantur propter hoc quod una vox multa significet, sed quia res significatae per voces, aliarum rerum possunt esse signa. . . . [There is no confusion since] omnes sensus fundentur super unum, sc. litteralem.[16]

This idea makes it possible to apply the method of symbolistic interpretation also to the relations of micro- and macrocosm. Although the symbolic interpretation, as practized by the medieval writers, reaches its final stage only when the particular thing or event has been related to eternity and salvation, there are intermediary stages in which the immediately given, be it thing or

[13] The passage proceeds: "Interpositis quippe aenigmatibus dum quoddam in verbis cognoscit (sc. anima) quod suum est, in sensu verborum intelligit quod non suum est; et per terrena verba separatur a terra. Per hoc enim quod non abhorret cognitum, intelligit quoddam incognitum." The last sentence has been misunderstood by Dunbar, *op. cit.* p. 270, who thinks that the *quod non abhorret cognitum* refers to the second Person of the Trinity; obviously the reference is to what can be immediately known. "Rebus enim notis per quas allegoriae conficiuntur sententiae divinae vestiuntur, et dum re cogniscimus exteriora verba, pervenimus ad interiorem intelligentiam." (Gregorius Magnus, *Super Canticum Canticorum expositio,* Prooemium, P.L. 79, 467).

[13a] *De partibus legis,* P.L. 68.

[14] Rabanus Maurus, *Allegoriae in Scripturam Sanctam* (P.L. 112, 850).

[15] Gregorius Magnus, *Moralia,* XX (P.L. 76, 135). Cf. Joannes Saresberiensis, *De septem septenis, VI* (P.L. 199, 956 B).

[16] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1m.

fact, nature or history, becomes a symbol of bigger things and contexts. But because intermediary, a step towards the elucidation of the ultimate truths, symbolistic microcosmism is hardly ever elaborated for its own sake. Accordingly, little emphasis is given to cosmological and anthropological theories.

Their eyes riveted on ultimate truth, the medieval thinkers did not stop to make fine distinctions between the micro- and macrocosmic facts. Both appeared, considered as such, equally insignificant; they received significance by being related, as *typi,* to some truth of faith. Later ages, no longer animated by the same intensity of religious passion, were more attentive to symbolic relation obtaining within the created world. There is a good deal of symbolistic microcosmism, besides other forms, for instance in Paracelsus or Agrippa.

5. A further form of microcosmism starts from the idea that man may include within himself the whole universe by knowing it, even though a complete knowledge can exist, obviously, only potentially. By thinking or knowing the universe, the human mind, or man, in a certain sense "becomes" this universe. This was the idea of Aristotle when he claimed that the human soul is πῶς ἅπάντα.[17] Two different developments are conceivable within the scope of this theory. The differentiating factor is, naturally, the idea one forms on the nature and object of knowledge.

First at all, it is clear that for the soul to be or to become in some way everything known, knowledge must be interpreted as a process by which some real change occurs in the soul, unless the Aristotelian-Thomistic statement has to be taken as a metaphor. If, however, this statement is taken at its full value, man indeed becomes the more a microcosm the more extensive his knowledge of the world becomes. The cognitive process appears as a gradual "assimilation", in the literal sense of the term, of the micro- to the macrocosm. Since microcosmism of this kind rests on a definite conception of the soul's operations, one may speak of "psychological" microcosmism.

This is especially the case if the known universals are taken to be in the sense of Platonic Realism as the ὄντως ὄν. Then, the human mind intuits being in its full and pure nature. If moreover it is assumed that the structure of the κόσμος νοητός and of the κόσμος ἀισθητός are of the same kind, the "assimilation" becomes perfect. It stays so even if the view of "moderate" Realism is adopted and the mind apprehends the *universale in re,* because it is still the very nature of being of which reason gets hold. Metaphysical Idealism, however, may also develop a characteristic form of microcosmism. In absolute Idealism, which ultimately ends in solipsism, there is an identity of micro- and macrocosm. It is questionable whether a philosophy of purely Kantian type can arrive at the notion of the microcosm. It would seem that within this

[17] *De an.* III, 8 (431 b 21). Cf. Aquinas: "anima quodammodo omnia", *In III. de an* l. 13; *S. Th.* I, q. 84, a. 2, ad 2m.

system it is not individual man, but at the best the *Bewusstsein überhaupt* which may acquire microcosmic properties.

Nominalism, if consistently worked out, is hardly compatible with any idea of microcosm, with the exception perhaps of the one mentioned before in the first line. But even here great difficulties arise. If only particulars exist, it is hard to imagine how any particular, that is any individual man, can be called meaningfully a microcosm. Microcosmism appears, in fact, historically considered, mostly as a part of a more or less Platonic or, especially, Neo-Platonic philosophy.

6. There is, finally, a still less genuine microcosmism which uses this name in a rather loose and, as it were, poetical manner. The parallels drawn between man and the universe are taken not really as serious statements in metaphysics. Κόσμος becomes a general name for every being which presents itself as intrinsically ordered. Especially of any organism one may say that it is "a world in itself" or a "universe on a small scale". To call man a microcosm becomes a mere figure of speech (metaphorical microcosmism).

It is rare that any of these interpretations, with the exception of the last named (which is, in truth, no such interpretation), is found in pure form. The usual thing is to encounter a number of various combinations. The single interpretations mingle and overlap. Hardly any of the philosophers of the past who indulged in, sometimes rather daring, speculations on the microcosm, attempted a real analysis of the idea. Accordingly, hybrid formations are frequent. One or the other interpretation, indeed, is particularly emphasized, but there are at the same time features incorporated which belong to another interpretative type and sometimes even appear as incompatible with the fundamental idea.

The co-existence of incompatible ideas within one system is a fact not at all new to the history of philosophy. But there are particular reasons why the notion of the microcosm did pass into many philosophies without being probed and analyzed. Most philosophies rest on some primary "intuition" of so fundamental a nature that the philosopher frequently lets it pass practically unnoticed, simply because he has come to look at it as "obvious". The more fundamental any idea becomes, the less we are inclined to subject it to a searching examination. The critical evaluation of last principles belongs to an advanced stage of inquiry, as one may gather from the history of mathematics. No wonder that early speculation indulged in sometimes fantastic ideas and combined them regardless of their eventual contradictoriness. Later times, following the lead of one or the other of the great predecessors, took over with their system also elements which were incorporated there, although in the manner of a "strange body".

The deepest intuition underlying some philosophical system is often dependent on the general mentality prevailing at the same time. The dependence may be one of conformity or one of opposition; this amounts to the same,

since both attitudes are determined by the general mentality and differ only by the sign of plus or minus. It will become evident that the microcosmistic speculation achieved particular success in ages characterized by definite traits. The existing general mentality colors noticeably any philosophy and may induce the thinker to incorporate also ideas which neither follow necessarily from his admitted suppositions nor even are consistent with them.

The notion of the universe as a living organism implies necessarily the other of a World-Soul. But there is nothing in this conception to force the philosopher to consider the stars as animated. They may be as well envisioned as mere parts of the animated whole, organs if one likes, but animated only insofar as they are parts, not in any independent manner. Nor is there any necessary connection between microcosmism and the ideas of the "harmony of the spheres" or the *musica mundi*. But these ideas are encountered together. The Pythagorean and, even more so, Neo-Pythagorean speculation on numbers has no intrinsic relation to microcosmism, but it is frequently associated with the latter.

Microcosmism is one of the primary—or, perhaps, even primitive—forms in which the human mind conceived of man's nature and his position in reality. It satisfies the deeply rooted desire for an all-comprehending conception in which everything finds its proper place within the order of being. It is endowed undeniably with a certain grandiosity. Especially if the *mundus sensibilis* is comprised in one fundamental principle of order together with the *mundus intelligibilis* and *politicus*, microcosmism becomes an imposing construction. One can understand that it escaped critical analysis because of its impressivity.

As has been shown above, there were various forms of microcosmism which differ widely one from the other, although they rest ultimately on a common notion. This notion, however, is so broad and indefinite that it develops in very divergent philosophies. It is, therefore, a mistake to speak of microcosmism as if it were always of the same kind. This amounts to a neglect of essential diversities, just as it is false to speak of "the medieval mind", as if all differences were of no significance. The medieval minds were, of course, agreed on certain fundamental tenets. They were all, within the Western world, Christian. Even those who expressed heretical ideas never intended to doubt the truth of revelation; they only interpreted it in a manner different from the one adopted by orthodoxy. They also had in common some fundamental convictions regarding philosophy, its scope and method. They shared with the whole Christian world certain attitudes. But it is not so easy to discern what ideas really were fundamental at a given historical age. The viewpoints and propositions which appear so today may have been rather peripherical in past times, and what to these appeared basically important may have lost this character for the modern mind.

The modern student of past philosophies, say of Plato or Plotinus, Philo Judaeus or Aristotle, St. Anselm or St. Thomas, is inclined to overrate the

importance of scientific evidence for philosophy and, especially, metaphysics. He therefore easily believes that the philosophies of these writers depended to a great extent on their, of course very imperfect, notions regarding the facts of science. Because they make little use even of what was known at their times of science, they are believed to have been hostile to scientific endeavors. In fact, they were not; they fully recognized the function of science in human knowledge and its practical usefulness. But they attributed to scientific evidence a dignity much below the one of speculation, and the evidence of the senses appeared to them less important than inner experience and the conclusiveness of reasoning. Their systems are, accordingly, highly independent of the stage science had attained at their times. The falsity or even scurrility of some of their ideas on nature does not constitute a valid argument against their philosophies.

Similarly, the particular "humanistic" or social viewpoint, so characteristic of modern thought, is absent in the philosophies of Antiquity or the Middle Ages. Not as if the individual had to be "discovered" as J. Burckhardt claimed, by the thinkers of the Renaissance. Quite to the contrary, it has been Christianity, and with it, Patristic and Scholastic philosophy, which made the world fully conscious of human personality, individuality, and dignity.[18] But it is true that the Middle Ages looked at man only as a part of the universe and that his fate appeared as of an only secondary importance in comparison with the greater glory of God. It has been remarked before, and will become clearer afterwards, that the idea of "man the center of the universe" had with the Scholastics a meaning very different from the one which developed in the centuries after the Renaissance. The same formula covers, here and there, very different meanings.

The same is true of microcosmism. It is hardly correct to assert that the medieval conception of the world "starts with the idea that the universe is an Organism (macrocosmus), animated by one Spirit and molded by one Law, in which, by virtue of the all-pervading divinely ordained harmony, every partial unity (microcosmus) presents an image of the universal whole".[19] Correspondingly it is erroneous to attribute the "organological" conception of the state indiscriminately to all medieval writers.

Another of these sweeping and misleading generalizations describes the sixteenth century as thoroughly "humanistic" and exalting man's position. If this is true, although within limits, of many of the philosophers, it is not true of the

[18] As W. Jaeger remarks, there was no word in Greek for "conscience", a notion of which the Mediterranean world was ignorant in pre-Christian times. One ought, however, to take account of ideas, current especially in the middle and late Stoa, which come close to the notion of conscience in the Christian and modern sense.

[19] O. v. Gierke, *The Development of Political Theory*, tran. B. Freyd, (New York, 1939). The first German edition appeared in Breslau, 1880, under the title, *Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien.*

Reformers, especially not of Calvin. After the disintegration of the medieval world one finds, side by side, a tendency for unrestrained individualism and the theology of Calvin which destroys the human individual by exalting God's infinity. There are, one opposed to the other, the views of Macchiavelli, preconizing an unrestricted choice of means, and the austerity of Calvin, annihilating man by abolishing his freedom.[20]

When attempting to follow the evolution of any idea, in the case of microcosmism, through the ages one must free oneself of such general formulae. If each historical age has its "spirit", this spirit expresses itself in a multiformity of manifestations. Certain ideas apparently have a particular affinity to each other and to the total set of fundamental convictions which make up the so-called spirit of the age. The repeated association of ideas, without their being necessarily linked one to another, points at certain patterns in the history of ideas, although they may become visible only in a dim and easily deceiving light. These patterns are discernibly more in times in which some ideas or a complex of such are revived than in those when they first make their appearance.

The recrudescence of microcosmism, in its truly metaphysical meaning, occurs in ages which usually are labelled as "Renaissance". This may seem a very trite observation. Renaissance means the revival of thoughts, views, and ideals of Antiquity; microcosmism is one of these views; no wonder that it becomes alive again together with the other constituents of Antiquity. Not all revival of Greek thought, however, is qualified as Renaissance. Medieval Aristotelianism, after the rediscovery of the *corpus Aristotelicum,* is surely a revival of a world of ideas pertaining to Old Greece. But the thirteenth century which witnessed this rebirth of the Peripatos is not generally considered one of Renaissance. The preceding twelfth century, ignorant still—until its last years—of Aristotelean metaphysics and physics, is an age of Renaissance. Neither did the Carolingian Renaissance know much of Aristotle. The writings of the "Philosopher" were, of course, in the hands of the authors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, those which were first given the name of Renaissance; but there was little interest for Aristotelianism among many of these authors, incomparably less than among the scholars of the thirteenth century. The Great Renaissance was thoroughly Platonic. If one considers, as some do, the age of German Classicism as a belated Renaissance, one must acknowledge that Platonism and Neo-Platonism, or currents of thought going

[20] Calvin criticizes Melanchthon for having reserved something to man. "No theologian has humiliated humanity and reason more than he (Calvin). To humiliate man and to glorify God, this is the only goal of his theology". Rognin, *Rev. Chrét.* 1936, quot. F. Olgiati, *L'anima dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento* (Milan, 1924), p. 402. One must, however, not forget that there is the opposite interpretation of Calvin's anthropology, too. W. Dilthey, *Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (*Ges. Werke*, II, Leipzig, 1921, p. 231), claims that never before had the "loftiness of human destiny been felt and stated" as in Calvin's idea that grace cannot be lost.

back to these, dominate throughout and that Aristotelianism, or the systems of the Stoa, of Democritus or Epicurus, play a very subordinate rôle.

One might conclude that Renaissance is always Platonic in its philosophical aspect. This was indubitably the case with the Great Renaissance. It suffices to recall that Marsilio Ficino, the founder and head of the "Platonic Academy" at Florence, gave to his chief work the title: *Theologia Platonica.* The Great Renaissance was the first to be called by that name, the first also perhaps, to have felt itself an age of rebirth. Its features supply the pattern by which other ages are equally called Renaissance. It might be that the general character of the Great Renaissance has become, in the minds of the historians, so much linked up with Platonism that a non-Platonic age, however much it may go back to Antiquity, is not recognized as a Renaissance.

Furthermore the revival of classical studies in the ninth and the twelfth centuries could not help being Platonic in its philosophy because hardly anything was then known of Ancient philosophy besides certain Platonic and Neo-Platonic ideas. Also, what one knew of the systems of Democritus, Epicurus, or the Stoics, was not such as to appeal strongly to Christian philosophers.[21] "Back to the sources", therefore, meant for these thinkers back to Platonism. Thus, the Platonic nature of these periods, preceding the Great Renaissance, might be purely accidental. But it is, at the same time, one reason why these ages are considered as of Renaissance. It might, therefore, be argued that the Platonism of Ficino, Poliziano, Bembo, and so on, presents the student of the history of ideas with a real problem, but that the Platonism of John Scottus Eriugena, or Bernardus Carnotensis does not. Also, that Platonism is not a necessary character of Renaissance, but only a trait characteristic of the Great Renaissance.[22]

On close examination, however, this objection loses its impressiveness so as to appear as a rather specious argument. The Platonism of the various ages of Renaissance is of a peculiar kind. Plato's philosophy, in its original form or in its many derivatives, allows for several viewpoints and emphases. One combination of ideas, ultimately going back to Plato, is found in the Renaissance of the ninth, the twelfth, and the fifteenth centuries. There is no intrinsic

[21] With the one notable exception of William of Conches who attempted a renewal of atomism, much in the sense of Democritus or, perhaps, better Epicurus or Lucretius. There is, of course, a noticeable appreciation of Stoic ethics; Seneca, for instance, is quoted frequently. But Stoic metaphysics, so far as they were known, did not meet with approval.

[22] German Classicism does not furnish an argument in favor of the necessity of Platonism in Renaissance. The feature which attracted, e.g., Goethe, in first line was art. Renaissance art was influenced by the art of Old Greece, and there was a general interest in the sculptures stemming from these times. It was art which first transmitted to the German mind the ideal of Antiquity and, subsequently, of the Italian Renaissance. The latter being Platonic in its philosophy, it is easy to see how Platonism came to be identified with the spirit of Classicism.

reason in the system of Plato himself, why just this particular form should have been adopted. Especially, there is no reason why in all these ages the idea of the microcosmus should be given such a prominent place. With Plato himself this idea plays a secondary rôle. It is indeed a constituent element in Neo-Platonism. But why did the Great Renaissance, which had Plato's works at its disposal (although many of them had been available earlier too), choose to be Neo-Platonic rather than Platonic? Why did it feel so attracted by microcosmism?

The writers of the Carolingian Renaissance or of that of the twelfth century thought on Neo-Platonic lines, because their main information of "Platonism" was derived from works deeply stained by Plotinian influences. The commentary on *Timaeus* by Chalcidius, the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, the passages from Maximus Confessor contained in the works of Eriugena, and other *auctoritates* were thoroughly Neo-Platonic. But this reason did not exist for the "Platonists" of the Great Renaissance. Ficino might have gone back to Plato, just as Aquinas had gone back to Aristotle; the former might have felt Neo-Platonism as a degeneration of the original system, as the latter considered that the Arabian commentators had misrepresented the Philosopher.

Even within the boundaries of Neo-Platonism there is no absolute necessity to accord so great an importance to microcosmism. The ideas of the *anima mundi,* the *mundus intelligibilis,* and of man as a microcosm, form indeed an important part in the Plotinian system. But its main features can be maintained without giving so much prominence just to microcosmistic speculations.

For this there has to be a special reason. It is obviously not a sufficient characterization of the phenomenon "Renaissance" to describe it simply as a revival of Antiquity, a renewed interest in Classic art, thought, and way of life. Renaissance is more than all this, more also than "humanism". The humanistic emphasis and the admiration for everything pertaining to the "Great Age" are but partial aspects of a particular mentality, such as favors also the development of Neo-Platonic philosophies. Another feature of this "metaphysical situation" is the predilection for microcosmism.

. . .

When Greek thought reached the age of maturity it found prepared all the constituent elements of microcosmism. It then depended on the individual bias of a philosopher whether he adopted at all, and in what form he did eventually adopt, microcosmistic ideas. On the following pages the attempt is made to group the available material on ancient and medieval philosophy according to the types of microcosmism which were distinguished in part II. As has been pointed out before, no complete survey is intended. The references to various authors have only the value of illustrations.

From now onwards, the chronological viewpoint is abandoned. Also, the limitation to strictly Occidental systems has to be given up. During the last centuries of the Old Age, and again in medieval times, when the translations of

Arabian and Hebrew texts became more numerous and generally known, the Western world came under the influence of the East. Alexandria and later Rome were centers where the East and the West not only met but intermingled. Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean doctrines incorporated many elements of Oriental origin. Again, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the scholars at Paris and other places of learning scanned with lively interest the new material which the activities of many translators supplied from Spain and the East; the crusades, too, had brought about an immediate contact with the Eastern world. And the thinkers of the Italian Rennaisance used in building their systems not only the Greek texts which had come from Byzantium but also ideas stemming from older and newer Oriental sources. Thus, for instance, Pico della Mirandola studied carefully the Cabbalah and similar works. All this makes necessary a certain consideration of Eastern thought.

1. *Elementaristic Microcosmism*

Most, perhaps all, authors who gave any thought whatsoever to the constitution of man felt sure that he is composed of the same elements which are distributed throughout the universe. Those who held that the psychic is one element among others could easily arrive at such a conception. Those who denied to the psychic such an equality with the other "four elements" must have encountered some difficulties. The same is true of any system assuming some element particular only to one part of the universe. Thus, it would seem that there is a certain inconsistency in Aristotle's remark on man as the microcosmus, since he expressly limits the composition of man to the "four elements" and excludes the fifth which does not enter into the composition of terrestrial bodies. His statement on the νοῦς coming "from without", too, may appear incompatible with the idea of the microcosmus, although it is possible to conceive of the νοῦς as one of the constituent "elements" of the κόσμος.[23]

Elementaristic microcosmism, however, generally assumes that not only is man composed of the same elements as existing elsewhere in the universe, but that they are also arranged in the same manner. Therefore, man shares with other beings, higher or lower than he himself, their characteristic natures. In innumerable passages we read that man has physical existence in common with inanimate beings, mere life with plants, sensorial capacities with brutes, rational powers with the angels. Claudianus Mamertus, for instance, says that the Creator gave to man *essentiam cum lapidibus, vitam seminalem cum herbis et arboribus, vitam sensualem eandemque cum pecudibus, vitam rationalem*

[23] Concerning the fifth element, αἰθήρ, see Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* B. 8 (334 b 30–335 a 5). On the notion of νοῦς and its relation to human nature, a complete survey may be found in F. J. C. J. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de Zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Nijmegen-Utrecht 1939). See, however, Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* I, 26, 65: "sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta, haec et deorum est et animorum". Also *Acad. post.* I, 7, 28.

cum angelis.[24] The *locus communis*, however, to which all later writers refer, explicitly or implicitly, is found in St. Gregory: *Omnis enim creaturae aliquid habet homo. Homini namque commune esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum animalibus, intelligere cum angelis.*[25] Johannes Scottus Eriugena uses much the same words: *Nulla creatura est, a summo usque deorsum, quae in homine non reperiatur.* And elsewhere: *Intelligit quidem ut angelus, ratiocinatur ut homo, sentit ut animal, vivit ut germen . . . nullis creaturae expers.*[26] Referring to the notion of harmony—on which below—Eriugena also calls man the *officina omnium.*

Some few further instances may be mentioned. Thus, Alanus de Insulis: *homo qui habet similitudinem cum omni creatura, esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum herbis, sentire cum brutis, ratiocinari cum angelis.*[27] Alanus expresses the same idea in a quite impressive passage of his work, *De planctu naturae;* there however, elementaristic microcosmism is mixed up with views pertaining to other interpretations. This passage, therefore, will be referred to also later. But it may stand as well here. It is, incidentally, a good example of medieval rhetorical ornateness as cultivated especially in the twelfth century.

[Nature speaks:] Ego sum illa quae ad exemplarem mundanae machinae similitudinem hominis exemplavi naturam, ut in eo velut in speculo, ipsius mundi scripta natura appareat. Sicut enim quatuor elementorum concors discordia, unica pluralitas, consonantia dissonans, consensus dissentiens, mundialis regiae structuras conciliat, sic quatuor complexionum compar disparitas, inaequalis aequalitas, deformis conformitas, diversa identitas aedificium corporis humani compaginat . . . Et sicut contra ratam firmamenti volutionem motu contradictorio exercitus militat planetarum, sic in homine sensu alitus rationisque continua reperitur hostilitas . . . Haec mentem humanam in vitiorum occasum deducit, ut occidat, illa in orientem virtutum ut oriatur invitat . . . Haec super scientiae nocte mentis lumen eliminat, illa contemplationis lumine mentis illuminat.[28]

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[24] Claudianus Mamertus, *De statu animae,* I, 21 (ed. A. Engelbrecht, *Corp. SS. Eccles. Lat.* Vol. 11, 1885), p. 71.

[25] Gregorius Magnus, *Hom. in Evan.* XXIX (P.L. 76, 1214 A). So also Isidore of Sevilla, *Sent.* I, 11 (P.L. 83, 559 A): "communia homini omnia naturalia esse cum omnibus quae constant et in homine contineri atque in eo omnium rerum naturam consistere (patet)." Similar statements are found in the writings of the Greek Fathers, e.g., Joannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, II, 12 (P.G. 94, 925): ὁ ἄνθρωπος κοινωνεῖ καὶ ἀψύχοις καὶ ἀλόγοις καὶ λογικοῖς. Nemesius, *De natura hom.* c. 1 (P.G. 40, 512 C).

[26] Joh. Scottus Eriugena, *De div. nat.* II, 4 (P.L. 122, 530 D) and III, 37 (*ibid.* 733 B).

[27] Alanus de Insulis, *Distinct. dict. theol.* (P.L. 210, 755 a), sub voce *creatura.* Similarly also *Sermo de Spir. Sancto* (*ibid.* 222 D), furthermore *Ars Fidei,* II, 13 (*ibid.* 607). Bernardus Silvestris, *De mundi universitate, s. Microcosmus et Megacosmus,* II, X (edd. S. Barach-J. Wrobel, Innsbruck, 1867, p. 55): "Mentem de coelo corpus trahit ex elementis / Ut terras habitet corpore, mente coelum."

[28] Alanus de Insulis, *Lib. de planctu nat.* (P.L. 210, 443 b). The parallel between the four elements and the four *complexiones s. humores* is common; e.g. William of St. Thierry, *De nat. corp. et an.* (P.L. 180, 698); also Honorius Augustodunensis, *Elucidarium,* I. 11 (P.L. 172, 1117 A). Henricus Francigena (ca. 1120), *Aurea Gemma,* cf. Ch. H. Haskins, *Studies in Medieval Culture* (Oxford, 1929), p. 178 ff. "mundus iste ex quatuor elementis constat. Creator . . . providet ut mundus sibi similia contineret. Continet enim hominem qui microcosmus dicitur . . . qui ex quatuor elementis constat

Of other writers, there is for instance, Bede,[29] then William, Abbot of Hirsau (ca. 1073) in his *Praefatio in astronomiam,*[30] Petrus Lombardus.[31] The *Glossa ordinaria,* too, refers to this *locus.* It is hardly worth while to list further quotations[32] since this conception soon lost the appeal it obviously had for the authors of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. True, St. Albert still mentions that man is a microcosm, i.e. *minor mundus eo quod de omnibus creaturis aliquid habet, esse cum lapidibus,* and so on, according to the formula.[33] But Aquinas already feels the need to introduce a restrictive "quodammodo"; *homo dicitur minor mundus quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.*[34]

The idea, however, is not limited to the Latin authors. Rabbi Joseph ben Jacob (ibn) Zaddik († 1149) wrote a treatise in Arabian of which we have a Hebrew translation. He says:

"There is nothing in the world which has not its correspondence in man. He is like the corporeal world; he consists of the four elements . . . he has the nature of the plants and animals; he is similar to things: upright like the terebinth, his hairs like the grass and the weeds, the arteries like the rivers . . . He is courageous like the lion, timorous like the hare, patient like the lamb, clever like the fox."[35]

The similarity of some of the expressions used by Rabbi Joseph and the formula of St. Gregory cannot be overlooked. There are, indeed, also noticeable differences. The comparison of the parts of the body with natural objects is absent in the Gregorian text. The Jewish scholar "indubitably followed the

. . . sed etiam ex quatuor humoribus qui similes propterea sortiti sunt".—This idea was transmitted to the Western scholars supposedly by Constantinus Agricanus: "Corpus humanum ex quatuor humoribus constat sibi a mundi elementis appropriatis." M. Müller, "Die Stellung des Daniel von Morley in der Wissenschaft des Mittelalters", *Phil. Jahrb.* 41 (1928), 309. But see Joh. Damascenus, *De fide orth.* II, 12 (P.G. 94, 921): *πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων συνίσταται· τὰ δὲ τῶν ζώων σώματα ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων χυμῶν κτλ.*

[29] Beda, *De temp. rat.* c. 35 (P.L. 90, 458 B).

[30] P.L. 150, 1641 B, C.

[31] F. Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1901, vol. 3, 5), p. 35, n. 4.

[32] There is a relation between the four elements and the qualities of the *quatuor tempora.* Honorius Augustodunes, *De imag. mundi,* II, 59 (P.L. 172, 154). So also, earlier, a treatise, possibly by Gerbert, MS. *Digby* 83 Bodl., init.: "Quicumque mundane sphere rationem et astrorum legem," L. Thorndyke, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science,* I, (New York, 1923), 382: a harmony of the elements, climates, seasons, and humors of the body.

[33] Albertus Magnus, *Compend. theol. ver.* II, 61 (ed. Borgnet, vol. 34, p. 83). Elsewhere, however, he refers to *minor mundus* only *rhetorice et per similitudinem loquendo.* (*In VIII, Phys.* Tr. 1, c. 9, text. 17, *Ibid.* vol. 3, p. 540).

[34] *Summa theol.* I, q. 91, a. 1, c.

[35] M. Doctor, *Die Philosophie des Joseph ibn Zaddik* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1895, vol. 2, p. 20). I. Husik, *A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy* (New York, 1916), p. 125 ff.

procedure of the Brethern of Purity".[36] Whatever ideas he took over from this Arabian sect, there is an older passage of which one is forcibly reminded by the words of Rabbi Joseph. This passage is found in Philo Judaeus' *De plantatione*. It will be discussed later, since this philosopher's microcosmism goes far beyond a mere elementaristic interpretation.[37] It seems probable that both St. Gregory and the Rabbi got their formula from one selfsame source. This original statement must have contained the expression that man "possesses", or "shares", "participates in", the natures of infra- and suprahuman beings—although the latter remark might be an addition by some Christian author. This source probably is Poseidonios.

The idea of man's including in his own the lower nature may be traced back, tentatively, to Aristotle's theory of the three souls. The highest, rational soul contains virtually the vegetative and the sensitive souls, that is, it is capable of all the operations pertaining to these vital principles.[38] But Aristotle's psychology was unknown to St. Gregory, while it might have been known to Rabbi Joseph. Nor is it probable that Claudianus Mamertus used the work of the Stagirite. The source is therefore rather to be located somewhere in the Neo-Platonic tradition which had, needless to say, absorbed many peripatetic elements.

Earlier, however, than the Neo-Platonists is Poseidonios whose writings exercized a great influence. He taught that man patricipates in the inanimate realm, the lower life, and the knowing power of rational beings. His body and its mixture of elements man shares with dead matter; with the plants, the powers of reproduction and nutrition; with the animals, instinctive movement, courage, appetition, and the powers of perception and respiration. He is related to the intelligible world by his reason, the power to think and to judge, by his will for virtue, and by the highest of all virtues, namely piety.[39] [40]

[36] Letter by Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon, M. Doctor, *op. cit.* p. 4. Cf. G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* (Baltimore, 1917), III, 118.

[37] Philo Judaeus, *De plant.* (*Opp.* edd. L. Cohn u. P. Wendland, II, 139, 15 ff).

[38] Aristotle, *De an.* B. 2–4 (413 a–415 b).

[39] K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1921), p. 343.—Two points may be noted in this passage. First, that the similarity with the lower organisms is not limited to mental capacities or faculties like perception or appetition, but also to a moral quality such as courage. Secondly, that the wording of Poseidonios recalls the way in which Scottus Eriugena states the same idea insofar as he distinguishes *intelligere* and *ratiocinari*. It is, however, doubtful whether this detail can be considered as indicative of a more direct relation to Poseidonios. For another interpretation of Poseidonios' philosophy, partly in agreement with, partly critically opposed to Reinhardt, see I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften* (2 vols., Breslau, 1921–28).

[40] L. Weissberg, *Der Mikrokosmos, ein angelblich im 12. Jahrhundert von dem Cordubaner Josef ibn Zaddik verfasstes philosophisches System nach seiner Echtheit untersucht* (Inaug. Diss. Breslau, 1888), quotes, p. 55, the following passage: *ὁ ἄνθρωπος μικρὸς κόσμος λέγεται, οὐχ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων σύγκειται—τοῦτο γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων—ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσας ἔχει τὰς τοῦ κόσμου δυνάμεις. ἐν γὰρ τῷ κόσμῳ εἰσὶ*

Elementaristic microcosmism cannot be said to have had any particular philosophical implications. Frequently though this conception is mentioned it does not play any prominent rôle, even with the writers who go to some length in illustrating it, as e.g., Alanus does. This conception, in fact, asserts more something about man's place in the order of being, emphasizing its uniqueness (and thus is related to the idea of "man the center of creation") than it makes any claim to define the relationship obtaining between the micro- and the macrocosmus.

2. *Structural Microcosmism*

Two forms of structural microcosmism were distinguished. They seem to be sufficiently characterized by the names of "cosmocentric" and "anthropocentric" microcosmism. The two viewpoints, although fundamentally different, are not always neatly kept apart. The underlying attitudes are, in spite of this overlapping, distinct from one another.

a. Cosmocentric Microcosmism

This theory is not sharply distinct from elementaristic microcosmism. However great the difference in principle, there are all kinds of intermediary forms. Elementaristic changes into cosmocentric microcosmism when man is conceived as not only including the divers elements and natures of which the universe consists, but also their specific powers and mutual relations. The main difference is the greater emphasis put on the "dynamic" aspect in the interpretation under discussion. This shift of emphasis becomes clearly visible, for instance, in the philosophy of Philo Judaeus. He states that man is justly called a microcosm because he includes in his being all the forces of the universe, high and low.[41] But Philo goes farther than this. He also believes in a strict correspondence between the parts of the human body and certain things in the visible universe, chiefly indeed things terrestrial. Stone and wood are solid bodies and are to be compared to the bones of man, hairs and nails correspond to plants, and so on. The idea of cosmocentric microcosmism is, of course, far older than Philo. It somehow pervades ancient anthropology.[42]

θεοί, ἔστι τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, ἔστι καὶ φυτά. πᾶσας δὲ ταύτας δυνάμεις ἔχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἔχει γὰρ θείαν μὲν δύναμιν τὴν λογικήν, ἔχει τῶν στοιχείων φύσιν, τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου γεννητικήν. The passage is taken from Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 249 (*Vita Pythag.*), p. 440 a. 33 ed. Bekker.

[41] Philo Judaeus, *Leg. alleg.* II, 22 (*ed. cit.* I, 107).

[42] "Das was wir heute eine kosmische Auffassung des Menschen nennen, ist der griechischen Metaphysik selbstverständliche Voraussetzung—so selbstverständich, dass sie oft gar nicht ausgesprochen wird, sondern uns erst entgegenspringt, wenn wir den Zusammenhang der Gedanken verstehen." J. Stenzel, *Metaphysik des Altertums* (Handb. d. Phil. I, Munich, 1931), p. 29.

Sometimes the parts of the body are analogized not to compound objects but to the elements themselves and to parts of the universe. As an example a passage may serve, taken from Robert Grosseteste:

> Corpus hominis . . . dividitur . . . in quatuor elementa. Tabeta enim in se aliquid ignis, aliquid aeris, aliquid aquae, aliquid terrae. Ratio terrae in carne est; aquae in sanguine; aeris in spiritu [breath]; ignis in caliditate vitali. Siquidem et quadripartita corporis humani ratio quatuor elementorum designat species. Caput namque ad caelum refertur, in quo sunt duo oculi tamquam lumina solis et lunae. Pectus aeri coniungitur . . . Venter autem mari assimilatur, etc.[43]

Fr. Mauthner calls cosmocentric microcosmism a "mechanistic explanation of man" as set over against the "psychological explanation of the universe" by anthropocentric microcosmism. Since he views mechanism as an advanced stage and "animism" as the obviously primitive form of speculation, he believes that anthropocentric microcosmism is, by necessity, the older conception.[44] Many other writers, especially of the nineteenth century, are in agreement with this view. But it is not necessarily in agreement with the facts of history. It may be even questionable whether "animism" is really as general a form of primitive world conception as it is usually presented. But even if this be the case, it is to be considered that "animism" supplies primarily an explanation of particular things and events, and rarely, if at all in truly primitive stages, one of complex—real or fictitious—wholes. The wind, the river, the sea, the tree, and the brute, are conceived as animated. But the conception of the universe as a whole and, therefore, as one animated being, seems to pertain to a rather advanced stage of speculation. When reflection has progressed so far as to comprehend all the multifarious events and objects as forming one universe,[45] the notion of universal order may easily appear as

[43] Robert Grosseteste, *Quod homo sit minor mundus,* in L. Baur, *Des Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1912, Vol. 9), p. 59. The twofold parallelism is noteworthy. There is one of organs or functions and the elements, and one of parts of the body, on one hand, and parts of the universe, on the other. (*Terra,* in this context, obviously refers not to the element but to the planet.) The formula, too, that the "ratio" of an element is in an organ is not without interest. It indicates that the relation is not one of composition but of correspondence. Insofar, this passage might be quoted also as an instance of symbolistic interpretation. The structural viewpoint, however, predominates. Such ideas remained alive a long time. Cusanus uses the same argument, with the intention to illustrate the conception of the earth as a living being. He ascribes this view to Plato: *De docta ignorantia,* II, 13 (*Opp.* edd. E. Hoffmann and R. Klibansky, I, Leipzig, 1931, p. 111).

[44] Fr. Mauthner, *Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (2d ed., Leipzig, 1924), II, 324 ff.

[45] The ἄπειροι κόσμοι of Anaximandros suggest that this philosopher had not yet developed the idea of there being but one universe. A Democritean fragment, too, speaks of ἄπειροι οὐρανοί. However, one has to consider that the words οὐρανός or κόσμος are quite ambiguous. Aristotle distinguishes, *De caelo,* A (278 b 11 ff.), three meanings: (1) the οὐσία of the uppermost sphere, or περιφορά, of the universe, (2) the body next to this, comprising the planets, sun, and moon, that is οὐρανός as opposed to Earth, (3) the whole universe as included by the uppermost circle. In any case, one must

the primary fact and become a starting point for speculation not less, or even more, plausible than anthropocentrism or "animism".

Primitive "animism", to become transformed into a truly philosophical conception of the universe, presupposes reflection on the nature of man as a being resting in itself. But such reflection seems to be the product of a stage much later than true primitivism. The small child is believed to indulge in a more or less "animistic" interpretation of the surrounding world. This is, perhaps, not as certain as some psychologists want us to believe, but insofar as this attitude exists, it is indubitably an unreflected one and does not imply any conscious knowledge of the individual's own nature. When the child has developed so far that he considers the question, "What am I?", his attempts to find an answer do not start with self-analysis. He rather applies to himself the knowledge he has acquired in regard to things. Similarly, anthropocentric microcosmism, on the philosophical level, results from a re-interpretation of human nature in the light of the previously attained idea of the universe. It is noteworthy that anthropology or psychology appear late in the history of Greek thought. Its first period is mainly occupied with cosmology and the metaphysics of being.[46]

The cosmocentric viewpoint sometimes appears linked to the anthropocentric. Because the universe is an animated being and this is taken to be the primary fact, man, being animated too, is viewed as an image or reproduction of the universe. He too must be ruled by an all-pervading principle as the macrocosmus is.[47] The notion of the living universe and the World-Soul will be discussed later.

For Christian authors, the necessity arose to bring together cosmocentric microcosmism with the doctrine of creation. The notion of the microcosmus

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distinguish between the indetermined number of universes, or *οὐρανοί*, and the Pythagorean notion of a definite number of such *οὐρανοί*—an idea suggested to these philosophers by the number of regular bodies. They assumed that there are five *κόσμοι*, Plato, *Tim.* 55, c. 7. Wherefrom Petron got his 183 worlds, of which we are told by Plutarchus (A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timeaus*, p. 79), seems not to be known. It is quite another question whether or not God could, or did, create several universes, a problem which plays a great rôle in late medieval speculation and also in the thoughts of Giordano Bruno.

[46] W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (2d ed.), I, 356, goes perhaps a little too far in his emphasis on the primacy of "cosmic" speculation. But his statement implies, nevertheless, a useful correction of the tendency to overestimate the rôle of "animism". First, according to this author, it is art which discovers in the harmony of the body the principle of the cosmos. "Von Kosmos aus kommt der Grieche jetze auch zur Entdeckung des Seelischen. Es brodelt nicht erlebnischaft als chaotische Innerlichkeit hervor, sondern wird umgekehrt als der letzte noch übrige Bereich des Seins, der noch nicht von der kosmischen Idee durchdrungen ist, gesetzlicher Ordnung unterworfen. . . . Es taucht jetzt der Gedanke einer seelischen Geformtheit auf." On the Greek "vision of the individual" as set over against the one characteristic of Christianity and, especially, of the Christian Occident, see *ibid.* p. 163.

[47] Thus, for instance, Adelhard of Bath. H. Willner, *Des Adelhard von Bath Traktat De eodem et de diverso.* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1903, vol. 4, 1), p. 82 f.

reproducing the macrocosmus imperceptibly glides into the idea of man being created *ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*. Sometimes, it is the universe which is, so to speak, interpolated between the Creator and man; the universe is primarily an image of God, and man, as microcosmus, is—at least in the natural features of his being—only secondarily such a reproduction. This view develops particularly with those authors who are strongly influenced by Neo-Platonism. The emanationistic conception of this school entails a gradually vanishing likeness between the One and the various successive emanations. A greater likeness exists between the soul and God than between man and God. The idea that the soul is as such *persona*—as held, for instance, by Hugh of St. Victor—is related to this conception, whereas in Thomism *persona* names the psychophysical unit of prime matter and soul.

However close Christian authors may come to Neo-Platonism, one cannot well speak of something like a theomorphic microcosmism, at least not within orthodoxy. The awareness of the infinite distance separating Creator and Creation was too much alive even before the principle of the *analogia entis* had been expressly formulated. Those authors who, eventually, deviated from orthodoxy and approximated pantheistic views are closer to such a conception. The desire to harmonize certain philosophical ideas with the tenets of Christianity became, in fact, the source for more than one heretical proposition.

Sometimes, cosmocentric microcosmism varies insofar as the microcosm is seen in the whole visible world, including man, and as an image of a better world. This better world bears features of the eternal life and of the *mundus intelligibilis*. This lack of clarity need not amaze us. The philosophers of old, especially up to the thirteenth century, read the pagan authors so much in the light of the faith that they did not realize, many times, the incompatibility of ideas which they put side by side without the slightest hesitation.[48]

Many Christian philosophers, however, extend their speculations not farther than their pagan predecessors had done. When speculating on man's position in the created universe, they leave out all consideration on creation or the relation between Creator and created world. Their interest focuses, when they write on these questions, exclusively on the relation of man and universe. Man appears to them as an image of the whole nature or creation. He discovers within himself the nature of the surrounding things. This is stated clearly by Nemesius whose *De natura hominis* figured, up to the sixteenth century, among the works of Gregory of Nyssa.[49] We contemplate in man as in an image the

[48] Bernardus Silvestris, for instance, speaks occasionally of "sensilis hic mundus, mundi melioris imago". *De mundi universitate s. Microcosmus et Megacosmus* II, X (edd. S. Barach and J. Wrobel, p. 55): "In minori mundo, homine, Physis intelligit non errandum, si maioris mundi similitudinem sumpserit in exemplum"; *ibid.* II, XIV (p. 64).

[49] The Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου was translated by Alfanus, Archbishop of Salerno (1058–1085) and again by Burgundio Pisano in the twelfth century. But the ideas of this "first anthropology", as B. Domanski calls this work with some exaggeration, reached

external world, he says; man carries in himself the image of the whole creation and, therefore, is a microcosm.[50]

b. Anthropocentric Microcosmism

Reasons have been shown above why anthropocentric microcosmism cannot be considered simply as a form or, eventually, remnant of primitive animism. It is difficult to imagine Plato as a victim of popular prejudice. The man who sharply distinguished between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα would be the last to take over unexamined any current belief. But it is Plato to whom the philosophers speculating on the microcosm mostly refer as the originator of their ideas.

Primitive animism may, for instance, claim that the sun and the moon are living beings. The shadow overcasting the sun in an eclipse may appear as a wolf threatening to swallow the light of the world. But there is apparently no case of primitive animism envisioning the universe as an animated whole (provided primitive mentality attains the concept of the universe). To conceive of every thing and every event as part of one whole demands obviously an advanced stage of speculation, the more so if this whole is to contain many things which do not, nor ever will, become objects of experience. There is, in truth, but a superficial likeness between primitive animism and the philosophies talking of a World-Soul.[51]

The ideas of Plato concerning the World-Soul are stated in *Timaeus* and *Philebus*. The argument of the later dialogue (28d–30c) is best rendered in the wording of A. E. Taylor.[51a]

"We are agreed to reject the theory that the cause of the universe is random (εἰκῇ 28d), and to agree with the traditional belief that it is directed by a supreme wisdom (φρόνησις) and intelligence (νοῦς) in every particular. . . . The materials of which our own body is made are only small parcels of the great cosmic masses of similar materials, and these constituents are found in a much higher degree of purity elsewhere in the universe than in our bodies. The 'fire' in us is small in bulk and 'impure' in substance compared with the fire in the sun. And again the 'fire' or 'water' in us is fed and kept up by that in the larger world (29c). And generally our little body is fed by the mass of body without

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the occidental world through many channels: B. Domanski, *Die Psychologie des Nemesius* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1900, vol. 3, 1), p. xix. One old manuscript, however, probably stemming from Mont St. Michel, correctly attributes the work to Nemesius: F. Bliemetzrieder, *Adelhard von Bath* (Munich, 1935), p. 390.

[50] *De nat. hom.* c. 1 (P.G. 40, 529 and 532 f.): Εἰ τοίνυν, ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐσοτρισθείημεν. And: τοῦ φέροντος ἐν τῇ καθ' ἑαυτὸν φύσει τῆς πάσης κτίσεως τὴν εἰκόνα δι'ἁ καὶ μικρὸς κόσμος εἴρηται.

[51] J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 128, note 4, affirms that "no Greek ever doubted that the world was in some sense a ζῷον". That every Greek felt this way is obviously an exaggeration. One may safely surmise that many inhabitants of Athens or Thebes never gave a thought to the problem. But even in regard to the philosophers, this statement seems to go too far.

[51a] A. E. Taylor, *Plato, The Man and the Work* (New York, 1936), p. 416 ff. On *Timaeus*, see the same author's *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928).

(29e). By analogy, we may infer that since there is soul in us, it too comes from a greater and brighter soul in the universe. Also, we see in our own case that when things are amiss with the body, it is the intelligence, resident in the soul, which reestablishes order by means of the medical art. So we may reasonably hold that in the universe at large the same holds good. The order in it is due to intelligence (*νοῦς*), and intelligence is only found in souls. So we may hold that there are superhuman souls, and that it is their intelligence which is the cause of cosmic order (30a). And we may answer the question . . . by saying that *νοῦς* (intelligence) belongs to the fourth of our classes, the class of the cause of the mixture (30c)".[52]

Thus, in *Philebus* only the existence of suprahuman souls is asserted, how many of them remains obscure. But no word is said of one World-Soul, though one may deduce its existence from the reference to the one cosmic order.

Not *Philebus,* but *Timaeus* was the work which became influential with Plato's successors in Antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages. However, this dialogue was mostly interpreted in a Neo-Platonic spirit, because of the commentaries which were written at a time when Neo-Platonism already dominated. Especially the medieval writers became acquainted with *Timaeus* nearly exclusively—at least up to the later part of the twelfth century—through the commentary of Chalcidius. In *Timaeus,* 34b, the idea of one World-Soul is clearly stated. This World-Soul fulfills, within the Platonic conception, a twofold office. It explains the order and the operations of the *κόσμος*, and it is the archetype of the human soul. It is the principle of generation of whatever exists or is going to exist.[53] But neither in *Philebus* nor in *Timaeus* does Plato assert that the individual human soul forms part of or takes origin with the World-Soul. The development of the relation betweeen these souls was left to Neo-Platonism.

Moved by the desire to spread his own goodness, the *δημιουργός* made out of the chaotic disorder an ordered world, since order is better than chaos. To make it still better he endowed this world with mind (or reason, *νοῦς*) and thus, since reason exists only in souls, the world was given a soul (*ψυχή*) so that it became an animated being with soul and mind.[54] The world was

[52] The four classes of the actual are: the unlimited (*ἄπειρον*), the limited (*πέρας*), the mixture of both (*μεικτόν*), the cause uniting them in mixture (*ποιοῦν*); *Philebus,* 23c.

[53] See *Leg.* X, 896: *ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων.* A. Schneider, "Der Gedanke der Erkenntnis des Gleichen durch Gleiches in antiker und patristischer Zeit", *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. Suppl. II (Festgabe Cl. Baeumker),* 1923, p. 68: "The World-Soul is credited with the capacity of knowledge. It comprises in its composition the elements of identity and diversity and thus the knowledge of the eternally identical and of the differences. Thus it is able to know the ideas and their terrestrial images. . . . The same is true of the immortal part of the human soul, which part is formed of the same, though less pure, elements". The latter idea takes on, with certain "Platonists", especially of the Middle Ages, the form that the human souls are formed out of the "remnants" of the World-Soul.

[54] *Tim.* 30b: *ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν.* 92c, on the *οὐρανός*: *ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον.* These statements are repeated, much without modification, by later authors, especially

fashioned, Timaeus proceeds, on the model or likeness the δημιουργός had conceived, a νοητόν, perfect and complete, τέλεον, and living. Why this "idea" in the mind of the δημιουργός has to be a living being, and not simply the idea of such a one, is not quite clear. The δημιουργός, of course, possesses life as one of his perfections; but what he conceives need not be necessarily alive, too. But according to Timaeus, the world was formed as an embodiment of a living being (ζῷον), and all living beings are part of it. One may ask whether the ζῷα of this world are alive because they are parts of the living whole. But the answer must be to the negative, because there are lifeless beings, too, which equally are parts of the living κόσμος. There can be but one κόσμος, since uniqueness is a property of the model in the demiurgic mind, and this property must reappear in the reproduction of this model.

The procedure by which Timaeus exposes his cosmology is not anthropocentric. He does not start with man. He does not even start with the universe but with the creative mind of the δημιουργός. The conception within this mind, the αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι ζῷον, is not only the formal cause of the universe, but also furnishes all the arguments concerning the nature of the world. Plato declares that all movement originates in a "soul". This sounds rather like animism. But another interpretation is possible. Plato does not claim that all movement stems from a soul inhabiting the moving body itself. Since there is movement in the universe, and nothing outside of the universe, there has to be a cosmic soul. Plato cannot conceive of the δημιουργός himself moving the world, because things eternal are identical and, therefore, immovable. There is no change in eternity, where there is no time; time rather is "the moving image of eternity". Eternity being the mode of being of the δημιουργός, an intermediary agent is needed which becomes responsible for all movement of the universe as a whole and within the universe. Hence, the necessity of the World-Soul. This soul can be conceived as the only source of movement, and thus makes superfluous the conception of "thing-souls" like those characteristic of animism.

The κόσμος is a living being, by its ψυχή, and rational by its νοῦς. It comprises within itself many other living beings: "gods" (created or made gods, a notion which acquires importance much later with Cusanus) in the sky, birds in the air, animals in the water and on the land.[55] The "created gods" are

of the Stoa. Eg. Chrysippus (H.v. Arnim, *Frag. Stoic. vet.* II, 693), from Diogenes Laertius, VII, 142: ὅτι δὲ καὶ ζῷον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν.

[55] Even is it is admitted that everything moving has to be alive, the fundamental idea is still very different from primitive animism. One can hardly accuse Varro of having indulged in so simplistic views. But he is reported by Isidore of Seville, *Etymol.* XIII, 1 (P.L. 82, 471 C) to have asserted that "nulla requies eius (sc. mundi) elementis concessa est . . . Unde et animalia Varroni videntur elementa quoniam per semetipsa, inquit, moventur". It is not far from this statement, it would seem, to the conception of "freedom" in the infra-atomic world as suggested by some contemporary physicists. The rôle which movement played with Varro, is played now by "indetermination". More impor-

spherical in shape, consist of pure fire, are self-luminous; they are the stars, not however the planets, which, perhaps because of their changing positions, were not deemed worthy of being gods. (Of astrology there is no trace in *Timaeus*. Astrology apparently began to play a greater rôle only in later times, although there existed a fully developed theory and practice of mantics. If one adheres strictly to the text, it appears that the "gods" and the human souls, and the World-Soul were all "made" by the δημιουργός, and in this regard there is no difference between them. It is not certain whether Plato thought of the lesser souls as being made from the World-Soul, as if the latter provided the material for the former..[56]

tant than this emphasis on movement is the conception, developed apparently in the first line by the Stoa, that the κόσμος comprehends dead and living, irrational and rational beings and, therefore, has to possess in its totality all these characteristics. Just as a member of the human body owes its life to the life of the world—*membri sumus corporis magni*, Seneca, *Ep.* 95, 32—so life and rationality must come to the single beings from the universe. Also, since according to a generally assumed principle the whole has a greater dignity than the part, the former cannot lack any perfection the latter presents. "The world is better than its parts; therefore the world must be gifted with life"; Zenon, in Sextus Empiricus, as quoted by I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, II (Breslau, 1928), 175. It should be noted, however, that the strictly Platonic interpretation of human nature creates certain difficulties when combined with the motion of the microcosm. If the body is a substance in itself, and the soul imprisoned therein—*hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosum carcer*, as Augustinus wrote, *Contra Academ.* I, 3, 9—then man can hardly be a microscosm, because the essential unity of κόσμος is missing; there is a break in his nature. This difficulty apparently, has not been noticed, or if noticed not felt as serious, by those writers who unhesitatingly speak of man as *minor mundus* and, at the same time, as consisting of two independent substances, united one to the other in a more or less accidental manner. The difficulty is eliminated, perhaps only to some extent, in the Stoic conception by means of the συμπάθεια which supplies a unifying principle for the whole κόσμος and for all its parts. One may recall, in this context, the cleavage between the *res extensae* and the *res cogitantes* in Cartesianism on one hand, and Leibniz' attempt to safeguard the unity of the κόσμος by his notion of pre-established harmony. It is Cartesianism which ultimately made microcosmism in its "classical" forms impossible.—Concerning Timaeus, it must be noted that the statement he makes in the dialogue which bears his name are indeed unequivocal microcosmism—e.g. when man is spoken of as τοῦ παντὸς ἀπομιμούμενον εἶδος, *Tim.* 88, c. 7; but also that his words do not render necessarily Plato's own views, as A. E. Taylor never tires to point out, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, passim*.—Insofar as microcosmistic ideas are to be found with St. Augustine, they are limited to the all-pervasiveness of order. The same order which holds together the universe is also within every being, and the more clearly visible the higher the being. *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 22 (P. L. 41, 335).

[56] J. Stenzel, *Metaphysik des Altertums*, p. 156, seems to go farther than the Platonic texts warrant: "Die Welt-Seele, die Gestirnseelen, und diejenigen Seelen, denen die Einkörperung in menschliche Leiber bestimmt ist, gingen für Plato in einer einheitlichen Seelenkraft [what this term exactly means, is not clear] zusammen, deren Wesen zunächst darin besteht, sich selbst und anderes zu bewegen, sich einfügend in alles Tun und Leiden". It is hard to understand how the one World-Soul can "fit itself into all doing and suffering", since it is the only origin of any event whatsoever.—If Plato himself did not

The notion of a World-Soul has a long and complicated history. In some disguise it may be said to be alive even to-day. But all these, however interesting, ramifications can be considered here only insofar as they have a bearing on microcosmism. Up to now, nothing more has been established than that the universe is an animated being. No reason is given in the Platonic argument why the universe ought to be considered as "the greatest and most perfect man."[57] Here, the idea that man is placed "in the middle" of being becomes important. W. Jaeger[58] considers as the profoundest intuition which the Greek mind achieved and expressed, the conception of "the human as the common boundary between animal and divine existence, in the middle of the cosmos, neither raising himself, in hybris, to a superhuman existence, nor debasing life in an attitude of cynicism, but revolving in the vital spheres to which man is bound by natural law". In this sense, the idea of "man the middle" acquires a deeper meaning than it receives within elementaristic microcosmism. There the position in the center results simply from man's containing, as it were, more elements than either the beings below, or those above him; the former lack reason, the latter are devoid of matter. In man the suprahuman and the infrahuman meet, he becomes the *nodus et vinculum*, the *medietas et catena,* which holds the world together.

The universe is conceived as a μακράνθρωπος, as soon as another principle, besides the one of the World-Soul, is introduced, namely, the Aristotelean category of evolution. There must be a principle of continuity warranting the extrapolation by which the infrahuman beings are conceived as a gradual approach to the perfection achieved by human nature, and this scale of perfection as proceeding beyond man into infinity. The highest being may be the δημιουργός, or the Plotinic ἕν, or the personal God of Jewish or Christian faith. It may be also the universe itself, which then is credited with personality. So also were the heavens (οὐρανοί) or the stars. Or the World-Soul came to be identified with God, or God conceived as the animating principle of the universe.[59]

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indulge in astrological beliefs, there existed this tendency, it seems, already during his lifetime even among some of his followers. J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde chez Platon et les Stoïciens* (Paris, 1939), p. 74. Moreau, incidentally, thinks that the World-Soul is to Plato only a "symbol" and that no physical reality was attributed to it prior to the later Academy. Likewise, the silent harmony of this soul becomes with the "so-called" Pythagoreans of a later age "une harmonie sonore". See *Tim.* 37 b, and Moreau, p. 54 f. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus,* p. 182, thinks that astrology became important only in Hellenistic times. There is, indeed, no astrological implication even in Aratos' (ca. 275) poems. See Fr. Boll, *Sternglaube und Sterndeutung* (3d ed. Leipzig, 1926), p. 21.

[57] Philo Judaeus, *De migr. Abrah.* 220; see also *De opific.* 146, *De aetern.* 80, and other passages. Usually Philo feels quite sure in regard to this doctrine; sometimes, however, it apparently impresses him as a rather daring hypothesis; cf. e.g. *De somn.* I, 15.

[58] W. Jaeger, *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1937), p. 170.

[59] Cf. e.g. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei,* IV, 31, reporting on Varro's view: "Hi soli vide-

In connection with speculation on the universe as animated, the stellar deities play an important rôle, in Antiquity and in medieval times. It is noteworthy that the Fathers, at least some of them, did not approve of this idea. St. Jerome is not in favor of it,[60] nor is Damscenus,[61] nor St. Basil.[62] Augustine does not reject this doctrine absolutely, but he expresses himself in a markedly reserved manner. If he did go farther in some early writings, he was careful to correct his statements later. Thus he declares his opinion on the World-Soul to be *temere dictum*.[63] He is not willing to decide whether the stars be governed by spirits[64] or belong to the society of the angels.[65]

Philo did not consider the stars merely as luminous bodies. He taught that they not only are governed by spirits, but themselves of a spiritual nature; they are "not only animated but νοῦς through and through".[66]

Whether Philo influenced Plotinus or not, there is no doubt that Oriental ideas were at work in the Neo-Platonic system.[67] Together with the views of the school, posterity became acquainted with, and willing to accept, these

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bantur animadvertisse quid esset Deus qui crediderunt eum esse animam motu, sc. ratione mundum gubernantem". *Ibid.* VII, 6: "Dicit Varro . . . Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi"; also VII, 23. See furthermore Seneca, *Natur. Quaest.* I, praef. 13: "Quid est deus? mens universi". *Ep.* 65, 24: "quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est."

[60] St. Hieronymus, *Ep.* 124, ad Avitum, on the Περὶ ἀρχῶν of Origen (P.L. 22, 1062).

[61] Joannes Damscenus, *De fide orthod.* II, 6 (P.G. 96, 885 AB): Μηδεὶς δὲ ἐμψυχομένους τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἢ τοὺς φωστέρας ὑπολαμβανέτω· ἔψυχοι γάρ εἰσι καὶ ἀναισθητοί. Scriptural passages, he adds, which have been quoted in favor of this idea refer either to rational creatures (men, angels), or are metaphorical.

[62] St. Basilius, *Hom. III, in Hexaem.* c. 9 (P.G. 29, 76 AB): οὔτε οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἔμψυχοι, ἐπειδὴ "Διηγοῦνται δόξαν θεοῦ" (Ps. 18, 2), οὔτε τὰ στερέωμα ζῷόν ἐστιν αἰσθητικόν, ἐπειδὴ "Ἀναγγέλλει ποίησιν τῶν χειρῶν αὐτοῦ" (*ibid.*).

[63] St. Augustinus, *De immortal. anim.* 15, 24 (P.L. 32, 1033). *Retract.* I, 5, 3 (*ibid.* 591); also *Retract.* I, 11, referring to *De mus.* VI, 14, 43.

[64] St. Augustinus, *De gen. ad lit.* II, 18, 38 (P.L. 34, 279).

[65] St. Augustinus, *Enchir.* c. 58 (P.L. 40, 260): "ne illud quidem certum habeo utrum ad eandem societatem (sc. angelorum) pertinerent sol et luna et cuncta sidera: quamvis nonnullis lucida corpora non cum sensu vel intelligentia videantur".

[66] Philo Judaeus, *De somn.* I, 135; *De opific.* 73; *De gig.* 8. Cf. H. Schmidt, *Die Anthropologie Philons von Alexandreia* (Inaug. Diss. Leipzig, 1933), p. 27 f.

[67] Philonic influence is maintained by Guyot, *Les reminiscences de Philon le Juif chez Plotin* (Paris 1905) and Fr. Heinemann, *Plotin* (Liepzig, 1921, esp. p. 189). W. R. Inge emphatically denies any such connection: *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (3d ed. London, 1929), 97. R. Cadion, *La jeunesse d'Origène, Histoire de l'École d'Aléxandrie au début du IIIe siècle* (Et. de Théol. Histor. Paris, 1936), is reported (*Rev. Sc. Phil. Théol.*, 26 [1937], 371 f.) to have emphasized the rôle of Christian thought in the formation of Neo-Platonism, which influence, he claims, usually is overlooked. One also ought to take account of the dependence of Plotinus on some of his predecessors who were not ignorant of the Hebrew tradition. Poseidonios is one of them. There are many parallels in the Poseidonian fragments, preserved mainly in Cicero and Seneca, to passages in the Enneades. Poseidonios, however, was acquainted with the ideas of the Old Testament; I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften,* II (Breslau, 1928), 210 and passim.

"astrobiological notions. They took hold of the minds, in the Middle Ages, the critical attitude of such authorities at St. Augustine or St. Jerome notwithstanding. The history of philosophy knows of few chapters as fascinating as the one dealing with Neo-Platonism. The system of Plotinus is a great, though unsuccessful attempt, to synthesize many of the currents which in the past had run parallel, sometimes intermingling, never really unified.[67a] The fundamentally syncretistic nature of Neo-Platonism facilitated the combination of the original system with all kinds of ideas, which sometimes were in fact incompatible with its basic tenets. To the mixture of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism in Plotinus were added ideas stemming from Neo-Pythagorean, Gnostic, Oriental sources. These features allowed thinkers like Ficino or Pico della Mirandola to combine with their "Platonism" notions they got out of cabbalistic and Hermetic writings.[68]

The idea of the microcosm presents some particular difficulties when envisioned on the background of Neo-Platonism. History, of course, shows that Neo-Platonism became associated with various types of microcosmism. But historical factuality and systematic possibility are very different problems. The fundamental conception of emanation postulates that the lower levels of being be unequal to the higher ones, even though they derive from them, and retain some kind of similarity. Especially, the diversity which appears when emanation proceeds beneath the World-Soul creates an unbridgeable gulf between the One, the νοῦς, and the ψυχή on one hand, and the individual human souls on the other. Thus, man may be an image or, even more so, a symbol of the living universe insofar as he is alive, but he can hardly be imagined as "containing" within his nature the properties characteristic of the higher emanations. The synthesis between Neo-Platonism and microcosmism, however, is brought about, to a large extent, by the adoption of Neo-Pythagorean speculations on numbers. The "oneness" of the ἕν and of any individual is qua oneness the same. Hence the rôle played by the notion of the μονάς.[69]

[67a] E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance* (Studien der Bibl. Warburg, X, Leipzig, 1927), p. 19: "Plotinus and Neo-Platonism try to combine the fundamentals of Platonic and Aristotelean thought; but the result is, considered from the viewpoint of systematics, only an eclectic mixture of the two constituents. The Neo-Platonic system is dominated by the Platonic concept of 'transcendence'—the absolute opposition of the intelligible and the sensible. . . . But the dialectic tension, insolvable with Platonism, is dissolved by the reception and incorporation of the Aristotelean notion of evolution. The Platonic category of transcendence and the Aristotelean of evolution beget among them the hybrid notion of 'emanation'. . . . The Christian Middle Ages got from this [Neo-Platonism, transmitted mainly by Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagites] the fundamental category of mediation, proceeding by steps, leaving intact on one hand divine transcendence, and overcoming it, theoretically and practically, on the other hand by the idea of a hierarchy of concepts and a hierarchy of spiritual powers."

[68] See the letter of Gerolano Benvieni to Salvacci, quoted by Olgiati, *L'Anima dell' Umanesino e del Rinascimento* (Milan, 1929), p. 605 f., referring to Pico: He justly is Count of Concordia, since he tries to reconcile the most divers currents of thought.

[69] It is also possible to combine Neo-Platonic with microcosmistic views by making

The human soul cannot have the same degree of being as the World-Soul from which it emanates. Consequently, the human soul cannot well be considered either as part or as embodiment of the World-Soul, although this view has been maintained. Some authors think, in a somewhat naive manner, that the human souls are formed out of the "remnants" of the World-Soul.[70] Nor can one speak consistently, within an emanationistic system, of the lower being "mirroring" the higher.[71] A mirrored image, though lacking true three-dimensionality, is correlated by a one-to-one correspondence to the original. It is essentially on the same existential level. This contradicts the fundamental assumption of emanationism. On the other hand, the World-Soul is conceived as the animating principle of the universe of which individual man is a part. He, too, therefore, must share in this general animation. The relation of the

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not individual men, but man, or mankind, the microcosm. By this, a bridge is found to the Averroistic conception of the *unitas intellectus*. I do not venture to suggest that there is actually any relation between Averroism and microcosmism. However, there is a noteworthy remark in Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* c. 2 (P.G. 40, 537 B, also 577 A), where the author refers to the Manichaean ideas. This passage might be indicative of some such connection as alluded to above. (On Manichaeism, see p. 306 f.) The remark in Nemesius may be dependent on Poseidonios. "Das Denkvermögen . . . ist dem Alldaimon, wie wesenähnlich, so stammverwandt": I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysiche Schriften*, II, 22; see also *ibid.* pp. 35 and 120, where the individual νοῦς is characterized as an inseparable part of the cosmic δαίμων.

[70] Pseudo-Beda (ninth century), *Mundi constitutio* (P.L. 90, 902 A): "Plato . . . animas dixit humanas de reliquiis mundanae animae esse." This author lists also the following opinions (*ibid.* D): "Dicunt . . . quidam unam tantum esse animam . . . ita ut una anima in pluribus rebus"; (*ibid.* 903 A): "Praeterea dicunt quidam eandem mundanam animam pariter cum humana anima esse in homine de qua vermes et fit in homine". Whose are these ideas? That the human soul is a fragment of the ether is an opinion reported by Diogenes Laertius, in the *Comment Pythag.* VIII, 27. But the author of the *Mundi constitutio* cannot have known this work. The source of the idea is probably the Stoic notion of ἀπόῤῥοια. The idea of two souls is also in Chalcidius and probably goes back to Numenius. One soul animates the body and is under the power of the stars. The other soul is rational, free and from God. Thus, there are a good and a bad soul. This notion, stems, as one may safely surmise, from Oriental sources and is maintained by Plutarchus. Cf. J. Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA, 1901, vol. 3, 5), p. 50; Cl. Baeumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie* (Munich, 1890), p. 385. It would be an interesting question whether this two-souls theory may be considered as an ancestor of modern ideas, from Goethe's "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust," down to conceptions like the *"id"* in Freud, or the *animus-anima* notions in Jung.—The idea of the human soul being made out of remnants of the World-Soul is critisized and rejected by Abaelard, *Theol. Christ.* I, 4 (P. L. 178, 1151). It must have played a certain rôle even in the late twelfth century, since William of Auvergne, too, has a refutation of this notion: *De universo*, II, 2, c. 10 (in the text erroneously II; *Opp.* Parisiis, 1674; I, 816b–819a). It may be traced back, presumably, to a misinterpretation of *Tim.* 41d, 4–7.

[71] Plotinus, however, occasionally uses this expression, *Enn.* IV, 9, 4. It is noteworthy that the metaphor of *umbra* appears within Neo-Platonic speculations. But it is probably of Stoic origin. When Nemesius credits animals with εἰκόνα καὶ σκιὰν λογικήν, he quotes Poseidonios.

World-Soul to the universe is exactly the same as the relation of the human soul to the body: *anima tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte.*[72] But, this relation does not make any part of the human body a likeness of the whole. Also it does not follow from the all-pervasiveness of the World-Soul that there is any true similarity between a part of the universe and the whole, so that the former may be considered as a microcosmus.

To the medieval "Platonists" it appeared as obvious that the World-Soul is, as it were, distributed throughout the whole universe.[73] As it is well known, some authors tried to identify the *anima mundi* of the pagan philosophers with the third person of the Trinity of Christian doctrine. Foremost among the representatives of this theory is Abaelard whose opinions were condemned at the Council of Soissons in 1121. A section of the *Theologia summi boni* exposes this view.[74] Warned perhaps by Abaelard's fate, Alanus de Insulis

[72] Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 2, 1. For the medieval authors, the source of this much quoted statement is Augustine. Proclus, *In Tim.* 32c (ed. Diehl, II, 53), sees an even closer analogy. As man loves himself, so does the universe. It is in "sympathy" with itself and thus preserves itself. There may be some Christian influence. The text reads: *ὁ δὲ κόσμος δι' ἀναλογίας καὶ συμπαθίας ἑαυτῷ φίλος ἐστιν· ἑαυτὸν ἄρα σώζει.*

[73] See, e.g., William of Conches, *In Boethii de consolatione phil. comment.* ed. Ch. Jourdain, "Deux commentaires inédits de Guillaume de Conches et Nicolas Triveth sur la consolation de la philosophie de Boèce," *Not. et Extr. des MSS. de la Bibl. Imper.* 20, 2 (Paris, 1862), 76.: "Quidam ita intellexerunt animam mundi mediam non quod esset in omnibus, sed in medio mundi posita, i.e. in sole, et inde vires suas et potestates in corpora mitteret; quia aperte falsum est, postponatur." Obviously, to speak of any location of the World-Soul is erroneous. The criticism may refer to teachings of the school of Chartres. Bernardus Silvestris, in fact, identifies the sun with the *mens mundi,* in *De mundi universitate, sive Megacosmus et Microcosmus,* II, 5 (ed. C. S. Barrach and J. Wrobel, p. 44): "sol illustrior lumine, potentior viribus, augustior majestate, mens mundi". This idea goes back to *Timaeus* and the commentaries on this dialogue. . . . Thus also in the late excerpt from *Timaeus* which under the name *περὶ ψυχᾶς κόσμου* figures as a work of Timeaus Locrensis; F. G. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1881), II, 39. Chalcidius has similar conceptions; "he follows in a noteworthy manner the Stoic Kleanthes;" J. Espenberger, *Die Philosophie des Petrus Lombardus,* p. 28. The proximate source may have been Cicero, see *De nat. deor.* II, 41. On the general spirit of Bernardus Silvestris, see E. Gilson, "La cosmogénie de Bernardus Silvestris", *Arch. d' Hist. Doctr. Lit. du M.-A.* 3 (1928), 1. The ideas of Bernard remind of certain Hermetic texts. Whether there is any direct relation, I am unable to say. Cf. J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1914, vol. 12, 2–4), p. 28.

[74] Abaelard, *Theologia summi boni* (ed. H. Ostlender, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1939, 35, 2, p. 13): "Qui [sc. Plato] nec spiritus sancti personam praetermisisse videtur, cum animam mundi esse astruxerit tertiam a deo et noy personam [referring to *Tim.* 34 c, i.e. Chalcidius, ed. J. Wrobel, 31, 22–32, 1] . . . De hac autem anima . . . quae dicuntur ab hoc philosopho . . . nulli rei potuerunt aptari nisi spiritui sancto per pulcherrimam involucri figuram assignentur". The same identification is implied in the passage, p. 16: "quod vero totum mundum unum animal dicit Plato, . . . maximum concordiam universorum Dei operum demonstrat . . . sic et Apostolus cum unitatem ecclesiae demonstrat unum corpus Christi appellat". Concerning the term *involucrum:* "In argumentum . . . est genus demonstrationis sub fabulosa narratione veritatis involven intel-

carefully avoids the expression of *anima mundi,* though he too considers the universe as an animated being; but he calls the unifying principle by the name of "nature".[75] Abaelard got involved in the difficulties which inevitably beset

lectum unde et involucrum dicitur". Bernardus Silvestris, *Comment. super VI LL. Eneidos Virgilii,* ed. G. Riedel (Greifswald, 1924). See also John of Salisbury, *Polycrat.* VIII, 24 (ed. Webb, II, 415). Thus it would seem as if Abaelard had made use only of an allegorical or symbolical expression, were it not that elsewhere he is quite explicit on the identity of the *anima mundi* and the *spiritus sanctus,* e.g. *Theol. Christ.* I, 4 (P.L. 178, 1156): "anima mundi quam, ni fallor, spiritum sanctum intellexerunt philosophi." *Ibid.* 1159: "ipse praeterea Macrobius ea quae de anima mundi a philosophis dicta sunt mystice interpretanda esse . . . meminit". The Council of Sens, 1140, repeats the condemnation of Soissons, listing among the errors condemned: "Quod spiritus sanctus sit anima mundi" (Denzinger, 370).

William of Conches, according to a fragment edited by C. Ottaviano, *Un brano inedito della 'Philosophia' di Guglielmo di Conches* (Naples, 1935), p. 17, quoted by Ostlender, *op. cit.* p. 17, reports on authors who considered the "anima mundi nichil aliud quam divina benignitas vel spiritus sanctus", whereas "alii dicunt eam esse quandam vigoren omnibus rebus inhaerentem . . . Haec anima . . . cum ipsa sit in homine et anima hominis similiter, videtur posse probari quod duae animae sunt in homine". See also *De philos. mundi,* I, 15 (P.L. 172, 46). Cf. above note 101. We are, however, not told who these *alii* were. In this regard one might refer to a fragment listed by Diels (4th ed.), I, 105 (Hippocrates, *De victu*), obviously concerning the World-Soul: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου καὶ σῶμα ὁμοίως ἡ ψυχὴ διακοσμεῖται. Anaxagoras used the expression πάντα διακόσμησε νοῦς, frag. 12; but this text was hardly known, nor were others, to the authors of the twelfth century. *Tim.* 37d, 5, however, has διακοσμῶν οὐρανόν, too.

For the rest, it must be admitted that those who made the *anima mundi* coincide with the *spiritus sanctus* might have found certain *auctoritates* on which to rely. Of course, these passages had to be interpreted in the particular spirit of these readers, they had to be somewhat twisted, but as Alanus said: "auctoritas habet cereum nasum qui in quamlibet potest flecti directionem." There are, especially, passages in St. Augustine which easily lend themselves to such an interpretation. Augustine was not in favor of the *anima mundi*-theory. But the students of Neo-Platonism, Dionysius, or Eriugena, found in the works of the Bishop of Hippo phrases like these: "Deus siquidem est rerum universitas ita quod nulla singularium" (*Lib. de spir. et anima,* II; P.L. 40, 788); "summe unum est et omnis formae principium"—did this not recall the Plotinian One? (*De gen. ad lit.* X, 32; P.L. 34, 234); or: "spiritus sapientiae multiplex (*Sap.* 7, 22) eo quod multa in se habet, sed quae habet haec et est et ea omnia unus est" (*De civ. Dei,* XI, 10, P.L. 41, 372). The latter statement seems to be influenced by *Enn.* VI, 2, 18: ἔστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς νοῦς ὃν μετὰ πάντων κατ' ἤδη πάντα ὄντα. Similar passages can be found in post-Augustinian texts. These ideas are still effective in Nicolaus Cusanus when he writes, for instance: "Universum licet non sit nec sol nec luna, est tamen in sole sol et in luna luna; Deus autem non est in sole sol et in luna luna, sed id quod est sol et luna sine pluralitate et diversitate;" *De docta ignor.* II, 4 (*Opp.* edd. E. Hoffmann and R. Klibansky, I, Leipzig 1931, p. 74). Also: "nec animam illam (sc. mundi) nec naturam aliud esse conicio quam Deum omnia in omnibus operantem quem dicimus spiritum universorum." *Liber de mente,* c. 13 (ed. Richter in E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance,* Leipzig 1927, p. 284).

[75] M. Baumgartner, *Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1896, vol. 2, 4), p. 80. Alanus seems to refer to the question when he remarks, *Dist.,* sub voce 'mundus' (P.L. 210, 866 B, C): "Dicitur sapientia Dei juxta quam mundus factus est, quae a prophetis dicitur archetypus mundi." Also: "Deus mediante natura

all Christian "Platonism, if it identifies the Logos-Christ with the νοῦς and the Holy Spirit with the universal soul, cannot maintain that the three Persons are co-equal".[76]

The idea that the universe is animated becomes with many, especially medieval, writers the reason for calling man the microcosm and for comparing the universe to man. Thus it had been with Philo, thus it remained through many centuries. Man is the true image of the universe because both are animated by souls.[77] The rationality of the World-Soul had been stressed by Macrobius and became a generally accepted doctrine.[78] The World-Soul is gifted with rationality, and the human souls, deriving from the former, owe to it their rational powers. They stand to their bodies much in the same relation as the World-Soul to the universe, insofar as both are the governing principles of their respective "bodies". Then, the micro-macrocosmic parallel becomes inescapable. Numenius ascribes such a view to Plato.[79] This view, however, endangers the uniqueness of the human person and was, accordingly, deemed inacceptable by several of the earlier Scholastics. Abaelard's criticism has been mentioned before.

Whether the human soul be a real part of the World-Soul or only, *qua* soul, of the same nature; in any case man, by possessing a spiritual soul, stands on the boundary where the material and the spiritual worlds meet. The two realms which otherwise appear as totally separated from one another become united by and in man. Thus, man not only is placed in the center of creation—

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res procreaturus," *Contra Haer.* I, 40 (P.L. 210, 345 D). Cf. Cicero, *De nat. deor.* II, 29: "natura est igitur quae contineat mundum . . . eumque tueatur."

[76] W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (3d. ed. London, 1939), p. 210. Such identifications managed to pass as long as the trinitarian doctrine was not yet fully defined. Clement, *Strom.* 4, 25; 5, 14; 7, 7; Theodoretus, 4, 750, do not hesitate to accept the immortal principles of the Platonists, the One, the νοῦς, and the World-Soul: "the One we call God the Father, νοῦς the Son or Logos, the soul The Holy Spirit". But Bernardus Silvestris, too, seems to identify *Noys* with the Son, or perhaps to designate Him by this name. E. Gilson, "La cosmogénie de Bernardus Silvestris", *Arch. d'Hist. Doctr. Lit. du M.-A.* 3 (1928), 12 ff.

[77] Alanus de Insulis, *Anticlaudianus*, (P.L. 210, 517 B): "Ut sic pygmaeus fraterculus esset gigantis / maiorisque minor mereatur image pingi." Adelard of Bath seems to suggest that the World-Soul loses somewhat its lofty spirituality by contact with matter, as the human soul is dragged down by the same reason; see: K. Werner, "Wilhelm von Auvergne's Verhältnis zu den Platonikern des XIIten Jahrhunderts", *Sitz. Ber. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss.*, Phil. Hist. Kl. 74 (1870), 120.

[78] Macrobius, *de somno Scip.* I, 14, 7: "habet purissiman de qua est nata rationem". Also Chalcidius, 292.: the universe has "animam et quidem rationabilem".

[79] Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* c. 2, PG. 40, 580: Πλάτων δὲ καὶ μίαν εἶναι καὶ πολλὰς τὰς ψυχὰς ἀποφαίνεται· μίαν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλας τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὡς ἴδια μὲν τὸ πᾶν ἐμψυχῶσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς παντὸς ψυχῆς . . . καὶ ζῇν μὲν πάντα, μὴ πάντα δὲ εἶναι ζῷα . . . Ζῇν οὖν λέγουσι καὶ τὰ πάντα ἄψυχα ἐκτικὴν ζωὴν, καθ' ὃ συνέχεται ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ὡς τὸ εἶναι μόνον καὶ μὴ διαλύεσθαι. Ταύτη δὲ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, τὴν διακυβερνῶσαν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὴν τὰς μερικὰς ψυχάς. Nemesius refers also to Theodorus the Platonist in the latter's treatise ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἔστι.

insofar as he is, so to speak, equidistant from the lowest and from the highest existential level—but he actually "holds together" the totality of being. The spiritual realm is conceived either as comprising only personal or personlike beings, like the angels, the *intelligentiae, anima mundi, νοῦς, ἕν,* God, or as the *mundus intelligibilis,* the realm of ideas. Both conceptions appear often together, although not without conditioning grave difficulties or inner tensions which sooner or later disrupt the system. Man's place among spiritual beings is defined already in the words of the eighth Psalm: *paulo minuisti eum ab angelis.* Statements to a similar intent may be found also in the writings of pagan philosophers.[80] St. Augustine calls man *medium quoddam; sed inter pecora et angelos . . . medius homo . . . infra angelis sed supra pecoribus; homini cum pecoribus mortalitatem, rationem vero cum angelis.*[81] Another formula says that the human soul is supratemporal and stands on the horizon of eternity.[82] Among the Schoolmen, Alanus de Insulis was apparently the first to use this expression.[83] Many others followed, among whom Gulielmus Parisiensis, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas.[84]

[80] Plato, *Tim.* 35a; Plotinus, *Enn.* V, 3; VI, 7, 6. Especially the stoic philosophy emphasized this view.

[81] St. Augustinus, *De civ. Dei,* IX, 13 (P.L. 44, 267); see also *De Trin.* XII, 4, 4; 7, 12; 12, 17 (P.L. 42, 1000, 1005, 1007). Many later writers repeated the ideas of the doctor gratiae, for instance, William of St. Thierry (see K. Werner, *Der Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie,* Denkschr. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl. 25, 82.), Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacr.* I, 4, 26, (P.L. 176, 246), also *Erud. theol.* VII, 14: "homo quasi in medio collocatus, habet super se Deum, sub se mundum"; Petrus Lombardus, *II. Sent.* 1, 7. In the thoughts of Augustine himself microcosmistic speculation holds but an insignificant place. His outlook is mainly "anthropological"; individual man is his problem; man who longs to live and is forced to die (*De civ. Dei,* XIV, 25); who wants to do his will and encounters obstacles inside and outside of himself (*Conf.* VIII, 9); who fights himself, "bellum adversus me gero" (*Ennar. in Psal.* 140, 11); who strives for the good and succumbs to evil; man in his relation to God: "Duo solum scire quaero. . . . Deum et animam." But man in his relation to the tangible world was not a question of much concern to St. Augustine.

[82] Thus the *Liber de causis,* cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Die pseudoaristotelische Schrift über das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis* (Freiburg i.B. 1882), p. 165. The expression "horizon" seems to go back, like so many others, ultimately to Stoic notions. Nemesius, whose dependence on Stoic philosophy is known and has been emphasized several times here, has the expression: *ἐν μεθορίοις νοητῆς καὶ αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας.*

[83] Baumgartner, *Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis,* p. 100, note 2. Alanus is the first Latin author whose writings show the influence of the *Liber de Causis.—Ibid.* pp. 10, 75, 93, references to Radulfus a Longo Campo, on whom see M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg i.B., 1911) II, 48. Radulfus speaks of the World-Soul and the *νοῦς* as of two invisible substances, distinct from God and the angels.

[84] On William of Auvergne (Parisiensis), see Baumgartner, *op. cit.* p. 19. On Albertus: K. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Albert des Grossen,* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA., 1903, Vol. 4, 5–6), p. 219. Also *De animalibus* 11. XXVI, 1, 22, tr. 1, c. 5 (ed. H. Stadler, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1920, vol. 16, p. 1355), where it is stated that the outstanding property of man is "quam dicit Hermes ad Esclepium scribens quod homo solus nexus est Dei et mundi." Also, Aquinas, *C.G.* II, 68. For the Hermetic texts

Whether because of the growing influence of Aristotelianism, or because certain intrinsic and extrinsic contradictions were more clearly realized, the idea of the World-Soul lost much of its appeal during the thirteenth century. It is less often mentioned. Alexander of Hales apparently is not interested in the question. Gulielmus is definitely hostile to the idea,[85] although he occasionally refers to some kind of symbolistic microcosmism. Still later, allusion is made to the *anima mundi* mainly to repudiate the idea. But it must have retained, together with the conception of the spiritual nature of the stars, a certain vitality, since a refutation is still thought worth while. Only much later, the *anima mundi* appears to Suarez as a mere superstition.[86]

The *anima mundi,* however, regained its prior importance with the philosophy of the Italian Renaissance. The revival of Platonism or, rather, Neo-Platonism was accompanied by a keen interest in all sorts of more or less related ideas. Some of them were quite fantastic. Not only did Neo-Pythagoreism reappear, with its speculations on numbers, but gnosis, cabbalah, together with astrology and magic, began to play a dominant rôle. Not that astrology had not been on the stage before. Its adepts had achieved great successes. They were advisers of princes, authors of much studied treatises, admired because of their alleged knowledge of the future, but also close to suspicion because of activities contrary to faith and morals.[87] Theologians and philosophers had been mostly antagonistic to astrology. The distinction made (see below, note 145) between two kinds of mathematics reveals the hostility against astrology among some leading minds of the twelfth century. St. Augustine had long ago voiced his objections. So did Aquinas. The critics, too, believed in an influence of the stars, but they emphasized the freedom of man and the unreliability of the astrologers' predictions.

It is, at first sight, somewhat amazing that the age which gave birth to the new science, which revived the study of the classics, and generally is considered

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see W. Scott, *Hermetica* (Oxford, 1924), I, 233. God willed that the κόσμος be a living being so long as it exists, that it have αἴσθησιν ἰδίαν καὶ νόησιν οὐχ ὁμοίαν τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ, p. 183. Also J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1914, vol. 12, 2–4).

[85] Gulielmus Parisiensis, *De universo*, I, 3, cc. 29–33 (*Opera*, Parisiis 1674; I, 801a ss.).

[86] E.g., Franciscus de Mayronis, *In II. sententiarum*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 (Venetiis 1520, f. 151rb): "Dico quod celi non sunt animati". On stars, *ibid.* d. 13, q. 1 (f. 154va–155rb). Suarez, *De superstitione*, II, 5 (*Opera*, Paris, 1859; 13, 485).

[87] Astrology and magic art—necromancy—were felt to be closely allied. The most famous astrologers did not escape suspicion. Dante places one of them in hell: "Michele Scoto che veramente delle magiche frode seppe il giuoco" (*Inf.* XX, 115). Magic appeared to Dante—however medieval his thoughts be—as a fraudulent activity. Cf. on Michael Scotus: Ch. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (Cambridge, Mass. 1925) and *Studies in Medieval Culture* (Oxford, 1929). In a consistent Aristotelean system, astrological prediction is out of place. As J. Moreau remarks (*L'Ame du monde chez Platon et les Stoïciens*, Paris, 1939, p. 149, n. 1): "chez Aristote, à mésure qu'on s'éloigne du premier ciel, la complication croissante des phénomènes donne lieu à la contingence et au disordre, exclut la régularité absolue et ne laisse subsister que la constance approchée". *Met.* E. 2 (1026 b 30): ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

as the beginning of the "modern times", should also have been an age of unrestricted belief in astrology and magic. This belief is partly a "scientific" view, corresponding to the state of knowledge of these times, and partly the logical outcome of certain basic conceptions concerning the plan of the universe as a whole. To be sure, critical voices were not absent. But the astrologers became important personalities in the universities and at the courts. Tycho de Brahe filled the post of an astrologer to the imperial court of Rudolph II, and so did after him Johannes Kepler. Wallenstein is known to have relied blindly on the predictions of his personal astrological adviser. The instances can be multiplied *ad libitum*. The belief in astrology was linked up, in the minds of the philosophers, with the microcosmistic conception. Marsilio Ficino, when discussing astrology,

> "starts with the statement that the universe is not an aggregate of dead elements, but a living being. Nowhere, accordingly, can there be in the universe mere 'parts', existing independently of the whole. What appears as a part is in truth an organ, having a definite place and function in the vital context of the cosmos. . . . Differentiation does not indicate separation of the part from the whole . . . but a particular mode by which the whole expresses itself."[88]

The astrological ideas acquired a still greater significance since the Renaissance "Platonists", Ficino himself and others, stressed a point in Neo-Platonism which had been originally of a subordinate importance. Plotinus had correlated the planets with some of the emanations. Saturnus became identical with νοῦς, and Jupiter with ψυχή, that is the World-Soul. Thus, Saturnus or the corresponding "sphere" represents the higher, Jupiter the lower emanation. Plotinus can hardly be understood as having conceived of the human soul as actually wandering through the "spheres" on its descent into matter. This idea would entail a direct procession of the individual soul from the One. But the human soul emanates from the ψυχή, and therefore cannot pass through the higher region of Saturnus or νοῦς. Late Neo-Platonism however had held such opinions.[89] For the Florentine Platonists it was obvious that the "children of Saturnus"—in ordinary judicial astrology the most unfortunate of all mortals —were in reality predestined for a life of intellectual contemplation, whereas the "children of Jupiter" were predestined for a life of rational action.[90]

[88] E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Renaissance* (Studien d. Bibl. Warburg, X, Leipzig, 1927), p. 116.

[89] Macrobius, *De somn, Scip.*, I. 12–14, explains that the soul receives in the Saturnic sphere "rationationem et intelligentiam quod λογιστκόν et θεωρητικόν vocant; in Jovis vim agendi quod πρακτκόν dicitur." The idea is Stoic as well as Oriental. Sextus Empiricus reports that Poseidonios believed in a descent of the human soul from sun and moon to the earth. *Adv. Math.* IX, 71b–73. See I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, II, 108. The idea of such a descent and, correspondingly, of an ἄνδρος of the soul after separation from the body is also found in the Hermetic texts. In descending, the soul acquires all kinds of impurities in the planetary spheres of which it is purified in its ascent: J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos*, p. 296.

[90] E. Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology. Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance* (New York, 1939), p. 209.

These speculations on the "spheres" and man's relation to them, the attempts to determine a person's fate by the study of "constellations" and such like ideas more, were, on the whole, but one aspect of the manyfold endeavors to reach a satisfactory conception of man's nature and place in the universe. However fantastic these speculations appear, they are ultimately dictated by a very rationalistic, even scientific attitude. The gradual weakening of traditional faith, the dissatisfaction with the formalistic teachings of philosophy on one hand, and the emphasis on "negative theology"—on the part of the mystics, but also of philosophers and theologians like Nicolaus Cusanus—on the other, forced the speculative and inquisitive mind to seek for a new interpretation of man's being. The increasing interest in the sensible world, too—an interest of which science and art give testimony—directed attention towards the universe as a whole. One cannot help being reminded of certain contemporary developments which sometimes strikingly look like a repristination of phenomena of the past. But it would lead us too far afield, were we to discuss the curious interest in occultism, astrology, and the like, which is noticeable today. However, one may consider the possibility that a more penetrating study of the history of ideas might throw some light also on our own times.

It has been said that in the age of the Great Renaissance man tried to understand his particular worth and himself as an inhabitant of the visible universe.[91] This tendency was, however, not altogether new. It was in fact the secularization of medieval speculation. But God seemed no longer as close to man as he had been in previous times, the emphasis on His transcendence, hiddenness and incomprehensibility notwithstanding. A theocentric conception of the world seemed no longer the only possible philosophical interpretation. God could be attained only in personal mystical experience. Speculation of the type common in previous centuries was no longer satisfactory. God had to be made immanent in the universe, as in Bruno's pantheism, or to be eliminated from philosophy and left to the theologians. The Averroistic cleavage between the "two truths" had furthered this development. At the beginning, reason tried to assert itself, also in regard to theological speculation; Ficino's *Docta Theologia* seems to be conceived in conscious opposition to Cusanus's *Docta Ignorantia.*

The microcosmistic ideas became an important link between humanistic rationalism and theological transcendentalism. But the intrinsic dialectic of these notions brought about, before long, disintegration and separation. Only then did Renaissance "Humanism" become more like the picture which the

[91] B. Groethuysen, *Philosophische Anthropologie*, (Hdb. d. Phil., Munich, 1931), p. 108: "In der weiteren Entwicklung der Renaissance-Anthropologie sucht der Mensch seinen Eigenwert von der Welt her zu erfassen: es verlangt ihn nach einer kosmischen Begründung seines Selbstbewusstseins." Pico della Mirandola, in fact, declares that man does not occupy a place in the scale of being, but rather stands outside of this order, being alone a microcosm and image of the Creator.

admirers of modernity love to draw.[92] Some of the forms which microcosmism took on in these centuries, and later, will be discussed in the last part of this article. Before passing on to the symbolistic interpretation, however, a few words must be said on a particular conception of the World-Soul, the theory namely that there are two of such souls, a good and a bad one. Related with these ideas are also certain doctrines of Oriental, especially Manichaean origin.

The mystical trend running through the philosophy of Plotinus is too well known to need any further expatiation. Neo-Platonism is also the first among pagan philosophies to emphasize the Ego. One may surmise that in this, too, Plotinus had been influenced by Judaeo-Christian ideas.[93] The shifting from the universal to the individual, from the eternal immutable world of ideas and the Good to personal fate and happiness, produced a definite alteration of original Platonism. This individualistic trend appealed to the thinkers of the Italian Renaissance and made them willing to consider notions of a rather heterogeneous nature.[94] The Oriental notes peculiar to Neo-Platonism, the general inclination towards all kinds of unusual ideas, the emphasis on individual man and his power, making magic a desirable thing because of the apparent influence to be gained over the world of things and spirits, all these trends co-operated to render the Renaissance mind susceptible for cabbalistic and similar vagaries. It is, perhaps, not without significance that a revival of

[92] E. Gilson, *Les idéas et les lettres* (Paris, 1932), p. 192.: "La Renaissance, telle qu'on nous la décrit, n'est pas le Moyen-Age plus l'homme, mais le Moyen-Age moins Dieu." Olgiati, *Lo spirito dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento* (Milan, 1926), p. 189.: "È la divinizzazione dell'uomo, della natura, della realtà; è la spiritualizzazione di tutto." This later development of Humanism has been characterized by Eichendorff as the "pride of the subject"—*der Hochmut des Subjects*—in which this German poet and historian sees the basic evil of the Renaissance and which, he felt, also destroyed German Romanticism.

[93] J. Stenzel, *Metaphysik des Altertums* (Hdb. d. Phil., Munich, 1931), p. 56: "Only seven hundred years after Parmenides did Greek philosophy refer to the self (ὁ ἐγώ, Plotinus) as a philosophical principle". It should, however, not be overlooked that a certain consideration of the self appears already in the later Stoa. See I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysiche Schriften*, I, 62 f. W. Jaeger has, in fact, suggested that Panaitios is the real founder of Neo-Platonic philosophy. Heinemann makes Poseidonios the ancestor of Plotinus. *ibid.* p. 59, n. 2.

[94] E. Hoffmann, "Platonismus und Mystik im Altertum", *Sitz. Ber. Heidelberg. Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl.* 1939, Abh. 35, thinks that the development of Platonic philosophy towards mysticism is the effect of a twofold deformation of two authentical Platonic themes, the idea of diversity in reality, united by μέθεξις, and the idea of the soul. Ideas and τἀγαθόν are both primary and irreducible; there is no *processio*. The falsification consists in placing the individual soul in the center, making of individual happiness the main issue, and therefore postulating the presence of God in all things: Neo-Platonic emanationism. The "presence of God" of which Hoffmann speaks, is probably of Christian or Judaeo-Christian origin. The notion of God, at the same time transcendent and immanent, governing the world and maintaining it by the *concursus*, is however not quite a new theme in the polyphony of Greek thought, since the late Stoa harbored similar notions.

some of these Oriental systems, particularly Manichaeism, had occurred in close relation to the Renaissance of the twelfth century in the Albigensian heresy.[95] In the context of the present survey it is irrelevant whether this metaphysical and cosmological dualism has its first origin in Iranian thought or elsewhere. In any case, it reached the Mediterranean world through its many contacts with the East and became more influential when the mixture of cultures developed further.

The main representative of the theory of two World-Souls is, in late Greek speculation, indubitably Plutarchus.[96] He teaches the existence of an evil World-Soul. Manichaeism combines this notion in a curious manner with microcosmism. "The five gods or luminous bodies are represented as good forces which imprisoned five kinds of demons; but the devil had his revenge by imprisoning luminous forces in man whom he made a miscrocosm".[97] Plutarchus too establishes, after the fashion of microcosmism, a parallel between the universe and individual man. To the two World-Souls corresponds a duality in man.[98] There is nothing, apparently, in Plutarchus of an actual war between the good and the evil principle as in Persian religion, although he was acquainted with these doctrines. The fight between the two World-Souls was part of the teachings of Numenius of Apamea.[99] Chalcidius refers to Numenius, without however mentioning the idea of a war between the two principles. According to this source, Numenius identifies the evil soul with matter.[100, 101]

[95] Besides the known sources, there is now available an edition of an authenic Albigensian treatise: *Un traité Néo-Manichéen du XIIIe siècle, Le Liber de duobus principiis*, ed. A. Dondaine (Rome, 1939).

[96] "Plutarchus comes nearer to the Manichean solution than any other Greek thinker. The imperfection of the world cannot come from God . . . we must therefore assume two principles. . . . The evil principle cannot be Matter, because we find evil to be a positive active thing, such as could not proceed from anything so characterless and indetermined as Matter. There must be a spiritual power of evil which may best be designated as an evil World-Soul". W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, I, 90. The idea of the two souls is, however, adumbrated by Plato himself, *Leg. X*, 896c, 906a, and emphasized in the post-Platonian *Epinomis*. Thus, it becomes somewhat doubtful whether Plutarchus depends exclusively on Eastern sources.

[97] L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, (New York, 1923), I, 382.

[98] E.g. *De virt. mor.* 3; *De anim. procreat.* 28: *τὴν ψυχὴν σύμφυτον ἔχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ μοῖραν.* He argues also that the chaos must have a soul, and since the chaos is the opposite of the *κόσμος*, the chaotic soul must be evil.

[99] Jamblichus, in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I; 844.

[100] Chalcidius, *In Tim.* §295: "Platonem idem Numenius laudat quod duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, sc. silvam quae fons malorum est". The correctness of this statement is questioned by Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, I, 91. He rather thinks that the anima maligna rules over matter, as in Plutarchus, being a principle acting on matter from without.

[101] P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele bei Plotin* (1929), p. 36, note 1, finds two souls also in the philosophy of Plotinus. One has to distinguish the World-Soul, *ψυχὴ*

Of the confused Manichaean doctrine, one point deserves mention since it introduces the idea of a real descent. Both in Gnosticism and in Manicheism the term ψυχή is applied to various entities. Sometimes it is the primeval man, ὁ Ἄνθρωπος; sometimes the elements which are not liberated by the "spirit of life" and remain under the domination of darkness receive this name.[102] The Ἄνθρωπος falls from the higher into the lower spheres, into darkness (σκότος) and becomes somehow united with the World-Soul. In other passages however, there is no real downfall, but only an illumination proceeding from the Ἄνθρωπος above into the lower spheres.

It is difficult to say, without further investigation, how far these Oriental ideas influenced in detail Western speculation. This is also the case with cabbalistic ideas. True, Pico is very enthusiastic about them, and so are several others, partly dependent on him. But one would have to distinguish between the original doctrine of the cabbalah and the sense read into the work by those who studied it during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

3. *Holistic Microcosmism*

Within this interpretation any "organized whole" may be considered as a reproduction of the macrocosm or the universe. This idea can be attained by developing further the conception of the universe as an animated being. Then every other living organism, especially of course man, because of his spirituality, appears as a microcosm. Whatever else appears as a whole, such that its parts are subservient to the whole, may be conceived in a similar manner as an image of the universe. The prototype of this conception is the organismic or organic theory of the state. An organism is the reproduction of the living cosmos; the state is an organism fashioned according to the same principles as an animal, or man; ergo, the state is a microcosm. The same result can be reached also by a somewhat different syllogism. The state is an organism, because of its many analogies to a living being. The universe is considered as a well ordered state and thus becomes, too, an organism. The analogy of state and universe can be worked out also independently of animation. The *tertium comparationis,* or rather the property common to both state and cosmos, is then the principle of order.

Whether starting from the notion of organism or from that of civic order, the analogy leads to the idea of the *res publica universi.* This idea allows for various modifications. It can be made the basis for the demonstration of a ruling cosmic power, personal or impersonal. It develops, eventually, in a special form of the so-called physico-teleological proof for the existence of God. One

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τοῦ παντός, and a superior psychic principle comprising both individual souls and World-Soul, μία ψυχή. But there is no trace of an *anima maligna.* Whether Kristeller's interpretation is tenable or not is of no concern here.

[102] See the informative work of W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (Göttingen, 1907), pp. 178, 181.

also might conceive of the universe as a republic in the strictly political sense of the term, so to speak as a democracy of cosmic powers or stellar spirits. No such conception seems to exist in history. Apparently, man conceived whenever he thought of the universe in terms of political order, the order as of the monarchical type.

The most common form of holistic microcosmism is no doubt the one based on the analogy to the organism. This fact creates a certain difficulty for W. Jaeger's theory that the political order, the πόλις, supplied the Greek mind with the main principle of cosmological interpretation. Since this type of microcosmism pertains more to the history of political theory than to philosophy or a general history of ideas, it will be dealt with only briefly. Some few quotations will suffice.[103]

In ancient and medieval times, imagination discovered many analogies between the human organism, the state, and the universe. *In hac republica deus est imperans, angelus operans, homo obtemperans.* To these three instances correspond in man *sapientia, voluntas, voluptas: Sapientia imperantis suscipit vicem . . . voluptas usurpat obtemperantis imaginem.*[104] Since the *res publica universi* and individual man stand in microcosmic relations, any *res publica* may be compared to individual man. There is an endless number of such remarks. Most of them seem to depend on Plutarchus: *Est autem respublica, sicut Plutarcho placet, corpus quoddam quod divini muneris beneficio animatur.* John of Salisbury goes on to carry through the analogy in detail. *Ea . . . quae ad cultum religionis . . . vicem animae, . . . obtinent. Princeps vero capitis . . . obtinet locum . . . cordis locum senatus*, etc.[105] The individual citizens are analogous to the members of the human body, an idea

[103] A more detailed discussion would entail a study on the origin and the legitimacy of the notion of *persona moralis* and therefore a lengthy digression on various juridical and political conceptions. Interesting though the relations be between organismic microcosmism and the idea of *persona moralis,* they are beyond the scope of this article.

[104] Alanus de Insulis, *De planctu naturae* (P.L. 210, 444 A–D). The passage goes back to Chalcidius. Cf. Augustinus, *De civ. Dei,* VII, 14 (P.L. 41, 238). But already Chrysippus had made similar statements. The notion of the world as a πολιτεία may even be older. Cf. I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, II, 283; Cicero, *De republ.* VI, 61. A more detailed analysis would have to consider the manifold relations of this holistic conception with the Stoic principle of συμπάθεια. Marcus Aurelius, for instance, refers to this principle as the foundation of both cosmic and civic order. See K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie* (München, 1926), p. 178 ff. St. Augustine uses the words *compassio* and *conspiratio*, by way of translations of συμπάθεια and σύμπνοια. *De Trin. XIII*, c. 3, 6 (P. L. 42, 1017).

[105] Joannes Sarisberensis, *Policraticus*, V, 2–4 (P.L. 199, 540), also VI, 1–35 (*ibid.* 589 ss.). On the universe as a *res publica* in writers of late Antiquity see, e.g. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften,* I, 130, where special reference is made to Philo Judaeus, *Spec. Leg.* I, 13. Diogenes Laertius, however (Diels, I, 293), lists the idea as of Anaxagoras. See also Plato, *Repub.* IX, 592 a, b.

strangely reminiscent of very recent conceptions and no doubt threatening, by an easy exaggeration, the dignity and the rights of the individual person.[106]

This analogy, however arbitrary and superficial it may appear to many modern minds, appealed obviously to a great number of writers, even up to rather recent times. It is mentioned not only by authors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,[107] but even by Suarez and Molina, who conceived of the state as a body governing its limbs, just as John of Salisbury; and Nicolaus Cusanus or Marsilius of Padua likened the powers of government to the organic functions within the body.[108] Even in Thomas Hobbes' and Gassendi's political theories the same ideas are utilized.[109] The latter refers expressly to Plutarchus as his source.

Some have expatiated on this analogy by comparing or identifying the Church with the soul, the State with the body, and likened their mutual relations to those obtaining in the human person. When the state comes to be considered as a real person, the organismic microcosmism blossoms out in quite fantastic theories. Sometimes, especially in earlier times, the expression is used merely as an analogy;[110] others, however, seem to believe that the state is actually a living person.[111]

4. *Symbolistic Microcosmism*

It has been remarked before that it is not easy to distinguish between the symbolistic and other types of microcosmism. Especially with many medieval

[106] On the citizens as members or organs, see e.g. Joannes Sarisberensis, *Policraticus,* V, 1; Aquinas, *De regim. princ.* I, 12.

[107] Aquinas (or Tholomaeus of Lucca?) *De regim. princ.* II, 7; IX, 11, 25. Engelbert of Admont, *De ortu et fine imperii Romani,* III, 16. Nicolaus Cusanus, *De concord.* I, 10; 14–17; III, 1; 41. Marsilius Patavensis, *Defens. pacis,* I, 2. In c. 15 he calls the *anima universalitatis* the *principium factivum* of the state.

[108] See O. v. Gierke, *The Development of Political Theory,* tran. B. Freyd (New York, 1939), p. 208 ff. and note 117.

[109] Hobbes' theories of the state as organism are well known. The organismic conception becomes, however, in his hand a pure mechanism, in accordance with the general trend of his philosophy and the Cartesian conception of the body. Gassendi's ideas can be found, for instance, in Petri Gassendi *Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii . . . de vita . . . placitisque Epicuri* (ed. IIIa, Lugduni, 1547), I, 375b–376a. Cr. also G. S. Brett, *The Philosophy of Gassendi,* (London, 1908), p. 23, on the World-Soul; p. 140, where the origin of the human souls from the World-Soul is denied.

[110] E.g. Aegidius Romanus, *De regim.* III, 2, c. 3., quoted by O. v. Gierke. *The Development of Political Theory,* p. 196, note 56: "plures homines principantes quasi constituunt unum hominem multorum oculorum et multarum manuum". The "body politic", whether constituted by some few ruling persons in an oligarchy, or by the whole people in a democracy, thus becomes "quasi" a person.

[111] The conception of the *persona moralis* varies from a mere legal fiction to the idea of an actually existing being of personal nature. The latter view is found, e.g., with J. Chr. v. Wolff, who claims that the state must be regarded as a single person (*Institut.* §850) and thus has as much right to defend itself against any other person, for instance the individual citizen who commits an offense against the "person" of the state. (§1030).

writers, the symbolistic trend is quite general and the symbolic reference is taken for granted. No special mention, therefore, is made when an author shifts from, e.g., the structural to the symbolistic interpretation, sometimes without noticing it himself. One has not to forget that symbolism does not deny to the phenomenon or to the nature of things either reality or significance. Things remain what they are, but they acquire, in the light of symbolistic interpretation, another, higher significance besides their natural one.

Symbolism becomes patricularly complicated when envisioned on the background of a world conception which admits several levels of being. Then, anything on a lower level may be a symbolic representative of something pertaining to a higher level, which in turn refers to a still higher form of being. Ultimately, all the levels of being become, according to their natures, symbols of the last and highest reality, God. The often quoted word of St. Paul that the visible things of this world draw us towards the invisible things of God is understood not only in the sense of rational contemplation. Not only by realizing that the contingence of things points at a necessary cause, that the order of the universe reveals a creative intelligence, and what other speculations there may be, but by directly "reading the book of reality", by translating its "signs" into the reality they indicate, we attain some knowledge of the wonders beyond.

This type of interpretation is applied primarily to the Scriptures. Persons and facts as told in the Scriptures prefigure the advent of the Savior and His work of redemption. Similarly, everything and every event reveals something pertaining to the eternal plans and works of God. This world bears the imprint of the creative mind of God. The *vestigia trinitatis* are everywhere. Any of the Holy Books has a symbolic besides the literal meaning. From St. Gregory's interpretation of the Canticles up to the late Middle Ages an endless number of such treatises were written.

This symbolism, however, is no longer strictly of the nature of microcosmism. The microcosm is envisaged not as a reproduction of the macrocosm, but as created *in imaginem et similitudinem Dei.*[112] The manyfold speculations on the symbolic significance of created things must, accordingly, be ignored in the present context. They had some influence on microcosmism *s.str.*, since the doctrine of the Trinity stimulated the imagination to speculate on numbers and thus contributed to arouse interest in Pythagorean or Neo-Pythagorean ideas. Long before mathematics developed into a true science and long before its practical value became evident, the mysterious properties of numbers fascinated the speculative minds. But number-symbolism is only one form of symbolistic interpretation. Number is, because of its properties and applicability, a symbol of relatively easy accessibility. It can function as a name (Sixtus, Octavus, etc.). It determines eventually man's fate (every tenth

[112] "Imago est expressa similitudo," Augustinus, *LXXXIII Quaest.* q. 74 (P.L. 40, 86); "vestigium est inexpressa similitudo", Alexander Halensis, *Summa Theol.* I-II, inq. 1, tr. 1, s. 2, q. 1, (Quarachi, 1927; II, 46, n. 36).

man). It represents wealth and thus confers a particular worth on a person; he is, for instance, "a millionaire". The knowledge of time and distance is expressed by numbers, and so on. No wonder, that number excited the curiosity already in early times.

There is a symbolism of names. There is one of things. One has, however, to beware of a hasty identification of the highly developed medieval—or, to a certain extent, also ancient—symbolism with the "symbolic thought" allegedly characteristic of primitive mentality. There is little of so-called "magic thinking" in medieval symbolism. The "law of participation"[113] is not effective in medieval symbolism. The tangible things do not participate in the higher reality, they are analogical to it. This is something very different from primitive participation and even from the Platonic μέθεξις. The notion of analogy was always active in the minds of the Scholastics, also before this principle had been expressly defined and applied by the Aristoteleans of the thirteenth century.

Analogy is a principle of the whole realm of being. But no thing loses, by virtue of any analogy, its proper nature. This is true of concrete things and of universals, of existing things and of *entia rationis*. Numbers may have all kinds of symbolic signification, and their relations may reveal others of a much loftier dignity; but numbers remain, nonetheless, modes by which to express adequately the quantitative aspect of reality. The laws of mathematics are as such in no way laws of suprasensory reality; as such, they are just true propositions on the "behavior" of numbers; but they "express" also truths concerning a realm of a very different nature.[114]

Some of the old Pythagoreans had, as reported above, attributed definite numbers to things or species of things. Because of this, a true identity of micro-

[113] This law has been emphasized and definitely overrated by Lévy-Bruhl and his many followers. There is no doubt that it exists and plays a great rôle in primitive thought. But it is active only under rather specific conditions, and by far not the universal principle of reasoning, even with the most primitive peoples.

[114] The distinction between ideal or symbolic numbers and numbers as the proper object of mathematical science is already clearly stated by Plato, *Phil.* 55c; *Polit.* 238d–285c. The understanding of medieval texts is sometimes rendered difficult because there is a third meaning of mathematics: *mathematica* often means astrological calculation and theory. Augustine distinguishes two meanings, a scientific and a superstitious one. *De doctrina Christ.* II, 28 (P.L. 34, 56), and others followed him, e.g. Abaelard, *Expos. in Hexaemer.* (P.L. 178, 755), where he condemns astrological procedures; see also *Dialect.* (ed. V. Cousin, IV, 435). Some tried to prevent confusion by suggesting different spellings. Hugh of St. Victor wants *matesis* to be the name of the superstitious practice, and *mathesis* to be used for the sound doctrine, *Didascal.* II, c. 3 (ed. Ch. H. Buttimer, Diss. Washington, D. C., 1939, p. 24). John of Salisbury distinguishes the two meanings by pronunciation, *máthesis* (with the accent on the *a*) naming the science, *mathésis* (with a long *e*), the superstition: *Policrat.* II, 18 (ed. Webb, p. 102). The same distinction is in the *Graecismus* of Eberhard of Bethune (ed. Wrobel, p. 85): "scire facit máthesis, sed divinare mathésis". Mathematical or numerical symbolism, however, received no particular name.

and macrocosmos appears not possible. The universe cannot have, or be, the same number as any of its parts.[115] But the universe may comprise, as a bigger number, the numbers of its parts. It is not perfectly clear whether Old- and Neo-Pythagoreanism interpreted numbers as symbols or saw in them the true essence of things. The same uncertainty prevails in regard to other schools which united speculation in numbers with their own ideas. Among these, Neo-Platonism stands in the first place, although there is a good deal of Neo-Pythagorean ideas also in the various Stoic philosophies. In Neo-Platonism

"the arithmetical symbolism of the older (sc. Pythagorean) school was given a deeper metaphysical meaning. The Monad and the Indefinite Dyad became metaphysical categories of wide scope. By the name of the One, the ground of all good, of all perfection and order, and of all imperishable and unchangeable being, was indicated. The Dyad was the ground of all imperfection and badness, of disorder and change. The Monad was the sign of the Godhead, of Spirit, of Form; the Dyad of Matter, as the root of all evil."[116]

The symbolic significance of numbers depends, of course, on many factors. Although the Monad retained much of its importance also during the Middle Ages, the Three there plays, for obvious reasons, a prodominant rôle. It has been, however, emphasized also by pagan writers like Xenocrates, Proclus, and others. These details need not concern us here.[117]

[115] A. Cameron, *The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of Recollection* (Columb. Univ. Diss,. Menasha, Wis. 1938), believes that to "have" number means, with the original Pythagoreans, "to be" such a number. This is not even certain of the older schools, and it definitely does not apply to later and medieval systems.

[116] W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus,* I, 84.

[117] There is an extensive literature on number symbolism in old, medieval and modern times, pagan, Jewish, Christian, and Arabian. Some references are given in H. Fl. Dunbar, *Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divina Commedia* (New Haven, 1929), especially pp. 501, 505, and in the bibliography. Further information in D. Mahnke, *Unendliche Sphäre. Beiträge zur Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik* (Halle a.S., 1937). The question is mentioned, incidentally, by A. Dempf, *Sacrum Imperium* (Munich, 1929) and by many other authors.

A few passages will suffice to illustrate medieval ideas on numbers. Most of the relations established by the writers have their antecedents in Stoic texts and in others dependent on the former. The relation of the One to the male, of the two to the female sex, e.g., is mentioned in the Hermetic treatises. J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos,* p. 51 ff. It might be pointed out, incidentally, that this symbolism has deeper roots than the rather cheap fancy of the Freudian psychoanalysts is able to discover. Many passages in the philosophers of Chartres deal with such problems. Thierry declares: "Unitas . . . est omnipotens in creatione numerorum; sed creatio numerorum est rerum creatio; unitas igitur est omnipotens in rerum creatione": B. Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits,* I (Paris 1890). The triad *causa efficiens, formalis, finalis* is repeated in *unitas, aequalitas, unitatis aequalitatisque connexio:* M. H. Vicaire, "Les Porrétains et l'Avicennisme avant 1250", *Rev. Scienc. Phil. Théol.* 26 (1937), 467, note. Bernardus Silvestris, *De universitate,* etc. II, II (ed. Barach-Wrobel, p. 35): "Induxi rebus formas. elementa ligavi / Concordem numero conciliante fidem". Alanus de Insulis, *Anticlaudianus* (P.L. 210, 514 D): "Quae numeri virtus, quae lex, quis nexus et ordo / Nodus, amor, ratio, foedus, concordia, limes", characterizes number; the relation of even and odd numbers is back of the fol-

Among the many statements on numbers, there is one which deserves brief consideration. The others may be left aside, since they contribute nothing essentially new. Many authors refer to a word of Xenocrates, *qui ipsam animam numerum esse definivit dicens:* "anima est numerus se movens."[118] Xenocrates was the second *scholarchos* of the Academy after Plato. With him, the Pythagorean trend, noticeable already in the *Epinomis* (of questionable genuineness), became stronger. His predecessor, Speusippus had abandoned the Platonic theory of ideas and made the mathematical numbers the source of everything. Xenocrates did not resume Plato's distinction between ideal and mathematical numbers, but he returned to the Platonic ideas insofar as he identified them with mathematical numbers. Thus, numbers became, at once, the ideal nature of things and were endowed with a higher reality. He is, in fact, reported to have spoken of the soul as a number moving itself. Apparently he had in mind the World-Soul. This statement, although original with Xenocrates, was attributed by many to Pythagoras, whose words the Athenian philosopher was supposed to have repeated. This is also the opinion of Nemesius who well may have been the source for Adelhard and the other twelfth-century

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lowing dichotomies: male-female, body-soul, earth-heaven, sense-reason, grief-joy, death-life (*Ibid.* 515 B). Hugh of St Victor, *Didascalion,* II c. 7 (ed. Ch. H. Buttimer, p. 30): "virtus autem numeri est, quod ad eius similitudinem cuncta formata sunt". It is easy to see how the One symbolizes God and how the Godhead comes to be represented by, or even identified with the Monad. The Monad, positing itself again, brings forth at the same time another Monad, equal to the first—*monas gignit monadem,* as one reads frequently—and also the *alleritas* or *pluralitas.* However, the dyad of which the ancient symbolists spoke is the ἀόριστος δύας, the indeterminate πλῆθος, not just the number two. A fragment of Xenocrates, *Aet.* I, 7, 30, already identifies the *anima mundi* with the *dyas.* Thus, there is a number-symbolism for the *processio Dei ad intra* as well as *ad extra.* One understands, accordingly, that Alanus can say (P. L. 210, 642): "Sola monas existit . . . cetera vere non sunt." This remark may depend on a passage in Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita which is rendered by Scottus Eriugena, *De divin. nom.* (P. L. 122, 1169 C): "non est multitudo non participans quid unius"; the original text reads: οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι πλῆθος ἀμέτοχόν πη τοῦ ἑνός (P. G. 3, 980 A; see also 820 D, whereof the translation is in P. L. 122, 1149 A). These examples will do to characterize what E. Cassirer not unjustly calls the "process of divinization and canonization of number." *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,* II (Berlin, 1925), p. 179. The characterization which Aristotle gives of the Pythagoreans, that they always wanted to discover everywhere likenesses to numbers, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐδόκουν θεωρεῖν ὁμοούματα πολλὰ τοῖς οἶσι καὶ γιγνομένοις (*Met.* A; 988 b 27), applies equally to the medieval writers.

[118] Adelhard of Bath, in H. Willner, *Des Adelhard von Bath Traktat De eodem et diverso* (Beitr. z. Gesch. Phil. d. MA. 1903 vol. 4, 1), p. 23. Adelhard, however, is not willing to accept this definition: "cum nullus numerus se ipsum moveat, anima autem se ipsam moveat, eam numerum esse non intelligamus." On this author, see Fr. Bliemetzrieder, *Adelhard von Bath* (Munich, 1935). The comparison, however, may stand considering the particular dignity of number. On the eminence of number, see, e.g., Augustinus, *De lib. arbitr.* II, 16, 42 (P.L. 32, 1263–1264): "Intuere caelum et terram . . . formas hominum quia numeros hominum . . . adime illic haec, nihil erunt. A quo ergo sunt nisi a quo numerus. . . . Inspice iam pulchritudinem formati corporis, numeri tenetur in loco . . . nobilitatem in corpore, numeri versantur in tempore".

authors who quote the theory of Xenocrates,[119] there is however also a passage in Macrobius.

The interpretation of the sentence of Xenocates and of other similar enunciations is not easy. The modern mind is accustomed to quite another idea of numbers. We read with amazement that the Pythagoreans solemnly invoked number as the "Father of the Blessed."[120] Whether the soul is called a number moving itself or simply defined, as by Plato, as that which moves itself, in any case the particular nature of the soul and its kinship to the highest power are emphasized. It seems that the Xenocratian declaration was perfectly intelligible to the ancients. Whenever it is quoted, it is so without any expression of wonder or without the need of any further explanation being felt. Whatever the sense was in which this statement was understood, it contributed to strengthen the microcosmic conceptions. From the moment onwards when the ancient mind alighted at the notion of mathematical laws governing the universe, any reference to numbers playing a rôle in the big and the small world emphasized their similarities. (On "law of nature", see above note 16.)

In Pythagoreism the "arithmetical" considerations were closely linked to the notion of "harmony". One can hardly overestimate the impression which the discovery must have made that musical harmony is founded on measurable

[119] Nemesius, *De nat. Homin.* (P.G. 40 569 A): Πυθαγόρας δὲ συμβολικῶς εἰκάζεν ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πάντα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς εἰωδὼς, ὡρίσατο καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα· ᾧ καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἠκολούθεσεν· οὐχ ὅτι ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πεπληθωσμένοις. Cicero too reports that Xenocrates "animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse, verum numerum dixit esse," *Tuscul.* I, 10, 20. Plutarchus, *Plac. philos.* IV, 2: Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα (τὴν ψυχήν). On Macrobius' *anima numerus se ipsum movens*, cf. Th. Whittaker, *Macrobius* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 60. J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde chez Platon et les Stöiciens* (Paris, 1939), p. 51, n. 3., apparently interprets Xenocrates' words as if they were a mere metaphor. He writes: "l'âme . . . ne peut être representée que sous la forme de la totalité organique, comme système autonome de relations. Tel est le sens de la définition de Xénocrate." But it does not seem that ancient writers did understand Xenocrates in this manner. For the Platonic root of this definition, see *Tim.* 35b 1–3; A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 111. In later times, this theory of number became associated with Neo-Platonic emanationism. Thus, it is understandable that Campanella calls the numbers "rays of God disseminated throughout the universe", Fr. Olgiati, *Lo spirito dell' Umanesimo e del Rinascimento*, p. 472.

[120] Simplicius, *In Phys*, III, 4 (ed. Diels, *Comm. Aristotel. Graec.* 9, 453, 9: ὃν ὑμνοῦντες λέγουσι (οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι): κέκλυθι, κύδιμ' ἀριθμέ, πάτερ μακάρων, πάτερ ἀνδρῶν. By assimilating, however, some of the spirit of old, one arrives, as it seems, to an understanding. The number invoked is, one may surmise, not number as such, but one number, namely the One. The One is more than a symbol of the *Urgrund* of being; it *is* this ultimate source of everything. Xenocrates had, as reported by A. E. Taylor (*A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 112), declared that the One and the multitude, πλῆθος, are indefinables. The latter is everything not the One, diversity, multiplicity, and so on. It is, accordingly, also change, since change presupposes multitude or results in it. One need only to arrange the invocation differently to get an acceptable sense: Father of all, who art the indefinable, sublime One.

proportions. To the students of that time, it must have seemed as if suddenly a bright and altogether new light were shed on the mysteries of this world. Two totally heterogeneous fields of experience revealed themselves not only as related to one another, but as identical: both were founded on number.

No inquisitive mind could fail to seek for an explanation of this wonderful new fact. The Pythagorean answer was to make reality to consist in, or at least to be adequately expressed by, number. But this explanation proves unsatisfactory as soon as the mind overcomes the first shock which this unexpected, fantastic, and bold statement arouses. The further elaboration of the idea into the conception of the "harmony of the spheres", too, demands a metaphysical foundation. Science may be content with correlations and functions. But common sense as well as philosophy ask for more. To renounce any further attempt at penetrating into the secrets of reality is not a sign of wisdom but of intellectual cowardice.

The will and the courage for far reaching metaphysical construction had been very much alive during the great years of Greek speculation. It had lost much of its impetus at the end of Antiquity. But once more it rose to an imposing height in Neo-Platonism. This philosophy endeavored to synthesize the basic elements of all the other currents then existing and to develop an all-comprising theory of being. Plotinus attempted to realize this synthesis by means of the notion of emanation. The emanations, however unlike the original One they be, retain traces of their origin. There is a certain parallelism between Plotinic and Christian conceptions. To the *vestigia Trinitatis* there, corresponds what one might call the *vestigia unius* here. The lower emanations particularly retain features proper to their proximate source, the World-Soul. Harmony is believed to have its origins in proportions within the World-Soul.[121] Later Neo-Platonism, especially during the Middle Ages, derived this idea from still another source. The Neo-Pythagorean speculation of number had been incorporated into the Stoic system by Poseidonios, in a commentary on *Timaeus,* and from there had passed into the commentary of Chalcidius which is known to have been most influential until the arising of Aristotelianism and the spreading of the original Platonic texts.[122]

The relation between human music, inner harmony, and the harmony of the

[121] Macrobius, *De Somm. Scip.* passim, especially II, 34. Macrobius depends on a Latin translation of some Neo-Platonic commentary on *Timaeus,* probably by Porphyry. M. Schedler, *Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mittelalters,* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1916, vol. 13, 1), p. 3f, Plotinus himself refers to the movement of the stars as being like the harmony of a lyre; ὥσπερ χορδαὶ ἐν λύρᾳ συμπαθῶς κινηθεῖσαν, *Enn. IV*, 4, 8. Harmony being rooted in the World-Soul is often mentioned. See, e.g., Adelhard of Bath, in H. Willner, *Des Adelhard von Bath Traktat De eodem et de diverso,* pp. 25, 27.

[122] See M. Schedler, *Die Philosophie des Macrobius,* p. 23, note. B. W. Switalski, *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Platos Timaeus* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1902, vol. 3, 6), p. 86.

spheres, therefore the cosmic law, explains the high esteem in which music was held throughout medieval times. Some writers, indeed, have felt the need to justify this esteem accorded to a rather profane art, but most of them approve of music without any misgivings and emphasize its symbolic and metaphysical significance.[123] Following Boethius the authors distinguish *musica mundana, humana, instrumentalis*.[124] The references to the *musica mundana* seem, with some, not more than a poetical image.[125] But an image used first in way of an illustration easily turns, at least with the medieval mind, into a true symbol. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain which significance prevails.

Music and harmony are important factors in the microcosmistic view. Through music and harmony the micro- and macrocosms appear to be related in a particular manner. One is perhaps not wrong in comparing the function of music in the cosmological systems of previous times to the rôle mathematics play in today's world conception. Just as the abstract mathematical laws, in a sense, precede the concrete physical happenings, so music precedes, according to Boethius, the movements of the stars.[126] Since music and mathematics are made to coincide, the statement of Boethius is in accordance with St. Augustine's assertion that numbers and their laws are higher than even human rea-

[123] The suggestions for justification of music are sometimes rather quaint. See, for instance, the curious statements of Rupertus Tuciensis (of Deutz), *De trinitate et operibus eius XII. De Spiritu sancto,* VII, 16 (P.L. 167, 1779–1780), where the proportions of the numbers of the just (*Gen.* 18) mentioned by Abraham to God are found to be the same as those of musical intervals and thus to justify the study of music.

[124] E.g. Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae,* ed. L. Baur, (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1903, vol. 4, 13–14), p. 241. He defines *modulatio* as "quaecumlibet rerum diversarum concors modificatio" (*ibid.* p. 96), thus indicating the general applicability of "music".

[125] Thus, when Claudianus Mamertus speaks of the four elements "quae moderate et musice concinunt," *De statu animae, I, 22* (C. SS E. XI, 73). Or Honorius Augustodunensis, *Liber XII quaest.* c. 2 (P.L. 172, 1197B): "Summus opifex universum quasi magnam citharam condidit in veluti varias chordas ad multiplices sonos reddendas posuit." *Quasi* and *veluti* seems to indicate a mere metaphor. But the same author elsewhere is very definite on the reality of this *musica mundana.* The idea of harmony appears in combination with man the microcosm in a passage which Scotus Eriugena designates as *verba praedicti magistri* (i.e. of Maximus Confessor), *De div. nat. II,* 4 (P.L. 122, 530 D): "[homo] officina omnium iure applelatur; in ea siquidem omnia conferunt, quae a Deo condita sunt unamque harmoniam ex diversis naturis veluti quibusdam distantibus sonis composuit." Cf. the excellent study by J. Handschen, "Die Musikanschauung des Johannes Scotus (Erigena)", *Deutsche Vierteljahrschr. d. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch.* 5 (1927), 316.

[126] Boethius, *Inst. arithm.* I, 1: "constant musicae vim astrorum cursus praecedere". So also Cassiodorus, *De artibus* (P.L. 70, 1208 F): "Pythagoras hunc mundum per musicam conditum et gubernari posse testatur". Isidorus Hispalensis, *Etymol.* III, 17: "Ipse mundus quadam harmonia sonorum fertur esse compositus". Also the notion of the σύνδεσμος linking all parts of the universe into an organic whole seems to be derived from musical harmony. See W. Jaeger, *Nemesius von Emesa,* Berlin 1914, Weidemann, p. 109.

son.[127] From such remarks in Augustine, Boethius, Macrobius, there stem many passages dealing with the eminence of music.[128] One passage out of many may serve as illustration. Robert Grosseteste states that physics deals with the mobile things, mathematics with the measurement of movement. Music, therefore, has a universal significance, that is to say, it is higher and prior to the other two sciences.[129]

Imperfectly and analogically, human music reproduces that of the universe, the harmony of the spheres. In this regard too, the dividing line between symbolistic and structural microcosmism becomes blurred. William of Paris, in a passage of his *De universo,* remarks that one cannot conceive of the hymns sung by the blessed spirits, nor of the harmony of the universe as being of the same kind as the music man makes, because he often makes very bad music; terrestrial music is but a prefiguration of the celestial one. To others, Honorius of Autun for instance, the celestial and cosmic music is the *exemplar* on which human music has been fashioned.[130] In addition, the fundamental identity of these two musics makes man a microcosmus because the principle here and there is the same, namely the law of musical harmony. It should be noted, however, that *ἁρμονία* originally means the gammut and not consonance of chords of which we think mostly today. Harmony in the former sense makes the beauty of the *musica mundana* somewhat questionable. Each sphere having its proper sound, this music seems to consist of a continuous sounding of all the tones composing the gammut. There are other difficulties, too, arising from contradictions between the postulates of harmony and the theories of planetary movements (A. E. Taylor has dealt thoroughly with these questions in his Commentary on *Timaeus*).

[127] St. Augustinus, *De lib. arb.* II, n. 20; also *Confess.* X, 19. Cf. J. Hessen, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem heil. Augustinus* (Beitr. a. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1916, Vol. 19, 2), p. 21 f.

[128] Macrobius has a very high idea of music: "iure . . . musica capitur omne quod vivit, quia caelestis anima, qua animarum universitas animatur, originem sumpsit ex musica". *De somn. Scip.* II, 3, 11. The *Epinomis,* 987a, proves by reference to music that number is the basis of everything good, beautiful, divine, and of all the *τέχναι.*

[129] L. Baur, *Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1917, vol. 17, 4–6), p. 16 ff.

[130] "Hi septem orbes (sc. planetarum) cum dulcissima harmonia volvuntur . . . A terra autem usque ad firmamentum caelestis musica mensuratur ad cuius exemplum nostra invent affirmatur . . . a terra ad lunam est tonus, a luna usque ad Mercurium semitonus, etc." (Obviously, the distances of the celestial bodies stand in the same proportion as the musical intervals), Honorius Augustodunensis, *De imag. mundi,* I, 80–81, (P.L. 172, 140). The parallel goes farther, since Honorius adds (*ibid.* 82): "sicut enim hic mundus septem tonis et nostra musica septem vocibue disiungitur, sic compago nostri corporis septem mundis coniungitur, dum corpus quatuor elementis, anima tribus viribus copulatur . . . unde et homo microcosmus i.e. minor mundus dicitur cum sic consono numero caelesti musicae par cognoscitur". See also Joannes Sarisberensis, *Polycrat.* I, 6. Suchlike ideas are still active with Kepler, in his *Mysterium cosmographicum* of 1596 (*Opp.* ed. Frisch, V, 315).

Honorius is in this, as usually, in no way original. He voices only the ideas suggested by many other writers,[131] but he is a good representative of this general opinion. Thus, music and the study of music assume a particular dignity. One does not study music simply for music's sake or to get enjoyment out of it. Music is part of philosophy, it is not an "art" in the modern sense, but truly a "science".[132]

One of the reasons why the notion of music was extended far beyond the world of audible sounds is the fact of rhythm. Everything measured in time appeared as related to music. One may surmise that the regularity of stellar movements had something to do with the original idea of the harmony of the spheres. Roger Bacon says expressly that there is music in regard to audible and in regard to visible changes. But he is no longer enthusiastic enough to make music an ultimate principle; he rather thinks that it is a human product and rooted in gesture.[133]

Music supplies only one, if a powerful, motive in symbolistic microcosmism. There are other features of an even more strikingly symbolic nature. Symbolism is so common with medieval writers, even up to the times of Dante, that a complete survey is out of question, and to choose illustrative instances becomes quite difficult. Also, a further discussion of the problems needs would carry us too far into an analysis of types of symbolism, a study of the psychological factors back of this mentality, and other problems not to be approached in this context.

Symbolism is mixed up, in medieval writings, with all kinds of empirical knowledge, and is brought in to solve all kinds of practical problems. Medicine and morals, politics and science, whatever there is to know, receives deeper significance on one hand, and enlightenment on the other, by the symbolistic view. A striking example is offered by the well known writings of St. Hildegardis of Bingen. In her *Causae et curae* she exclaims: "O man, look at man! For man has in himself heavens and earth . . . and in him all things are hidden". His head corresponds to the heavens, the eyes to the stars, the

[131] For the same idea see, for instance, Alanus de Insulis, *Anticlaudianus*, III, 5 (P.L. 210, 517 B) where music is presented as the force by which hours and months and seasons are regulated and ". . . elementa ligat, cogitque planetas / Astra movet variatque vices quae musica nectit / Corporis humani partes, mundumque minorem / Ordinat et specie mundi melioris honorat".

[132] See G. Paré, A. Brunet and P. Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle: Les écoles et l'enseignement* (Publ. Inst. d'Études mediév. d'Ottawa, vol. III, Ottawa 1933), p. 174. Cf. also L. Schrade, "Die Stellung der Musik in der Philosophie des Boethius", *Arch. Gesch. d. Phil.* 41 (1932), 360. Music is called "audible mathematics" already in *Tim.* 80b, 6–7.

[133] "Musica alia vertitur circa audibile, alia circa visibile." Roger Bacon, *Op. mai.* IV (ed. Bridges, I, 237). And: "Praeter vero has partes musicae quae sunt circa sonum sunt aliae quae sunt circa visibile, quod est gestus, quo comprehendit exultationes et omnes flexiones corporis . . . Et istud dicitur in libro De ortu scientiarum [by Alfarabi], sc. quod gestus est radix musicae". *Op. tert.* ed. Brewer, p. 232.

car to the air, arms and touch to the *latera mundi,* the heart to the earth, the abdomen to the creatures. There is not only the already known parallelism of the parts of the human body and the parts of the universe, not only the idea of an animated universe, but there are everywhere the most varied and manyfold relations between all kinds of things, so that nothing is devoid of a deeper significance.[134] The parallelisms she discovers are not only those of order or shape, but also those of finality. The symbol is in the realm to which it belongs a mere fact, independently of its symbolic function; it is destined to realize the same or the corresponding end as does the symbolized on its level. Although this is, perhaps, not worked out clearly, the result of such an idea is a threefold symbolic relation. The symbol and the symbolized, the end or destination of the one and of the other, finally the relation between those two destinations, form a network of symbolic correspondences which is not easily unraveled. The crossing and recrossing of these symbolizations constitute one of the greatest difficulties in the interpretation of medieval symbolic writings.[135]

For reasons already mentioned, a further discussion of symbolistic microcosmism is omitted. But we cannot well leave the genuine forms of microcosmism without taking account of one thinker who in a way summarizes the medieval mentality and lets it once more light up with its old brilliancy.

As St. Anselm of Canterbury stands at the beginning of Scholasticism and full-grown medieval mentality and has, therefore, been hailed as *praecedentium compendium, Scholasticorum dux,*[136] so Nicolaus Cusanus stands at the end of medieval times, a *praecedentium compendium* also, but no *dux,* although not without great influence on many of his successors and, in a definite sense, much more "modern" than most of his contemporaries. Theologian, mystic, philosopher, scientist, politician, an ardent student of his predecessors, an intrepid seeker for the truth, the great Cardinal cannot be given a place within any definite pattern. If he is mentioned here, it is more by a certain embarrassment, an incapacity to subsume his ideas to one or the other of the microcosmistic types which have been distinguished. He makes use of all of them, and at the same time, is critical of all of them. Ideas which had been repeated, more or less uniformly, by innumerable writers, reappear in the Causanian texts, but some subtle modification gives them quite often a new and very different turn.[137]

[134] Hildegardis Bingenis, *Lib. divin. oper.* Vis. I, c. 4, 82 (P.L. 197, 813 D, 839 C, 862 D) *et passim*). Man especially is the image of every kind of creature: "Deus omnes creaturas secundum mensuram in ipso homine signavit".

[135] H. Liebschuetz has presented a thorough and painstaking study, *Das allegorische Weltbild der Hl. Hildegard von Bingen* (Stud. d. Bibl. Warburg, XVI, Leipzig 1930); on Microcosmism: p. 59 ff. Cf. also Ch. Singer, "The Scientific Views and Visions of St. Hildegard", *Stud. in the Hist. and Meth. of Science,* 1 (1917), 1.

[136] Saenz de Aguirre, *Theologia St. Anselmi* (Rome, 1680) I, introd.

[137] He speaks, for instance, of the harmony of the universe and refers to terrestrial harmonies as analogical to the former. But there is no longer so simplistic a belief in the all-

There is a certain mathematical symbolism in Cusanus' speculations. He loves to use arithmetical and geometrical propositions for the sake of illustrating and "symbolizing" metaphysical and theological ideas. Numbers have for Cusanus a deeper signification. But it soon becomes obvious that his manner to look at these problems differs from the speculations current during the twelfth century.[138] Microcosmism becomes with Cusanus a very general principle. Although it is man who is specifically considered as the microcosm, the fundamental microcosmistic relation is extended to any finite being whatsoever. The whole is mirrored in every part, and thus the universe and each of its parts become perfect.[139] Man is the microcosm, containing virtually the whole universe, he is *deus humanus,* placed on the horizon between time and eternity.[140] In his treatment of these questions Cusanus proves himself to be not throughout a Platonist—though he is well acquainted with all this literature and especially with the Pseudo-Dionysian texts[141]—but to be also under the influence of

covering power of music. Nor does he feel that the harmony we know reveals the truth about the one hidden beneath it. In things of this earth, he says, no such perfect harmony is found that it could not be much greater. The perfect harmony of the universe will be revealed to us only thereafter. *De docta ignorantia,* II, 1 (*Opera,* edd. R. Hoffmann and R. Klibansky, Leipzig, 1932; I, 62).

[138] One need only read the following passage to become aware of this difference: "Quia unitas absoluta est prima et unitas universi ab ista, erit unitas universi secunda unitas quae in quadam pluralitate existit. Et quoniam, ut in De coniecturis (L, 5 ff.) ostenditur, secunda unitas est denaria, decem uniens praedicamenta, erit universum explicans primam absolutam unitatem simplicem denaria contractione." *De docta ignorantia* II, c. 6 (*ed. cit.* I, 79). Here, the universe is given the number ten, not because of the properties of this number or its particular symbolic significance, but because of the logico-ontological order of being, a viewpoint far from the number symbolism of a Thierry of Chartres, a Bernardus Silvestris, or an Alanus de Insulis.

[139] *De ludo globi,* L; *De docta ignor.* II, 2; III, 1. On the exceptional position of man, *ibid.* III, 3: "Humana vero natura est illa quae est supra omnia Dei opera elevata . . . intellectualem et sensibilem naturam complicans ac universa intra se constringens, ut microcosmus . . . a veteribus rationabiliter vocitetur". Man, by perfecting the universal human nature, also perfects all other beings. The true perfection of human nature has been achieved by God becoming man. Through the Incarnation every thing attains its perfection. (Cf. *Cusanus-Texte,* edd. E. Hoffmann and R. Klibansky (Sitz. Ber. Akad. Heidelberg, 1929), p. 33.

[140] *De docta ignorantia,* III, 3; *De coniecturis,* II, 14; *De venatione sap.* 32. "Not only the whole world, but also every single creature within this universe is . . . so to speak, a created god": A. Faust, *Der Möglichkeitsgedanke* (Heidelberg, 1932) II, 287. On "creatura quasi infinitas finita aut deus creatus s. occasionatus", see *De docta ignorantia,* II, 2. Cf. also S. Lorenz, "Das Unendliche bei Nicolaus von Kues", *Phil. Jahrb.* 40 (1927), 44. The expression *deus creatus* may go back to Pseudo-Apuleius. See *Apulei Platonici de philosophia libri,* rec. P. Thomas (Leipzig, 1908), p. 45. The ultimate source is, of course, *Timaeus.*

[141] Referring to Cusanus, Conrad of Geissenfeld writes, Aug. 22. 1454, to John of Weilhaim: "quem pre ceteris in sancti Dionysii libris studiosissimum agnovimus". E. Vansteenberghe, *Autour de la docte ignorance* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1915, Vol. 14, 2–4), p. 219.

Aristotle. There are passages which read like transcriptions of Aristotelean statements, especially concerning the notions of act and potency.[142]

The idea of the microcosm is linked, in the mind of Cusanus, to the Redemption. Such associations had been established previously. They are suggested by a passage in St. Paul: *Nam expectatio creaturae revelationem filiorum Dei expectat . . . Scimus enim quod omnis creatura ingemiscit et parturit usque adhuc.* (Rom. 8, 19 and 22).[143] Since man comprises within his nature the nature of all things, his redemption and his elevation and, as it were, divinization imply also the elevation of the totality of things.[144]

The type of microcosmism advocated by Cusanus is not sharply defined. Some passages read as if he held a strictly elementaristic view, but elsewhere it seems as if he interpreted man as a microcosm mainly because of his capacity to know.[145] He comprises the universe *notionaliter*. There are also passages in which the world of ideas, created by the human mind, appears as the microcosm. The sensible is transformed and united in the spiritual. Man's thought is free; by his own indetermined activity he creates his own world.[146] Out of the messages received by the senses, man builds a realm of his own in which he rules in freedom, the microcosm.[147] One has, however, to remember that Cusanus is true to the tradition. The proposition, *intelligible in actu est intellectus in actu* has lost none of its validity. Man, thus, by "having" a microcosm also becomes one, in one sense or the other. There is no contradiction between the two statements that man is, and that he has, a microcosm.[148]

[142] E. Vansteenberghe quotes from the *Impugnatorium* which Vincent of Aggsbach directed against the admirers of Cusanus, particularly against Marquard Sprenger: "Votre Cusa ne reçoit la théologie mystique pour divine, spirituelle et sécrète que si elle s'accorde avec le troisième chapitre du *De anima* de son misérable Aristote". *Autour de la docte ignorance,* p. 66.

[143] The exact interpretation of this text is controversial. Some refer *omnis creatura* to created beings with the exclusion of man, others consider it as signifying humanity taken as a whole, See. e.g. on this matter P. Dulan, "Omnis creatura ingemiscit", *Div. Thom. (Plac.)* 37 (1934), 386, and 39 (1935), 431; F. Tucco, *ibid.* p. 320, opposes Dulan. These articles contain also several references to other writers. Older opinions are reported, for instance, by Cornelius a Lapide, *Commentarius in omnes D. Pauli epistolas* (2d ed., Venetiis, 1717)p. 86 a,b.

[144] *De docta ignorantia,* III, 2. Cf. E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance* (Stud. d. Bibl. Warburg, Vol. X, Leipzig, 1927) p. 42, where reference is made also to *De vis. Dei,* c. 20. Also Cusanus, *Excitat.* IX; *De coniect.* II, 14: "humanus Deus, microcosmus aut humanus mundus".

[145] "Mens est divinum semen sua vi complicans omnium rerum exemplaria notionaliter", *Idiota,* III (*de mente*), c. 5 (ed. J. Richter, in E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos*).

[146] *De coniecturis,* II, 14; *De ludo globi,* I.

[147] *Compendium,* VIII.

[148] P. Rotta, *Il Cardinale Niccolò Cusano* (Milan, 1928, Pubbl. Univ. Catt. del S. Cuore, Sc. Fil. XII), p. 344, writes: "Ciascuna cosa è un' infinità finita, un Dio creato, anzi un Dio occasionato, perchè Dio, volendo creare sè, ne potendo, creò sè come poteva, e diede origine a ciò *quod fieri potest Deo similius* (*De coniect.* II, 2), il che vuol dire l'universo, il quale, appunto perchè può contrarsi in un limite, fa che l'infinitudine sua

Cusanian microcosmism has little in common with the holistic view insofar as the latter rests on the theory of a World-Soul. Cusanus, indeed, criticizes Aristotle for having found fault with Plato's conception of the World-Soul, but he also holds that Plato was mistaken, as were all his followers, in considering this soul as different from, and outside of, God. They fell into this error, because they had no correct notion of the highest Absolute: *De maximo absoluto sufficienter instructi non erant. Solus enim Deus est anima mundi, eo modo quo anima (sc. humana) quasi quid absolutum . . . consideratur.*[149] Such statements made the Cardinal suspect of pantheistic inclinations. Johannes Wenck of Herrenberg, professor of theology at Heidelberg, tried, in fact, to prove in a work *De ignota litteratura* that the views of Cusanus necessarily must lead to pantheism, a reproach against which Cusanus defended himself vigorously.[150] But however far Cusanus was from any pantheism, it is true that

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diventa per esso un finito; così le cose diventano ed appaiono un finito contratto dell' infinito universo, contraibile rispetto a quello, mentre alla sua volta è già un contratto dell'unità prima assoluta. Gli individui adunque sono il contratto attuale non direttamente della possibilità di Dio, che è possibilità della contrazione dell'universo, ma solo indirettamente della possibilità dell'universo, che è appunto la possibilità della contrazione particolare.—Da tutto ciò deriva questa importantissima conseguenza: non è, deduce il Cusano, che l'infinito perda la sua infinità e diventi questo o quest' altro finito, no, l'infinito solo si contrae nei singoli reali, sicchè in questi l'infinito e sempre latente, perquanto solo in potenza, mentre in atto non c'è che una parte di quella infinità, la quale così attuata solo in parte fa che quella cosa appaia finita".—This able summary of the difficult theory of "contraction"—a pivotal point in Cusanian metaphysics—seems to suggest that man, and so any other creature, is a microcosm only *potentia.* But it is also conceivable that being a microcosm consists precisely in being a macrocosm *in potentia.*

[149] *De docta ignor.* II, 9. What some have called the *anima mundi* is in truth "ratio et idea atque absoluta rerum necessitas", the "contrahens quod per ipsum possibilitatem necessitat et constringit"; *ibid.* II, 7. Cusanus' admirer Dionysius Carthusianus (Rykkel) is very explicit in his rejection of the idea of a World-Soul and of the universe as an animated being. He speaks of these notions as "opinio insana nec rationi nec fidei consona", *De contemplatione,* I, a. 69 (*Opp. minora,* IX, Tornacis, 1902); this work is, incidentally, dedicated to Cusanus. There are many other passages in Dionysius to the same intent; e.g. *In II. Esdrae,* a. 9, on the words: "Tu vivificas omnia", (*Opp.* I, Tornacis, 1899, p. 252); *De divin. nom.* c. 2, a. 15 (*Opp.* XVI, 60).

[150] E. Vansteenberghe, *Le De ignota litteratura de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cuse* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1910, vol. 8, 6), p. 11. Cusanus, in his *Apologia,* not only justifies his own position, but also tries to defend Eriugena, condemned because of allegedly pantheistic doctrines by the Council of Vercelli in 1050; recommends Eckehardt; and even goes so far as to attempt a rehabilitation of David of Dinant. Cf. G. Théry, *Autour du décret de 1210:* I. *David de Dinant* (Bibl. Thomiste, VI, Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1925), p. 24 ff. However, Cusanus does not want these books placed into the hands of everybody. "Recte admonent omnes sancti quod illis debilibus mentis oculis lux intellectualis subtrahatur". But this *lux intellectualis* is found also, e.g., in the writings of Dionysius Areopagita, so that this warning does not refer to condemned works only. St. Albert says that David of Dinant interpreted the *anima quodammodo omnia* in a pantheistic sense. *S. Th.* I, tr. 1, q. 5, a. 8. The influence of Scottus Eriugena may be detected by comparing certain passages in his works with concepts developed by, and characteristic of, Cusanus. One is reminded, for instance, of the Cusanian *contractio*

his views could be exploited in such a sense and that they did not fail to influence later doctrines of veiled or open pantheism.[151] This danger exists, in fact, whenever in a microcosmistic conception the mirror-relation between particular parts of the universe, the whole universe, and the Creator is overemphasized.[152]

The principle, *totum in toto,* or *quodlibet in quolibet*—which latter formula is but the same idea stated from a different viewpoint—is applied in the philosophy of Cusanus to the macrocosm. But Cusamus does not, because of this, see any need to introduce the idea of a World-Soul. His conception of the κόσμος abandons the old idea that everything is arranged around a center, as it was the case with Aristotelean or medieval cosmology. In the Cusanian universe, there is neither a center nor are there any definite directions. All depends on the standpoint. Opposites which are very obvious to the human mind, like above and below, have no significance in reality. The κόσμος appears no longer as a system of spheres but as one of relations. The modern notion of physical law is adumbrated.

Cusanus is the mediator between medieval microcosmism and related ideas of later times. On one hand, he is the continuator and, accordingly, the interpreter of his successors, of the Augustinian tradition. The soul and the knowledge which man has of himself are the starting points of Cusanian speculation. Thus, he figures among the long line of ancestors of Descartes and his followers. His cosmological speculations, on the other hand, are related to views which developed into the monadology of Leibniz,[153] with whose ideas

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when reading in *De divis. nat.* (P.L. 122, 631 A): "Est . . . participatio non cuiusdam partis assumptio sed divinarum dationum . . . a summo usque ad deorsum per superiores ordines inferioribus distributio".

[151] "L'universo . . . poteva sembrare bastasse a sè stesso, in quanto in sè pareva contenesse il principio di tutta la realtà; il Dio trascendente poteva ridursi ad essere il Dio immanente senza alcuno sacrificio dell'infinità sua e della sua libertà in quanto identica alla sua necessità; in altri termini, eccoci al Bruno ed allo Spinoza". P. Rotta, *op. cit.* p. 351. To consider Cusanus' system as outright pantheism is definitely going too far, nor can Gerson or d'Ailly be made into representatives of panentheistic philosophies, as W. Dilthey does (*Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus,* Ges. Werke, vol. II, Leipzig, 1921, p. 324).

[152] This point ought to be considered in the controversies on the moot question whether or not there existed a pantheistic note or even an outspoken pantheism in the school of Chartres. The question is not yet definitely answered, notwithstanding the emphatical denials on the part of De Wulf and Gilson. Also J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Publ. de l'Inst. d'Etud. méd. d'Ottawa, VII, Ottawa-Paris, 1938) declares that there is no *panthéisme Chartrain.*

[153] The similarity between Cusanus and Leibniz has been noted, for instance, by R. Zimmermann, "Der Cardinal von Kues als Vorläufer Leibnizens", *Abh. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. Phil. Hist. Kl.* 1852, p. 321. There is also an (anonymous?) article in *Der Mainzer Katholik* of 1887, listed in the bibliography of *Philos. Jahrbuch* 1 (1888), 105. This article may refer to J. Schaeffer, *Des Nicolaus von Kues Lehre vom Kosmos* (Mainz, 1887, Inaug. Diss. Giessen). For views similar to Leibniz's Monadodogy, see e.g., *De coniect.*

there is also the further similarity that Cusanus stresses the notion of continuity, although not quite in the same sense as this notion is understood by Liebniz. By emphasizing certain aspects of Cusanus' philosophy and neglecting others, one arrives at pantheistic systems like the one of Giordano Bruno. Finally, there is the strong scientifico-mathematical trend in Cusanus' way of thinking which makes him a precursor of modern mentality—his theology, his mysticism, and his decidedly metaphysical turn of mind notwithstanding.[154]

5. *Psychological and Metaphorical Microcosmism*

These two interpretations may be opposed, as no longer genuinely microcosmistic, to those listed before in which the notion of the microcosm retains its full value and metaphysical significance. They are treated, therefore, together, the more since they merge one into the other.[155] The father of this type of microcosmism is Aristotle. Although he too speaks of man as a microcosm, as quoted above (p. 321), his use of the term is less charged with metaphysical speculation than either the systems of the Academy or any of the later philosophies. The notion of a World-Soul has not place in the conception of the Stagirite, nor has he sympathy with Pythagorean number-speculation. Man, to him, is not simply a microcosm, but he is such a one only "somehow". And the soul is not simply and strictly speaking all things, but it is all things only "somehow": πῶς ἁπάντα.[156]

II, 14: Creatures are "imagines repraesentantes varie s. differenter". Spiritual beings are "specula clariora et rectiora".

[154] On the influence of Cusanian ideas on Kepler, see E. Panofsky, *Die Perspective als symbolische Form* (Vortr. d. Bibl. Warburg, X, Leipzig, 1924/25), also D. Mahnke, *Unendliche Sphaere* (Halle a. S. 1930), p. 143.

[155] Perhaps it ought to be expressly stated that the name "psychological" is used here in its original sense, and that no reference is made to scientific or any other contemporary psychology. This name indicates simply that, if man is a microcosm, the reason for his being one has to be sought in the peculiarities of his soul and of the way it functions. These peculiarities and functions derive from the nature of the soul—as conceived by those who held this view—and from the relations it has to reality, because of its nature. Psychological microcosmism, therefore, has nothing to do with "psychologism". It is not a theory of the origin of our ideas, but starts from a definite conception of the soul. One might have considered speaking of "epistemological" microcosmism, were it not that this name immediately suggests a realistic or idealistic philosophy.

[156] Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 8 (431 b 20). Aristotle does not favor the idea that human souls are parts of a World-Soul. In *De gen. anim.* (736 b 29) he declares that the νοῦς alone is divine. However, "the soul has part in a body which is different from, and more divine than the elements", namely the so-called fire contained in the πνεῦμα, a fire which does not destroy but gives life as a ζωτικὴ ἀρχή. He had held, it seems, views more in accordance with *Timaeus* and *Laws* in *De philosophia* and *Protrepticus*. See, J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens* (Paris, 1939), p. 106 ff. Joannes Philiponus ascribes a somewhat similar view to Plato: Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα γιγνώσκει καὶ οὐ τὴν εἰκόσως ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τούτων ἔλεγεν (Πλάτων) εἶναι, ἵνα γιγνώσκει ἁπάντα. *Comm. in Arist. de anima* (ed. Hayduck, *Comm. in Arist. Greaca*, 15, Berlin, 1897, pp. 77, 20).

Medieval Aristoteleanism followed the Philosopher in this respect too, however not without retaining several of the notions, or at least terms, of its predecessors. Man, with Albert the Great, is the "center" of creation,[157] in the sense explained before. Albertus mentions several of the current ideas, e.g. that the stars be of a spiritual nature, but he does not accept them in the traditional sense. The stars are not themselves animated, but moved by *intelligentiae*.[158] Aquinas seldom omits, when speaking of the problems involved, the restricting *quasi* or *quodammodo* or *quidam*. Man has "some" similarity with the world and, therefore, is called a microcosm;[159] but he does not say that man is, strictly speaking, such a microcosm. It is rather remarkable that St. Thomas does not stress more the notion of the microcosm, because he, too, considers man as standing on the *confinium* of the sensible and the spiritual world and emphasizes that the human soul comprises also the powers of the vegetative and sensitive life.[160] He also declares that man is the end of the whole creation and, therefore, contains within his nature all the powers proper to the infrahuman beings.[161] He does not, however, admit a thorough-going likeness or parallelism between macro- and microcosm. There is *quaedam similitudo ordinis universi* in man,[162] but this likeness is only *secundum aliquid* and not in every regard.[163] St. Thomas is obviously less inclined than his master Albert

[157] Albertus Magnue, *S. Th.* II, tr. 11, q. 4, m. 2 (*Opera* ed. Borgnet, 32, 608b); td. 12, q. 74 (*ibid.* 33, 51). Man owes this position to the general plan of creation which aims at the perfection of the whole by being an image of divine perfection. Since man is specifically *ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*, he completes and crowns creation. Cf. G. v. Hertling, *Albertus Magnus* (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1914, vol. 14, 5–6), p. 173.

[158] St. Albert returns to this question often: *De causa et proc. universi,* m. I, tr. 4, c. 7; *In II. sent.* d. 14, a. 3; *S. Th.* II, tr. 11, q. 53m, m. 3; *S. de creat.* II, q. 55, a. 3. He also denies that the spheres are moved directly by God. In this, he is in accordance with Alexander Halensis, *S. Th.* II, q. 5, m. 2, a. 4, q. un.; 18, m. 4. The same opinion in Aquinas, *C. G.* II, c. 69; III, c. 23; *In II.* sent. d. 14, q. un. a. 3; *S. Th.* I, q. 70, a. 3. Also Bonaventura, *In II. (1, a. 3, q. 1;)* sent. d. 14, p. 1, a. 3, q. 1, a. 3, 2. 1.

[159] Aquinas, *In VIII. Phys.* 1.4, ad 3m.: "Habet . . . homo similitudinem quandam cum mundo: unde dicitur . . . quod homo sit parvus mundus".

[160] "Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet, quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum". *S. Th.* I, q. 77, a. 2c. On the unity of the soul: "quod eodem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva". *Ibid.* I, q. 76, a. 3c.

[161] *C. G.* II, 20: "Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta, haec vero propter viventia in quibus plantae sunt propter animalia, animalia propter hominem, homo est enim finis totius generationis".

[162] *In II. sent.* d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.: "In homine est quaedam similitudo ordinis universi, unde et minor mundus dicitur quia omnes naturae quasi in homine confluunt". The Commentary on the Sentences is an earlier work than the *Quodlibeta*. It seems that St. Thomas became even more cautious concerning the microcosmic nature of man in later times.

[163] *Quaest. quodlib.* IV, a. 3.: "quod homo assimilatur maiori mundo quantum ad aliquid . . . non tamen ad omnia assimilatur universo". Also *S. Th.* I, q. 91, a. 1c.; q. 96, a. 2c.; I-II, q. 17, a. 8c. and ad 2m.; *De pot.* q. 5, a. 10.

to expatiate on these similarities.[164] When St. Thomas repeats after Aristotle that the soul is "somehow" all things he is careful to make a distinction. The soul is actually only what it actually knows; all other things it is but potentially. The *anima quoddammodo omnia* lends itself, accordingly, to a microcosmistic interpretation only in a metaphorical sense. In fact, when St. Thomas speaks of this, he does not refer to the notion of the *mundus parvus*.[165]

Thus, the two great medieval Aristoteleans are not too much inclined to indulge in microcosmistic speculations. These are, in fact, somewhat contrary to the general spirit of the Peripatos. Not even the ideas, held by the Philosopher himself, on the animation of the spheres or heavens, on the *intelligentiae* as movers of the stars, and similar notions, could induce the strict Aristoteleans to build any system as fantastic as those evolved by certain Platonists, earlier or later. Of the later Aristoteleans, indeed, there were not a few who managed to combine peripatetic principles with ideas of quite another nature and origin. Albertus himself is not always free of such syncretistic tendencies. Platonic and Aristotelean tradition were not yet neatly separated in his philosophy. But Aquinas held himself aloof of such conceptions.

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Modern study of human nature operates much with the notion of "psychological types". It is supposed that there exist more or less stable combinations of traits, of which it suffices to determine a few for being entitled to assume with reasonable reliability the presence of certain others. The traits on which the division is based are considered as "typical"; they may be primary factors, that is, such from which others spring, with a certain necesstiy, as secondary developments or effects of the first; or the traits used for characterization of a type may be merely "symptomatic", that is encountered together with others,

[164] Albertus Magnus, *In VIII. Phys.* tr. 1, c. 9, text. 17 (*Opera*, ed. Borgnet, 3, 540): "Animal et praecipue homo dicitur mundus parvus quia in eo est motor primus, sicut intellectus, et sunt in ipso motores moti, sicut phantasia et appetitus et virtutes quae sunt in nervis motivis et musculis, et calor naturalis, et est in eo motum tantum, sicut corpus et membrum corporis aliquid, et motores inferiores habent motus proprios, sicut est in mundo magno: et ideo quod in parvo mundo fit et in magno videtur debere fieri". See also *In III. de somno et vig.* tr. 1, c. 9 (*Opera* ed. Borgnet, 9, 189).

[165] See particularly *In III. de anima*, c. 8, 1, 13 (no. 788 ed. Pirotti): "Scientia et sensus se habent ad scibilia et sensibilia quae sunt in potentia; scientia vero et sensus quae sunt in actu ordinantur in sensibilia et scibilia quae sunt in actu, sed tamen diversimode . . . Sed potentia animae sensitivae et id quod scire potest, i.e. potentia intellectiva, non est ipsum sensibile vel scibile, sed est in potentia ad ipsa". In the light of this explanation one has to read the statement (*ibid.* no. 790): "anima est homini loco omnium formarum, ut sit homo quodammodo totum ens in quantum secundum animam est quodammodo omnia prout eius anima est receptiva omnium formarum." See also *S. Th.* I, 9.84, a. 2, ad 2m: "anima quodammodo omnia, in quantum est in potentia ad omnia, per sensum quantum ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia". Later writers, however, use a similar argument to prove a kind of microcosmism: "Alles was in der grossen Welt ist, ist auch in mir geistlich, darum bin ich und sie eins", Valentin Weigel, in D. Mahnke, *Unendliche Sphaere*, p. 122.

perhaps more fundamental but less obvious. A "symptom" very often is not a primary factor in a complex phenomenon but one by which primary factors can be ascertained. Thus the rash in scarlet fever or the raise of temperature are not of a primary nature, but they indicate the presence of an infectious disease of a definite kind. Similarly, a marked degree of "perseveration", on the inability to shift attention quickly from one object to another, need not be a primary factor, and nonetheless may prove helpful in determining a psychological type, provided it occurs in regular association with several other traits fashioning the total behavior of an individual.

The same viewpoint may be used, *analogice,* in the study of general mentality and its various forms as they appear in the documents of past ages. Perhaps, a sufficiently extended study of such "cases" might enable us even to make a diagnosis of the present mentality. But the analogy must not be stressed. Rather, it must be used with the greatest caution. The notions of primary and secondary traits, applied to historical epochs, the very notion of a general mentality and other notions of a relied nature, are too vague and too questionable to be handled with security. One must beware of hasty hypostatizations lest one fall too easily in the error of inventing a quasi-substantial group-mind, *Volksgeist,* spirit of the age, or of the race, and suchlike imaginary entities more. These unwarranted hypostatizations, resting mostly on very superficial analogies, have created more confusion and harm than proved useful for our understanding of the history of civilization. Also, one ought not to claim primacy for any trait, however prominent in a definite historical period, because of the manyfold and complicated interrelations of ideas. The complexity of *geistesgeschichtliche* facts does not permit such simplification. The "symptomatic" approach alone seems legitimate.

But even this cautious and limited enterprise encounters great difficulties. Is a "symptom" we observe truly one of the "general mentality"? Or is it, perhaps, only a characteristic of a certain class of documents—literary, scientific, political, artistic—which a kind fate has preserved? That these things escaped destruction may even be the effect of the "general mentality", not of the age we study, but of the next which followed and cared to preserve only those things of which it approved. Suppose that time, means, and energy had been sufficient, at the time of Baroque, really to refashion all Gothic building according to the taste of this age, our idea of the "Gothic mentality" would be rather incomplete and in many points, probably, erroneous. Do we really know the "Greek mind" when we study Plato and Thucydides, Sophocles and Aristophanes, Strabo and Polybius? Is the medieval mind reliably mirrored in the writings of Anselm, Abaelard, Bernard, Bonaventura, and Aquinas? Or must we rather turn to the chronicles of a Robert of Torigny and Suger of St. Denis to learn about the medieval mind? What is more characteristic of this mind, the discussions on the *distinctio realis,* or the controversies concerning

the "Two Swords", or the constitution of the guilds, the freedoms of the towns, or the rules of chivalry?

But even keeping all these doubts in mind, it still seems permissible to look at the available facts as "symptoms" of a mentality which had at least some generality. Only, one must not go too far. Whichever fact we may consider, it is in some sense a symptom, although not necessarily a characteristic one, just as fever is no doubt a symptom, but one common to a large number of diseases. The "symptomatic" approach presents at least the advantage that it discards the question of primary and secondary traits. Not more is asserted than that a certain cultural phenomenon occurs, that it is particularly in the foreground, stressed, appreciated, and so on, during a definite historical epoch. Such a discovery gains in importance if one can make sure that the same phenomenon also occurs at other times which may or may not be similar in other respects to the one considered first.

Limiting our inquiry in this manner, we may ask whether microcosmism has any symptomatic significance and if so, of what it is eventually indicative. A distinction, however, seems necessary. It is not the same whether a cultural phenomenon appears for the first time at a certain period or whether it continues to be effective or, eventually, becomes so again. The conditions of origin and revival need not be the same. Romantic interest in chivalry is, for instance, very different from the interest which led Sir Thomas Mallory to preserve and rewrite the saga of the Holy Grail. The conditions of origin are, furthermore, often hardly discernible. What appears as an original growth may well be transplanted from other regions. But neither must one push back the origin of all ideas into a far-off and largely hypothetical antiquity. The inventiveness and creative power of the human mind did not cease the moment its way becomes visible in the light of history. On the other hand, it is very probable that the time when a cultural fact becomes observable is not the one at which it actually made its appearance. The very last source is, generally, unknown and will remain so. We are in a better position in regard to ages on which more information is available. When an idea which once before had enjoyed popularity—at least with the scholarly and intellectual world—is taken up anew and estimated as fitting into the framework of thought and culture, we may feel entitled to ask what other age is, or was, receptive for the same idea. A comparative study, then, may teach us what kinds of ages feel attracted by what kinds of ideas.

To be sure, no idea of old is ever revived exactly in the same shape it originally possessed. It is modified according to the needs and attitudes of the present. Sometimes this modification goes so far that nothing remains but a name. This fact may pass unnoticed, and those who use the name may believe that they still think on traditional lines. Mention has been made of the change of content of the term "cosmos" in the seventeenth, as compared with the fourteenth or even fifteenth century, not to speak of Antiquity or the Middle Ages.

Of the modern idea of the cosmos there is hardly any trace of the κόσμος-idea of Pythagoras and his successors. But as long as the notion of the microcosm was alive it functioned as an important link in the interpretation of reality and remained fundamentally unchanged. The foregoing sections tried to show that all the later varieties of this notion were contained, *in nuce,* already in the conceptions of early Greek philosophy and that the whole history of microcosmism throughout ancient and medieval times is but the gradual unfolding of ideas which existed in a rudimentary form when this notion made its first appearance as an element in a philosophical system.

There is one basic idea underlying the various interpretations. It is the conviction that all ordered wholes, which have somewhat of an existence of their own, are essentially constructed on the same pattern. There is but one principle of order which is discovered in the universe, in human nature, in society, and even in the products of the human mind exhibiting proportion, harmony, and order. The κόσμος αἰσθητός, νοητός, and πολιτικός are, qua κόσμοι, identical.

A mentality which finds microcosmism to its liking and sees in it an adequate expression of its tendencies, ought to be, it would seem, one to which the aspects of wholeness, order, proportion, and harmony appear as particularly important. This importance may be felt either because wholeness and order are conceived as the determinants of the actual situation or because they are missing and felt to be highly desirable. Thus, according to particular conditions, these ideas may be harbored, at one time, by the "conservatives" and at another, by the "progressive" parties. The fundamental notions of wholeness, order, proportion, and harmony are perhaps related to a still more fundamental view, one which emphasizes diversity in sameness more than sameness in diversity. These two attitudes can be best illustrated by a comparison of the medieval and the modern view-points. Medieval thinkers were struck by the dissimilarity of things, and their problem was therefore to safeguard the unity of the widely different and separated layers of reality. The modern mind loves to emphasize similarities between the inanimate and the living beings, between material and mental processes, between facts of nature and facts of society. To the medieval conception discontinuity is a main feature of reality. The modern mind is focused mainly on continuity. Some continuity had to be recognized, of course, also by the Schoolmen. They solved the problem by applying the principle of analogy and by the notion of an intermediary being, or rather by the idea that the highest being in one order somehow participates in the nature of the next higher level. But they maintained nevertheless that reality is divided in separate levels of existence between which no true transition can be imagined.[166] The modern conception, to the contrary, rests chiefly

[166] Even Cusanus, who in his mathematical reflections sometimes comes rather close to modern conceptions, does not think of continuity as the moderns do. "Inter genera unum universum contrahentia talis est inferioris et superioris connexio ut in medio coincidunt, ac inter species diversas talis combinationis ordo existit ut suprema species generis unius

on the fundamental idea of gradual transition and successive approach of a final stage. This view, accordingly, has no use for any kind of "link", like the συμπάθεια or the World-Soul. But a system which conceives of reality as a hierarchy of levels needs such a link.

When one conceives of the world as order in diversity, the microcosmistic view presents definite advantages. Not as if all philosophical systems stressing order, proportion, and so on, must necessarily arrive at some kind of microcosmism. Unquestionably, the system of Aquinas retains the fundamental features of the medieval world conception. But the notion of the microcosm plays in this system a very subordinate rôle. The terms *minor mundus, microcosmus,* become with Aquinas practically mere metaphors or poetical illustrations.

A problem of such extent and complication cannot be adequately discussed, not even sufficiently clarified, on a few pages. A thorough analysis of the "symptomatic significance" of microcosmism would entail, for instance, a study of the complex phenomenon called Renaissance. Of this, microcosmism is indubitably a symptom. But what actually characterizes a Renaissance is a question not easily answered. Some see the characteristic of Renaissance in Humanism, but Humanism itself is a rather ambiguous term. Others emphasize the development of science, but this feature is obviously not in the foreground in the Carolingian, nor in the twelfth-century Renaissance. Still others

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coincidat cum infima immediate superioris, ut sit unum continuum perfectum universum". *De docta ignor.* III, 1 (*Opp.* edd. E. Hoffmann and R. Klibansky, Leipzig, 1931, I, 120); also III, 3 (*ibid.* p. 126). The fundamental conception is not one of gradual transition, but of "opposites" held together by a μέσον participating both in the lower and the higher levels. This idea is, of course, very old. It is stated e.g. by Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* c. 5 (P.G. 40, 616): opposites cannot be brought together unless there be μέσόν τι δέσμον. This view prevailed throughout the Middle Ages; see e.g. Aquinas, *C.G.* II, 68.

I am afraid that I cannot agree with Professor Lovejoy who speaks in regard to medieval ideas of the "postulate that between natural things the transitions are insensible and quasi-continuous", at least if, as the author seems to imply, transition and continuity are to be understood in the modern sense (*The Great Chain of Being,* p. 61). The link is not one member in a continuous series, one which just happens to be the uppermost, but which *qua* member is in no way distinct of other members; it is rather one holding an exceptional place, standing, as it were, astride the gap between the *genera,* and thus uniting or linking the otherwise separate levels of being. Perhaps, one ought to emphasize the difference between the fundamentally quantitative view-point of modern times and the qualitative principle underlying suchlike speculations in previous ages. An illustration may be gathered from color, taking it in its phenomenal appearance and not as "explained" by physics. There is, of course, a gradual transition from red to yellow; but yellow is not a higher degree of red; it is something altogether new, something which cannot be derived from red by any kind of gradual increase. In physics such a derivation is possible because, there, color does not exist; physics deals only with wave-lengths, and these, being mere quantities, increase by imperceptible gradual steps. The *supremum infimi* is at the same time the *infimum superioris generis,* because it unites within its being two heterogeneous principles; but this union of the two does not, to the medieval mind, constitute any true transition of the type commonly considered to-day.

consider the turning from ecclesiasticism to secularism as the essential trait. And there are those who, like L. Thorndike, admit their dislike of, and unbelief in, all kinds of Renaissance.[167] Perhaps, the name of "Renaissance", however

[167] Jakob Burckhardt, in his famous work on "The Culture of the Renaissance", probably did not yet realize the full complexity of the historical phenomenon he studied. Recent historians have become very conscious of this fact. Not even a partial aspect like "Humanism" can be adequately characterized by so simple a formula like the one coined by Burckhardt. "Emergence of the individual" does not say enough, and it entails a misconception of medieval ideas. On the insufficiency of this formula, see e.g., W. Strich, "Renaissance und Reformation", *Deutsche Vierteljschr. f. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch.* 1 (1923) 591; A. v. Martin, "Zur kultur-sozialischen Problematik der Geistesgeschichte", *Histor. Zeitschr.* 142 (1930), 242; G. F. Jacob, "Changing Views of the Renaissance", *History,* 16 (1931), 214; N. Nelson, "Individualism as a Criterion of the Renaissance", *Journ. Engl. German. Philol.* 32 (1933), 316. Many years before, E. Troeltsch had pointed out in an article ("Renaissance unde Reformation", *Histor. Zeitschr,* 110 [1913], 528), that "der Geist der Renaissance ist nicht allzu einheitlich zu formulieren und vor allem nicht mit den modernen Gedanken zu vereinheitlichen". The eminent scholar, however, if avoiding on one hand the over-simplifications against which he warns, falls, on the other, prey to certain prejudices concerning the world of ideas characteristic of the centuries preceding the Renaissance. Much of what he believes to be new and specific of the Italian Renaissance is in fact much older and only restated, although indubitably in a different manner, by the writers of the Renaissance (see particularly Troeltsch's remarks, p. 531). In spite of the warning sounded by Troeltsch, and heeded by many, there are still many works which present the Renaissance as a thoroughly homogeneous epoch. The enormous variety of individuals and ideas is often overlooked. The image of an age of undisturbed sense of beauty, "progress"—an idea alien to these times—, enjoyment of life and reality, prevails in many studies. But in the Italian Renaissance, there met an age which was slow to die and still powerful enough to create disturbance, and an age which was not yet—if such an expression is permissible—conscious of itself. This time is not only one of a new form of life emerging; it is this too, but it is also an age of crisis, with all the disequilibration which accompanies cultural periods of this kind.

If it is correct to label as "Renaissances" other epochs, besides the Italian Renaissance and the cultural changes resulting from it in other countries, it would appear as a methodological fault to limit, as is usually done, the studies on Renaissance exclusively to the cultural events in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It then becomes necessary to make a comparative analysis of the various Renaissances as they allegedly existed in Western Europe in the ninth and the twelfth centuries, eventually also of the so-called Ottonian Renaissance, and to combine these studies with others dealing with similar developments in Byzantium, perhaps even in Old Rome—the age of Plotinus—, maybe also within the Islamic world.

I have remarked above, p. 334, that the Revival of Aristotelianism "die Aristoteles-Reception", to use Grabmann's expression, of the thirteenth century is not considered a Renaissance. In this regard, one author makes an exception. A. Demph writes: "Wenn man nicht die den gesamten Universitätsbetrieb schon von 1260 an bestimmende Aristoteles-Renaissance als die eigentliche Philosophische Renaissance anerkennt . . . so gibt es keine kontinuierliche Geistesentwicklung vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit" ("Geisteswissenschaftliche Aufgaben der Erforschung der Renaissance-philosophie", *Deutsche Vierteljschr. f. Literaturwiss. u. Geistesgesch.* 7 [1929], 636).

I am quite aware of the incompleteness of these and other remarks in this article, pertaining to the topic of Renaissance. They are not offered in any sense as solutions. Also, the problem is envisioned here only incidentally, insofar as it arises inevitably when micro-

much used, is not so fortunate after all. It is too suggestive. It implies a definite interpretation which, maybe, is not equally suitable to all periods of so-called Renaissance. The similarities between such periods may become more visible, if "rebirth" is not made, from the very outset, the diacritical feature.

Symptomatic analysis is unprejudiced. It starts with assembling the most complete list of "symptoms" to be attained. To be sure, one or the other outstanding symptom may serve, and even must serve, as a directive of research. But for all this importance, it need not be fundamental. It is possible—although to assert this positively would amount to temerity—that the "symptomatic approach" and, particularly, an extended and deepened analysis of microcosmism will be able to throw some light on those ages which felt this idea to be congenial to their general spirit.

It should be noted, even though this line of thought cannot be followed further, that microcosmism may appear also in ages which, at first sight have little in common with those termed Renaissance. This fact is, so to speak, the counterpart of the other, referred to before, that the conception of a well-ordered universe is not necessarily conductive to microcosmism. This idea has been particularly attractive for the Romantic school, at least in Germany.[168] The question why this was the case deserves a special investigation. It is closely related to the further question of the reasons for the preference shown by these writers—poets as well as philosophers—for a certain type of mysticism, like the one of Jacob Boehme.

Microcosmism is one of the great ideas by which man attempts to understand himself and his relation to the totality of being. Insofar one may speak of a relation between microcosmism and "Humanism", if the latter term is taken in its widest sense.[169] Whenever and wherever these two lines of human endeavor for understanding reality meet, man tries to unite under one aspect both his view of himself as set over against the universe, and his view of himself as part of the universe. Whenever this happens, microcosmism in one or the other form is apt to reappear. The most intense interest in the question, *quid est homo?* is unable to provide an answer as long as human nature is considered in isolation. The answer can be found, on the level of philosophical inquiry, only by integrating "Humanism" with "Cosmism". The most stupendous advances in the knowledge of the physical universe cannot satisfy the

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cosmism is under discussion. These remarks are mere suggestions, of an obviously hypothetical nature.

[168] Novalis, in a letter to his betrothed, writes: "Du bist eine Elongatur des Universums, das Universum ist eine Abbreviatur von Dir."

[169] The Humanism of the Italian Renaissance, as it is usually described, is in fact a late form of the attitude characteristic of the earlier years of this movement. It results partly from a curious transformation of the latter. The emergence, out of the notion of the microcosm, of the idea of "superman", of the "great" individual, who by his greatness is absolved from the laws binding the average person, has been briefly described by H. Leube, *Reformation und Humanismus in England* (Leipzig, 1930).

longings of the human mind because man is part of the universe. If the "position of man in the cosmos" is to be determined, both terms must be considered in their interrelation.[170] To have achieved this synthesis; to have envisioned the problem in its widest extent and in the fulness of its content; to have attempted an answer to these questions, however inacceptable this answer may appear to the modern mind, is the everlasting merit of those thinkers who, from Anaximandros to Paracelsus, meditated on the microcosmus.

[170] Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (Darmstadt, 1928).

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